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This thesis re-examines the territorial dispute between Japan and Russia, the so-called 
“Northern Territories” issue, through a reinterpretation of the role of the indigenous Ainu 
of Japan. An exploration of Ainu history and historiography reveals that the long-
standing emphasis on Wajin-based legitimacy of rule and annexation of northern areas 
was replaced by historical amnesia concerning the role and status of the Ainu. 
 Discussion focuses on an interpretation of Ainu understandings of local, 
regional/national and international historical events. This approach underscores the 
importance of de-nationalising History by integrating the important perspectives of 
Indigeneity. It asserts, further, that the understanding of these events and processes 
require a broader disciplinary prism than that provided by the study of history. The 
preponderance of nation-based studies, and not only in the field of History, has seriously 
inhibited the analysis of historical phenomena involving Indigenous peoples, in this case 
the Ainu. The study of the Northern Territories issue offers, then, both a new perspective 
on the history of this important dispute and an illustration of the importance of 
broadening traditional academic studies in disciplines such as History, Anthropology, 
Ecology, Political Science, International Relations and Law to incorporate Indigenous 
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detailed information on their contemporary issues. For this project, I am deeply indebted 
to the Kawamura Kaneto Ainu Memorial and the Hokkaido Utari Association for 
providing support and resources concerning Ainu perspectives. My Canadian citizenship, 
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for their underlying support. 
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1 E.P. Thompson, “The politics of Theory,” in People’s History and Socialist Theory, ed. Raphael 
Samuel (London, 1981), 407; quoted in Bain Attwood, The Making of the Aborigines (Sydney: Allen 
& Unwin, 1989), 143. 
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I have capitalised the word “Indigenous” to conform to growing trends in publications on 
the topic. 
Japanese names are written family name first. 
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Figure 1: Ainu Territories2
2 William Fitzhugh and Chisato Dubreuil, eds., Ainu: Spirit of a Northern People (Washington, DC: 
Arctic Studies Centre National Museum of Natural History Smithsonian Institute, in association with 




…as long as someone else 
controls your history 
the truth shall remain just a mystery… 
Ben Harper, 1995 
 
Rational and Significance of This Study 
This thesis simultaneously addresses two politically sensitive issues: the so-called 
“Northern Territories” dispute and the Indigenous Ainu of Japan. There has yet to be a 
comprehensive historical interpretation of the Northern Territories dispute that focuses on 
the Ainu which incorporates other international examples, such as the Åland Islands 
settlement in northern Europe. The majority of studies on the Russo-Japanese Northern 
Territories/Southern Kurils problem ignore the historical, present and future connection 
of the Indigenous Ainu. For a group of people that has been literally written out of the 
history of this dispute, many politically sensitive issues will continue to rise to the surface 
unless we seriously and critically question the status quo. It follows that any 
incorporation of multilateral frameworks or international examples related to this dispute 
will continue to avoid the Ainu, unless they are first addressed in domestic and regional 
arenas in relation to this dispute.  
This thesis highlights some historical blind spots of Northeast Asian history, 
challenges the foundation on which past and present research is based, and moves 
towards explaining why scholars have avoided the topic of the Ainu in relation to this 
Russo-Japanese dispute. Investigating and examining the Ainu in relation to this issue is 
an important means to expand the current research framework and place a larger portion 
of relevant material on the discussion table. Looking into this particular group of 
Indigenous peoples further complicates the issue at hand, but also challenges past and 
present ways of thinking and viewing this issue. 
 This project deals mainly with the Ainu from a historical standpoint, but has 
general and broad connections to areas of study involving Indigenous peoples, and is by 
its nature intertwined with a wide variety of academic disciplines at local, regional and 
international levels. Studying Indigenous peoples inevitably leads to topics that are 
connected and associated with Anthropology, Geology, History, International Relations, 
Law, and Political Science.1 Examination of the non-inclusion of the Ainu in relation to 
the Northern Territories dispute encourages an interdisciplinary approach. This research 
area offers a unique and original addition to studies related to the Ainu and this dispute, 
which have all but ignored the Ainu in what they have coined as a “dispute between two 
thieves.”  
 
1 The capitalised History is used in reference to the discipline, while history denotes its study. 
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Theoretical Framework and Statement of Problem Investigated for This 
Study 
It is sometimes said that the aim of the historian is to explain the past by 
“finding,” “identifying,” or “uncovering” the “stories” that lie buried in 
chronicles; and that the difference between “history” and “fiction” resides 
in the fact that the historian “finds” his stories, whereas the fiction writer 
“invents” his. This conception of the historian’s task, however, obscures 
the extent to which “invention” also plays a part in the historian’s 
operations… The historian arranges the events in the chronicle into a 
hierarchy of significance by assigning events different functions as story 
elements in such a way as to disclose the formal coherence of a whole set 
of events considered as a comprehensible process with a discernible 
beginning, middle and end.2
The objective of this thesis is not only to work towards inclusion of the Ainu in the 
Northern Territories problem, but also to address and explain why scholars have not 
seriously included the Ainu in past and present research on this issue. This is done 
through a historical examination of the Ainu at three levels: the local, regional and 
international. Centering on the Okhotsk region, rather than the traditional view of 
centering Japan on the Kansai or Kanto regions moves the focus away from a centrifugal 
and largely unilateral historical dialogue of the Ainu at a local level. De-centering (or re-
centering) the area of focus also helps to open arenas for a coherent, important and living 
voice that is both worthy to be heard and responded to. The regional level works to 
include other Indigenous peoples of the area, as well as Russian and Japanese interaction 
within East Asia during their pursuit of nation-building and colonialism. The third level 
of interaction, the international, moves research away from the potential of falling into 
the trap of creating a nationalistic historical interpretation that is easier to become a part 
of, if the sole focus is more local in nature. These three historical levels do not operate in 
an isolated vacuum, but are mutually and simultaneously interactive, and encourage 
movement away from nationalistic and state-centered histories that plague many 
historical accounts, and in the case of Hokkaido have often resulted in histories or 
interpretations that focus on development and “progress” in terms of the modernisation of 
Japan. Examining the Ainu and the Northern Territories issue from these three 
perspectives enables the inclusion of the Ainu in this issue and works towards answering 
why the Ainu are not included in this issue. 
 This thesis analyses history that, according to the current official Japanese 
government view, does not exist or is at minimum not fully recognised. In turn, it 
challenges this state-sponsored view, which much of the local and international academic 
community appears to support. The issue of the Ainu and Northern Territories shows that 
there are numerous ways to interpret history and that it does not operate in a vacuum, or 
in isolation from other fields of academia, and that the political world, which very much 
influences academia and vice-versa, utilises History to its advantage. History of this 
 
2 Hayden White, Metahistory: the Historical Imagination in the 19th Century Europe (Baltimore: John 
Hopkins University Press, 1973), 6-7. 
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northern region cannot be properly understood unless we include the Ainu and their 
relationship to both the lands and the varying peoples with whom they were and are in 
contact. 
Similar to Marshall Beier’s thinking in regards to International Relations and 
Indigenous peoples, this work has “three conflicting propositions: that it possibly cannot, 
perhaps should not, and yet must be written.”3 It should not be written because it is a 
topic that has potential to negatively affect future employment and research in Japan 
since it challenges views that tend to fluctuate between the far left and the far right. Some 
academics in Japan refused to study about the Ainu and their relation to the Northern 
Territories because they felt that it could affect their employment.4 However, it must be 
written because, if it is not, then it would imply agreement with the current arguments by 
both the majority of Russian/Soviet, Japanese and third party scholars that have ignored 
the Ainu issue in the past and present.  
Since the Northern Territories issue is one of border demarcation, bringing the 
Ainu into discussion is difficult because they are a people included in the Japanese state 
and did not have a state of their own. Scholars should openly include the Ainu in their 
research, as well as negotiations on the Northern Territories, as a means to move away 
from past and present hegemonic ways of thinking on this issue. Since this issue is 
extremely political, it is unlikely that the status quo will change in the near future, but 
challenging deeply entrenched ways of thinking needs to start somewhere.  
Definitions of Terms 
The term “Indigenous peoples” needs clarification as it describes one such group of 
people that are the focus of this thesis.5 The post World War II trend of decolonisation 
was accompanied with the creation of international organisations such as the United 
Nations Working Group on Indigenous Populations (WGIP). This body has acted as a 
forum enabling Indigenous people worldwide to assert themselves as Indigenous. In 
effect, this is giving them the legitimate political voice which allows them to participate 
as full or complete actors. In 1984, Jose Martinez Cobo finished a study for the United 
Nations on discrimination of such peoples, which led to the now widely accepted 
definition of “Indigenous peoples.” Similarly to the global community not supporting a 
definition for the term “peoples” as used by the United Nations Charter, I do not propose 
or support a universal definition of “Indigenous peoples.” To do so would work against 
the spirit of inclusion and deny many peoples which I do not feel I have the qualifications, 
authority, or knowledge to judge. However, for the sake of some clarity on the matter 
Cobo’s rather loose definition proves useful. According to his definition the four main 
characteristics of “Indigenous peoples” are their: 
 
3 Marshall Beier, International Relations in Uncommon Places (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2005), 53-54. 
4 Some academics in Japan refused to study about the Ainu and their relation to the Northern 
Territories because they felt that it could affect their future employment (Mr. A. et al., personal 
communication with author, August 2006 [Japan]). 
5 For a more in-depth discussion on defining this term see, Ken Coates, A Global History of 
Indigenous Peoples: Struggle and Survival (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), 1-15. 
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(1) having historical continuity with pre-invasion and pre-colonial society; 
(2) considering themselves distinct from other sectors of the societies; (3) 
forming at present non-dominant sectors of the society; and (4) being 
determined to  preserve, develop and transmit to future generations their 
ancestral territories and their ethnic identities.6
Forums like the WGIP and inclusive definition have allowed many of the world’s three-
hundred seventy million Indigenous peoples to reclaim or create their identity and 
announce it to the world. In 2000, the UN took an unprecedented step when it established 
the Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues which, unlike the WGIP, is a direct branch of 
the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC).7 In a global system which respects and 
pays particular attention to the “state,” this is a formidable movement. This thesis follows 
the definition as stated by the Cobo report, but since the focus of this thesis is not on 
defining who is, and who is not belonging to “Indigenous peoples,” I will also make use 
of the terms Indian, Aborigine and Native interchangeably as to best fit the literature and 
time periods in question.  
 The word Ainu, similar to many other self-recognising terms of Indigenous 
peoples throughout the world, means “human being” in the Ainu language. Another word 
that the Ainu have used to call themselves is Utari or comrade. This term began to 
replace the word Ainu in some situations where many had felt “Ainu” had too many 
negative connotations connected to it. One of the best examples of this transformation 
was the change in name of the Hokkaido Ainu Association to the Hokkaido Utari 
Association in 1960. According to the Association’s own writings, this was a positive to 
lessen discrimination. However, the Ainu were not a homogeneous group in earlier times. 
There existed both linguistic and cultural differences among the Ainu in Sakhalin the 
Kuril Islands and even those within Hokkaido. Only after the Japanese government 
amalgamated the Ainu into their Imperial subject system were they seen as a single entity, 
as authorities ignored their language and cultural distinctions, entering the Ainu into 
registries under the heading of “former native.”8
Determining who is Ainu, and how many Ainu there are today, depends largely 
on the method one adopts. According to the Japanese government, the only modern Ainu 
homeland is Hokkaido. This conveniently deflects attention away from the numerous 
historical contacts with Ainu in the north and mainland Japan, Okinawa and abroad. As 
well, it works towards non-recognition of the some 2,700 to 5,000 Ainu who live in the 
 
6 Uemura Hideaki, “The Colonial Annexation of Okinawa and the Logic of International Law: The 
Formations of an ‘Indigenous People’ in East Asia,” Japanese Studies 23.2 (2003): 107. Also see, 
International Labour Organization, Convention 169 (1989) 
<http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/english/subjlst.htm> (1 April 2006). 
7 See, UN Working Group on Indigenous Populations, 
<http://www.ohchr.org/english/issues/indigenous/groups/groups-01.htm> (10 April 2006) and UN 
Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues, <http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/unpfii/index.html> (10 April 
2006). 
8 See, Emiko Ohnuki-Tierney, “Regional Variations in Ainu Culture,” American Ethnologist 3.2
(1976): 297-330. “Besides the Ainu, other minorities [Indigenous peoples] such as Giryaku and the 
Orokko live in Japan, calling themselves Nibufu and Uiruta” (Narita, “Discrimination,” 137). 
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Kanto region, other areas of Japan, Sakhalin and those Ainu who live abroad. In official 
surveys carried out by the Hokkaido Utari Association every seven years since 1972, only 
those who openly admit that they are Ainu, in areas that are recognised to be home of 
Ainu people, are counted. For various reasons, some Ainu chose not to participate in the 
Utari Association’s survey, or live outside of recognised areas of residence, and thus the 
official number is lower than it probably is. According to a 1999 survey the Ainu 
population was 23,767 in seventy-three areas of Hokkaido, but estimates go as high as 
300,000 for the whole country.9
The “Northern Territories” issue is the Japanese title given to the border dispute 
between Japan and Russia over four islands to the northeast of Hokkaido. This specific 
title is a Japanese government-fabricated term that gained significant use and attention 
during the 1960s, after a Diet resolution first adopted it in 1962, and then in 1964 when 
the use of “Southern Kurils” was practically, although not entirely, forbidden to refer to 
the islands of Kunashiri and Etorofu.10 Before the widespread use of this term, the islands 
of dispute were called either by name, or addressed as the southern Kuril Islands. For a 
period in the late 1940s and into the 1950s, the Japanese government recognised the two 
islands of Kunashiri and Etorofu as being part of the Kurils while those of Shikotan and 
the Habomai islets (often addressed as a single island) were not. With the spread of the 
term “Northern Territories,” all four islands became part of the same group, and 
ideologically and politically separate from the remaining Kuril Islands. This term is 
rather new, and has not been imagined and supported enough either domestically or 
internationally to the point of recognising it as a coherent region or property, or territory, 
hence the use of quotation marks around the term. However, as Howell noted, adding 
quotation marks around words used under duress does little more than evade the 
recognition of the force of politics in constituting identity as social reality. Although 
Howell wrote this in relation to the changing and fluid constructs of Japan and Japanese, 
this same idea is applicable to the term Northern Territories because, to apply Howell’s 
argument, no matter how new or fluid this political geographical identity is, it is real in 
the minds of many people and the Japanese state. Even though the state and institutions 
are constructs, they exercise real power. “Real power over life, property and livelihood is 
reality enough.”11 When I use the term in this thesis, I refer to a real, new, largely 
unaccepted (especially in Russia), unfounded, and dynamically created and imagined 
conception of a territory that nonetheless has power of mobilisation. 
Wajin refers to the people that make up the dominant group of Japanese people, 
the so-called descendents of the Yayoi culture. To be Wajin is to be Japanese and to be 
 
9 Hokkaido Utari Kyokai, <http://www.ainu-assn.or.jp/about03.html> (7 December 2006); Katrina 
Sjoberg, The Return of the Ainu: Cultural Mobilization and the Practice of Ethnicity in Japan (Chur, 
Switzerland: Harwood Academic Publishers, 1993), 152.  
10 Koroishi Sachiko, “Chishima retto ni okeru daiichi no toposu no seitei ni tsuite: ‘hoppo ryodo’ to 
chishima,” Sogoseisaku 6.1 (2004), 27; taken from Higashimura Takeshi, Senkoki Ainu minzoku-
Wajin kankei shi josetsu (Tokyo: Sangensha, 2006), 205. According to international law scholar 
Takano Yuichi the term “Northern Territories” first started to appear approaching the Tokyo Olympics 
in a Foreign Ministry Supporting Officer Notice on 17 June 1946 (Ainu Moshiri no jijiku o 
torimodosu kai, Ainu Moshiri: Ainu minzoku ga mita “hoppo ryodo henkan” kosho [Tokyo: Ocha no 
mizu shobo, 1992], 95. Hereafter noted as AM, Ainu Moshiri).  
11 Howell, Geographies, 18-19. 
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Japanese is to be Wajin. However, today being Ainu means being Japanese according to 
citizenship but does not imply that they are Wajin, and being Japanese certainly does not 
imply one is Ainu.12 The same holds true for those of naturalised Korean or Chinese, and 
Okinawan decent. The Ainu often refer to the Wajin as Shisam or Shamo: the first 
meaning “neighbour,” and the second “coloniser” with somewhat negative connotations. 
I use the well accepted term of Wajin to distinguish between Ainu and non-Ainu 
Japanese of the dominant group. 
Concepts of colonialism are important as they are deeply rooted in, and 
connected to, nation-building and modernity, which are themselves connected to 
indigeneity and thus to the Ainu.13 The time frame of Japanese colonialism could vary 
greatly depending on perspective and what we consider as a Japanese colony. We could 
start in Tokugawa times with expansion into Ezo (Hokkaido) in the north, and the 
Ryukyu Kingdom (Okinawa) to the south, with the acquisition of Taiwan in 1895, or 
even with the annexation of Korea in 1910. A large amount of literature has taken 1895 
and the attainment of Taiwan as the start date for Japanese imperialist activity.14 However, 
as a means to further include Indigenous peoples in discussion, this thesis follows a more 
fluid and less binary definition of colonialism by avoiding a specific start date and states 
broadly that colonial activity was present with expansion into Ezochi (Hokkaido) in the 
north, and the Ryukyu Kingdom (Okinawa) to the south, even though neither are 
officially recognised as a colony.15 One such definition that is fitting was put forward by 
Beckett in 1989: 
 
A colonial order arises when the state that has annexed a territory formally 
and systematically discriminates between the conquering invaders and the 
subject indigenes in such a way as to entrench the differences between 
them and to foster their economic, political, and cultural inequality. This 
discrimination is sustained by some form of ideology that justifies the 
domination of the indigenous population in terms of differences of race, 
mentality, moral qualities, cultural advancement, religion or historic 
destiny.16 
12 Howell argues that the Ainu were very much included within the term “Japanese” in the Tokugawa 
era, but in Meiji they “had to contend with the reality that being Japanese in the eyes of the state was 
not the same as being Japanese in the eyes of society” (Howell, Geographies of Identity [Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 2005], 151,171, 193). 
13 For nation-building and indigeneity see Bain Attwood, Making of the Aborigines (Sydney: Allen & 
Unwin, 1989). 
14 For example see, W. G. Beasley, Japanese Imperialism, 1894-1945 (Oxford: Clarendon 
Paperbacks,1991), 6; Mark Peattie, “Introduction,” in The Japanese Colonial Empire, 1895-1945, ed. 
Ramon Meyers and Mark Peattie (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1984), 15-16; Takakura 
Shinichiro, (trans. John Harrison) “The Ainu of Northern Japan: A Study of Conquest and 
Acculturation,” Transactions of the American Philosophical Society 50.4 (1960): 7. 
15 This inclusion is important even in the case of Taiwan, because Wajin used an incident where 
Taiwan aborigines killed shipwrecked Okinawans to further their claim to the Ryukyu kingdom. 
16 J. Beckett, “Aboriginality in a Nation-State: The Australian Case,” in Ethnicity and Nation-building 
in the Pacific, ed. M.C. Howard (Tokyo: United Nations University, 1989), 120; quoted in Richard 
Siddle, Race, Resistance and the Ainu of Japan (London: Routledge, 1996), 8. 
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Within this colonial order, as well, lie inherent contradictions that make the concept of 
colonialism much more dynamic and expansive, allowing it to continue in various forms 
to the present day.  
Methodology and Scope of This Study 
While performing research in this area it is important to pay attention to a few Ainu 
preconceptions of scholars that are noticeable in the literature. Some examples of these 
include that scholars: only study about the Ainu for personal gain; treat the Ainu as 
research specimens that have long since passed away; create nothing but problems for the 
Ainu people and that in general they do not respect the Ainu. The perception that non-
academics are not interested in the Ainu appears to be another fixed idea. Not falling into 
the trap of objectifying or romanticising them, where objectifying them would deny their 
own subjectivity and thus their voice(s), is also important. Romanticising the Ainu would 
do little more than praise a past Eden-like utopian period that historically would be 
difficult to accept, or would support the Ainu as being a curious Other yet to become a 
part of the present. These views were kept in mind while performing research to 
encourage both critical analysis of the material and original research. In this pursuit the 
concept of academic responsibility is directly related to both research and analysis, 
especially while dealing with Indigenous peoples. In other words, academic freedom (as 
guaranteed in Article 23 of the Japanese Constitution that reads “Academic freedom is 
guaranteed”) and academic responsibility are not mutually exclusive as some traditional 
Wajin Ainu scholars tend to think.17 Every right is in conflict with another, and in this 
case choosing responsibility to the group over a potentially discriminating and harmful 
form of “freedom” is appropriate. 
 Research for this project was highly qualitative in nature through concentration on 
the use of primary and secondary sources written in English and Japanese. Authors of 
such work include Ainu, Wajin, westerners, institutions and governmental bodies. While 
performing and critiquing these sources it was critical to consider who has studied and 
written about the Ainu, and for what purpose(s). Research for this project relied to some 
extent on resources acquired in Hokkaido, Japan during three separate trips in the winter 
 
17 For issues on Academic responsibility and the Ainu see, Tomek Bogdanowicz, “Accepting the 
‘Real’ Past: An Investigation into Missing Ainu ‘Grave Goods,’” Kantaiheiyo Ainu bunka kenkyu 3
(February 2003): 47-66; Richard Siddle, “Academic Exploitation and Indigenous Resistance: The 
Case of the Ainu,” in Indigenous Minorities and Education, ed. Noel Loos and Osanai Takeshi 
(Tokyo: Sanyusha Publishing, 1993), 41-51; and Fujino Yutaka, “Ainu minzoku e no iryo eisei chosa 
no sabetsusei,” Tsubute 35 (Summer 2002): 21-32. In 1989 the Japanese Society of Ethnology formed 
an ethics committee and they published a “Statement with Respect to Ainu Research.” Since then 
publications on the Ainu in the journal Minken declined (S.C.H. Cheung, “Japanese Anthropology and 
Depictions of the Ainu,” in The Making of Anthropology in East and Southeast Asia, ed. Yamashita 
Shinji et al. [NY: Berghan Books, 2004], 142). For further information regarding Canadian academic 
standards regarding research involving Indigenous peoples see, Canadian Institutes of Health 
Research, Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council of Canada, Social Sciences and 
Humanities Research Council of Canada, Tri-Council Policy Statement: Ethical Conduct for Research 
Involving Humans. 1998 (with 2000, 2002 and 2005 amendments), “Section 6: Research Involving 
Aboriginal Peoples” <http://www.pre.ethics.gc.ca/english/pdf/TCPS06e.pdf> (28 October 2006). 
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of 2004, spring of 2005 and summer of 2006, from (in no particular order) the  
Kawamura Kaneto Ainu Memorial, Hokkaido University Library and the Resource 
Collection for Northern Studies at Hokkaido University, Hokkaido University of 
Education (Sapporo [HUES] and Asahikawa campus libraries) and Asahikawa Public 
Library’s Recourse Centre, the Foundation for Research and Promotion of Ainu Culture 
(FRPAC), the Hokkaido Utari Association and the Shiraoi Ainu Museum. I have also 
made use of some resources obtained at HUES while studying there from 2000-2002. 
Although Russian views are not a focus of this thesis, where possible I relied on English 
and Japanese resources for Russian perspectives, and this reveals some biases in my 
approach and focus. I included some historical comparisons while understanding that 
theoretically historical occurrences are too complex and unique in themselves to make 
any direct comparison meaningful, so I have opted for integrating historical events rather 
than necessarily comparing them. I hope that this study will contribute, albeit modestly, 
to rethinking subjects related to the Ainu, the Northern Territories, Japan, and Indigenous 
peoples in general.  
 I have relied heavily on Aboriginal perspectives in this thesis. Writing from this 
angle does not presuppose it is the Aboriginal perspective, nor does it intend to give the 
impression of speaking as an Indigenous person (of which I am not) as there are 
numerous views and opinions within each community. Furthermore, by utilising these 
voices my intention is neither to appropriate them as my own, nor to represent or speak 
on behalf of the Ainu or any other Aboriginal group. Rather, I hope this approach allows 
for a different outlook to both western and Wajin points of view on the topic.  
Focusing on local Ainu perspectives, however, does have potential to take on 
“nationalistic” nuances, but by sacrificing governmental or state-centered positions it 
allows largely silenced or downplayed voices to be heard and told, which should be given 
authority to speak in their own right, with the expectation that they deserve some sort of 
serious response. However, not including government positions would eliminate the 
relational aspect of history that has been important in shaping Native and non-Native 
views and actions. Bain Attwood has also recognised the need to include the narrative of 
the Europeans while studying the Aborigines of Australia. He wrote that a lot of work 
starts from the assumption that we “already know about whites,” and that they were 
homogeneous or that it is unnecessary to learn who they were; for the study of Aboriginal 
people we need to know who they were.18 In the case of the Ainu, we need to know who 
the Wajin were, and how they both fit into global perspectives throughout history, which 
is not a static but elastic and changing set(s) of actions in a matrix of relational constructs. 
It follows that without governmental or state positions being told, the modern/recent 
Native position would not be entirely comprehendible, as well as vice versa. In other 
words, these two groups of people, the Native and newcomer, have been and are mutually 
influencing. Attwood suggests, just as one should view the history of Aboriginals as in 
the “becoming” instead of in a state of “being,”19 so too should we view the history of the 
nation-state. The history of a state was of the becoming and not of the being, despite the 
tendency of the nation-state to create its own antiquity and timeless origins.20 In the 
 
18 Attwood, Making of the Aborigines, 147.
19 Attwood, Making of the Aborigines, 149.
20 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities (New York: Verso, 1991).  
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context of Indigenous peoples’ history it is also important to keep in mind that the act of 
“nation-building…is an act of colonization.”21 
Historical analyses have been, and are, important components in the development 
of social policy, land rights claims and laws regarding Indigenous peoples throughout the 
world. For better or worse, the Ainu are no exception, as many laws and policies, 
including the Hokkaido Former Aborigines Protection Act of 1899, and the 1997 Cultural 
Promotion Act, were largely the outcomes attributed to state-sponsored scholastic 
research. Beyond the scope of policy making, research on Ainu history and the Northern 
Territories also benefits academic and non-academic audiences wishing to learn more 
about Japan, its minorities, and how human rights issues and Indigenous land rights have 
been developing in Japan. For the purpose of broadening the framework of this project, 
investigating international examples in Canada and Åland (Finland) through international 
organisations, such as the League of Nations and the United Nations, alongside Ainu 
issues in Japan, contributes to a better understanding of past endeavors and future 
solutions dealing with Indigenous peoples.  
 
Chapters One and Two assess the historiography, first that of the Northern Territories 
issue in relation to the Ainu, and second of Indigenous peoples and Japanese colonialism. 
These chapters establish where my research fits, or does not fit, in relation to previously 
written material, and works towards showing some of the consequences of non-inclusion 
of the Ainu in discussion on the Northern Territories and Japanese colonialism, of which 
these northern islands were a part. Chapters Three through Six include the Ainu in 
historical issues that concern the Northern Territories. Chapter Three provides a brief 
historical overview of Ainu-Wajin relations to set the stage for further discussion. A view 
of the Ainu in relation to the Åland Island settlement in northern Europe is the focus of 
the Chapter Four, which addresses the Ainu, Japan and the League of Nations. The 
remaining chapters focus on post-World War II events: connecting the Ainu and early 
Return Movement discourse through Japanese government initiatives in Chapter Five, 
then through Ainu internationalisation in Chapter Six. 
 
21 Mark Caprio, “Koreans into Japanese: Japan’s Assimilation Policy” (PhD thesis, University of 
Washington, 2001), 8. 
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CHAPTER 1  
The Northern Territories/Southern Kurils/Ainu Moshir 
Problem 
 
The historiography of the Northern Territories problem in Japanese and English has for 
the most part focused on events in the geopolitical realm between Japan, the Soviet 
Union/Russian and the United States in predominantly bilateral or trilateral state relations. 
Within this framework scholars have addressed various aspects of state diplomacy, 
treaties and the Cold War in East Asia. Taking the state to be the centre of study, and 
giving the state sole agency and authority, has been a typical way to view power relations 
or disputes. With few exceptions, scholarship that specifically deals with the Ainu has 
also neglected this issue. 
During the early 1990s, a rapidly changing Soviet Union and its eventual collapse, 
along with the waning of the Cold War, brought optimism for finding a solution of the 
Northern Territories problem, which contributed to two collaborative trilateral projects on 
the topic.1 Around this time, there was an increase in international activities within 
Indigenous circles that were connected with the United Nations movement towards the 
International Year for the World’s Indigenous People that began in 1993. The director of 
the Hokkaido Utari Association, Nomura Giichi, was invited to be one of eleven 
Indigenous representatives to address the General Assembly in New York on 11 
December 1992. Nomura closed his speech with words reflecting the theme of the event 
by encouraging governments to take on new partnerships with Indigenous people around 
the world. The Utari Association’s movement called for a new law concerning the Ainu 
that would recognise the Indigenous status of the Ainu and certain rights to land, allow 
the Ainu to have representation in the government, and work towards rejuvenating the 
Ainu culture and language. Just before Nomura’s speech and during the UN International 
Year there was an increase in publications on and by the Ainu in general, a small number 
of which addressed the Northern Territories. Throughout the early to mid-1990s there 
was a lot of activity both locally and internationally in political and academic circles 
related to the Northern Territories that coincided with increased indigenous activity.  
This was not the first writing on Ainu involvement in the Northern Territories. 
Since the 1970s, some Ainu and various Wajin have stated their views that the lands in 
question are inherently Ainu territory, and they have requested that both the Russian and 
Japanese governments listen to their arguments from their perspective. Nonetheless, the 
Ainu were not included in the more popular and widely distributed published works on 
the Northern Territories. Historically, windows of opportunity for a resolution have 
cycled every sixteen or seventeen years. The first window was in 1956 with the Joint 
Declaration, the second in 1973 with talks between Brezhnev and Prime Minister Tanaka, 
 
1 Graham Allison, Kimura Hiroshi and Konstantin Sarkisov, ed. Beyond the Cold War to Trilateral 
Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific Region (1992); James Goodby, Vladimir Ivanov and Nobuo 
Shimotomai, ed. “Northern Territories” and Beyond: Russian, Japanese, and American Perspectives 
(Westport, CT: Praeger, 1995). 
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with the last in the early 1990s.2 According to this trend, 2006-07 represents the start of 
another potential window, so even though resolution is politically unlikely, we may see 
more publications on the topic in the coming year. We can hope that it shows initiative to 
challenge the status quo. 
Literature on the Northern Territories 
An exception to the norm and a quite notable article that strove to include the Ainu was 
Noel Ludwig’s 1994 article, “An Ainu Homeland: An Alternative Solution for the 
Northern Territories/Southern Kuriles Imbroglio.” This article, a product of the literature 
boom on the topic in the early 1990s, was ahead of its time. Even though Ludwig wrote 
this before the Japanese government implemented the Cultural Promotion Act (1997), he 
shows us how the “Ainu solution” may be an important factor in helping to resolve the 
dispute by making comparison to other territorial disputes in Australia and Hawaii.3 His 
thesis does not appear to have influenced further writing, however, and taking the Ainu 
seriously in English language literature started and stopped with him.  
 Another product of this same period is the book “Northern Territories” and 
Beyond, a compilation of twenty-nine articles written by thirty two contributors of 
Russian, Japanese and American backgrounds who are for the most part well-known 
academics or ambassadors. While the focus of this edited volume was on bilateral 
relations between Russia and Japan, it was written as an international collaborative 
project. Peter Poole, a doctoral candidate at the time, was the only author to make 
mention of the Ainu in his short essay “Environment and History.” Poole recognised that 
historically the Ainu lived on the islands, but his goal was not to get the Ainu involved. 
Rather he used the Ainu and even an Ainu epic poem, yukar, as an example of poor 
Japanese handling of the northern environments of Hokkaido and the Kuril Islands. If 
Poole was constructing the Ainu as a part of a recent past, having nothing to do with the 
present or future, while at the same time using them as an instrument to prove a selected 
point, he reproduced all the elements of the unequal relationship and absence of a 
recognised Ainu voice.4
In 1998, Hasegawa Tsuyoshi, a well known historian at the University of 
California, wrote a two volume edition entitled The Northern Territories Dispute and 
Russo-Japanese Relations, which covers the years 1697 to 1998. He tried to take the 
middle ground between Japanese left and right wing scholarship as represented by Wada 
Haruki and Kimura Hiroshi, but he tended to lean closer to Wada’s leftism. This book is 
the definitive English book on the subject. He dealt with the Ainu in a sensitive, but at the 
same time, minimalist manner: he showed Russian “brutality” against the Ainu as they 
pushed from Kamchatka southward down the island chain. This sensitivity has its limits, 
 
2 Hara Kimie, Japanese-Soviet/Russian Relations Since 1945: A Difficult Peace (London: Routledge, 
1998), 228; Shimotomai Nobuo, “Cold War in East Asia and the ‘Northern Territories’ Problem,” 
presented at “New Initiatives for Solving the Northern Territories Issue between Japan and Russia: an 
Inspiration from the Åland Experience” conference 18-20 August 2006. 
3 Noel A. Ludwig, “An Ainu Homeland: An Alternative Solution for the Northern 
Territories/Southern Kuriles Imbroglio,” Ocean & Coastal Management 25 (1994): 1-29. 
4 Peter Poole, “Environment and History,” in “Northern Territories” and Beyond: Russian, Japanese, 
and American Perspectives, ed. James E. Goodby et al. (London: Praeger, 1995), 173-181. 
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as his portrayal of the Ainu as docile victims of Russian expansion ignores similar 
treatment to which the Ainu were subject under Japanese expansion from the south and 
ultimately denied the Ainu as actors of their own history. He argued that historical debate 
cannot solve this problem because, if it could, then the Ainu would be the rightful owners 
of the land.5 This implies that he thinks that the study of history should be selective in 
order to show that the Ainu are not the rightful owners. His argument on this issue was 
not entirely clear or logical. What this argument allowed him to do, however, was to limit 
the mention of the Ainu to less than twenty pages of over seven-hundred pages of text. If 
he meant that history is not the answer, then it would also be difficult for Japan to claim 
rights to the islands as Hasegawa favours.6
Hara Kimie wrote the intriguing book Japanese-Soviet/Russian Relations since 
1945: A Difficult Peace in which she made use of new materials unearthed from 
Australian archives. The core of this book, which focused on events since the 1951 San 
Francisco Peace Treaty, dealt with governmental relations on domestic, bilateral and 
international levels. This was a provocative work on the matter, but since localities or 
local movements were not the focus she offered the reader only one paragraph of the 
Ainu connection.7
Two years after the publication of Hasegawa’s two volumes, Kimura Hiroshi, a 
prolific writer on the topic of Japanese-Russian relations, wrote his own two volume 
edition which overlaps and follows Hasegawa’s book. 8 He finds no room in either 
volume for the Ainu in his discussion which focused largely on Russia. The closest 
Kimura has come to the Ainu in his writing was an earlier book he edited in Japanese in 
which Togawa Tsuguo, who wrote the introductory chapter, brought up the fact that the 
names of all the islands in the Kuril chain are based on the original Ainu names and that 
they had trade networks from Nemuro, on eastern Ezo, expanding throughout the whole 
Kuril chain. Togawa went on to explain that the Ainu were the original inhabitants of the 
area, and that they provided Matsumae-han with enough information to draw a 1644 map 
of the Kurils. It is rather intriguing, then, that Kimura has come so close in association to 
others that wrote on the Ainu yet none of his own work mentions or attempts to build on 
such information.9 Reasons for this will be expanded on later in this thesis. 
As Kimura’s contemporary, Wada Haruki has a very radical opinion about the 
Ainu. In his 1999 book Hoppo ryodo mondai: rekishi to mirai, Wada adopted an 
intriguing and unusual stance towards the Ainu. While many authors only mentioned the 
 
5 Hasegawa Tsuyoshi, The Northern Territories Dispute and Russo-Japanese Relations. Vol. 1: 
Between War and Peace, 1697-1985. Vol. 2: Neither War Nor Peace, 1985-1998 (Berkeley: 
International and Area Studies Publications, University of California at Berkeley, 1998), 527. 
6 Hasegawa, The Northern Territories, 16-22, 25-27, 513, 518. In Hasegawa’s 2000 Japanese book 
only five pages make reference to the Ainu (Hasegawa Tsuyoshi, Hoppo ryodo mondai to nichi-ro 
kankei (Tokyo: Chikuma shobo, 2000), 10-13, 348.  
7 Hara Kimie, Japanese-Soviet/Russian Relations since 1945: A Difficult Peace (London: Routledge, 
1998), 14. 
8 Kimura Hiroshi,  
9 Togawa Tsuguo, “Hoppo ryodo no rekishi,” in Hoppo ryodo o kangaeru, ed. Kimura Hiroshi 
(Sapporo: Hokkaido shinbunsha, 1981), 11-12; Kimura Hiroshi, Nichii-ro kokkyo koshoshi: ryodo 
mondai ni ikani torikomuka (Tokyo: Chuo koronsha, 1993). 
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Ainu in passing or not at all, he designated the whole first chapter to the history of the 
Ainu in the Kurils and the movement of both Russians and Japanese into the island chain. 
Wada is even bolder in his concluding remarks when he suggested a solution to the issue 
which involves entrusting one of the islands in the Habomai Islets to the Ainu, allowing 
them to participate in its management. This conclusion largely stems from the ratification 
of the Cultural Promotion Act and the 1997 termination of the 1899 Protection Act (that 
he mistakes as taking place in 1995), which has worked to promote a resurgence of Ainu 
culture and language. By allowing the Ainu to take an active role in the management and 
upkeep of one of the islands, he argued, the Ainu would be able to further their cultural 
revival, and at the same time this would be in the best interest for both the Japanese and 
Russians. Mutually aiding the Ainu would give such a program a positive, global 
humanitarian message.10 This interesting and provocative idea was built on “morality,” a 
concept often used in Indigenous or non-government petition processes.11 Providing the 
Ainu with land rights to bolster national morality in an international context would not be 
an act performed for the Ainu, but would be done to the Ainu for their own benefit, and 
ultimately misses the main issue at stake: it would undermine Ainu and other Indigenous 
voices. Nonetheless, many Ainu would be sure to support this idea. However, such an 
action would require more scrutiny and analysis than Wada offered. Would such an act 
continue to hold “moral” features knowing that, although rich in konbu and other natural 
resources, Stephan described the Habomai Islands as lying “so low that they could be 
mistaken for reefs?” 12 It seems unreasonable to think it could serve as a redemptive new 
home of Ainu cultural rebirth without extensive Japanese and Russian support. At the 
moment the Japanese government’s reluctance to identify the Ainu as being Indigenous 
to any area within their national boundaries, or beyond, fails to show the large amount of 
commitment needed for Wada’s solution. 
 These few mentioned works represent the dominant approach of literature on this 
specific topic. Focus has been mainly on bilateral (state-level) negotiations with a fleeting 
short term focus on trilateral scholarship (Japan, Russia, and United States), where states 
were (and are) taken as the only authoritative actors and viewed from a top-down 
perspective. When scholars mentioned the Ainu, they were given scant attention or used 
to derive conclusions that usually did not involve the Ainu themselves. This trend was 
not limited to discourse that takes the state as the centre-point. Literature on the Ainu 
revealed that the issue was one that was not of immanent concern as it appears to be 
bogged down by states themselves and international laws and declarations.  
Those that have written more specifically about the Ainu have given minimal 
attention to the Northern Territories dispute. Focusing on events from the twentieth 
century onwards Richard Siddle is one of the most well-known Western scholars in 
modern Ainu studies. Between 1993 and 2004 he has written over a dozen articles and an 
“authoritative” book regarding the Ainu entitled Race, Resistance and the Ainu of Japan.
10 Wada Haruki, Hoppo ryodo mondai: rekishi to mirai (Tokyo: Asahi shinbunsha, 1999), 14-38, 381-
382. 
11 On Indigenous petition process and morality see, Ravi de Costa, “Identity, Authority, and Moral 
Worlds of Indigenous Petitions,” Comparative Studies in Society and History 48 (2006): 669-698.  
12 John J. Stephan, The Kuril Islands: Russo-Japanese Frontier in the Pacific (Oxford: Claredon Press, 
1974), 21. 
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In this book he made occasional mention of the Ainu reaction to the “movement for the 
return of the Northern Territories.” For example, Siddle acknowledges this issue’s 
importance as one seed that encouraged Kaizawa Tadashi and the Hokkaido Utari 
Association in the 1970s to produce a “correct” version of Ainu history that would 
challenge the official narratives of the “opening up” of Hokkaido and that of the Northern 
Territories. 13  However, his direct discussion of the topic goes no further than this. 
Arasaki Moritetsu, professor at Ryukyu University dedicated a chapter in his book 
Yawarakai shakai o motomete to the Ainu and the Northern Territories, suggesting that 
inclusion of the Ainu is important to resolving the matter, and that the discussion should 
be broadened to historical events before the signing of treaties in 1855 and 1875.14 This 
argument is contrary to views presented by many scholars that have come to see the San 
Francisco Treaty of 1951 as central to the issue, and challenges the field of research. 
 Kikkawa Hitoshi’s “Land Rights of the Ainu People and Japanese Legal Culture” 
focuses on general land claims within Hokkaido. 15  By comparing the 1992 Mabo 
decision in Australia with the Ainu situation in Hokkaido, he questions whether the Ainu 
have lost their rights to the land. While he does not draw any conclusions, he proposes 
that using an Australian example may help resolve land issues with the Ainu. This article, 
written in 2000, shows that movements working to internationalise understanding of Ainu 
land disputes are relatively new, are still in the process of development and require more 
attention. A more recent addition is Higashimura Takeshi’s 2006 book on Ainu-Wajin 
relations from the 1940s to 1960s. In one chapter he examined newspapers’ portrayal of 
Kuril Ainu and the Northern Territories from the late 1950s to late 1960s.16 This offers a 
valuable critique on Ainu involvement in the area but the breadth of scope is quite limited. 
While all the above research and publications were those of westerners or Wajin, many 
Ainu have also published on the issue of land. 
Ainu Authors and the Northern Territories 
The few accounts written by Ainu people include the article in AMPO: Japan-Asia 
Quarterly Review entitled “Getting Back Our Lands: An Interview with Akibe Tokuhei 
on the ‘Northern Territories,’” and Nomura Giichi’s article in the book Ainu no hon,
“Hoppo ryodo wa dare no mono?” Both of these were published in 1993, the first UN 
International Year for the World’s Indigenous People. The first of these articles called for 
other people to stand up and press both the Russian and Japanese governments to listen to 
the Ainu. This article notes that the Ainu that are involved see the land issue well beyond 
the Northern Territories and affecting another Ainu homeland, Sakhalin. They argued 
that they are not concerned with which country is in possession of the land as long as 
 
13 Siddle, Race, Resistance, 175, 182-183 and Richard Siddle, “Limits to Citizenship in Japan: 
Multiculturalism, Indigenous Rights and the Ainu,” Citizenship Studies 7.4 (2003): 454, 455.  
14 Arasaki Moritetsu, Yawarakai shakai o motomete: 1988-1990 (Tokyo: Gaifusha, 1992), 152-164. 
15 Kikkawa Hitoshi, “Land Rights of the Ainu People and Japan’s Legal Culture,” in Papers of the 10th 
Aiennial Conference of the Japanese Studies Association of Australia: Japanese Studies: Communities, 
Cultures, Critiques. Volume Two: Identity, Politics and Critiques in Contemporary Japan (Clayton, 
Australia: Monash Asia Institute, 2000). 
16 Higashimura Takeshi, Sengoki Ainu minzoku-Wajin kankei shijosetsu: 1940 nendai kohan kara 
1960 nendai kohan made (Tokyo: Sangensha, 2006), 192-207. 
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they have access to their traditional lands. In the second, Nomura, former executive-
director of the Hokkaido Utari Association, called on the government to act responsibly 
and to acknowledge historical events of the area that the Ainu were very much a part.17 
Both articles are important as they represent Ainu views, yet they amount to less than ten 
pages of text. This is negligible compared to the edited book put out by the Association to 
Restore the Autonomous Ainu Homeland in 1993. This book includes work by both Ainu 
and what many scholars call “sympathetic Wajin” detailing Ainu discussion with the 
Russian government, as well as other activities that have moved to raise awareness of the 
issue, such as that done through the non-governmental organisation called the Peace Boat, 
wherein Chikappu Mieko traveled to Kunashiri, Etorofu and Shikotan in September 
1991.18 This book contains the most written Ainu perspectives on their involvement with 
the Northern Territories, yet it appears unknown or at least not worthy of attention by 
scholars on the Northern Territories issue, some of whom dismissed it as “activism.”  
With this in mind, there is a counter discourse as Escobar pointed out in 1984. He 
said that subjugated knowledge trying to speak out usually demonstrates a local, 
“autonomous, non-centralized and non-hierarchical character and … that their validity 
has ceased to depend on the approval of the established regimes of thought.”19 While the 
Ainu based counter discourse is largely local, it has also begun to internationalise. An 
issue of hierarchy, or regionalism, may also come into play within the Ainu community. 
For example, governments and scholars give the Hokkaido Utari Association more 
attention than other Ainu organisations because it has the largest base of Ainu 
membership and was connected to the Docho at the time of its conception. As for validity, 
it appears the voice of the Ainu depends on an opening in the “established regimes of 
thought” that do not appear to want to share their position.20 
Changing the Focus of Study 
Traditional scholarship that focuses on state negotiations is not a hindrance to this issue, 
for it is an exceptionally important aspect in order to understand the international 
geopolitical situation. As well, in order to understand contemporary rights in international 
law and regulations set forth by the United Nations, broad studies that focus on state and 
international institutions have significant merit. In doing so, however, scholars have 
meekly addressed history before World War II and the 1951 San Francisco Peace Treaty. 
Gregory Clark, former Australian diplomat, clearly illustrates this when in 2005 he wrote: 
“The story begins with Japan’s 1951 San Francisco Peace Treaty with the Allied 
 
17 “Getting Back Our Lands: An Interview with Akibe Tokuhei on the ‘Northern Territories,’” AMPO: 
Japan-Asia Quarterly Review 24.3 (1993): 7-9; Nomura Giichi, “Hoppo ryodo wa dare no mono?” in 
Ainu no hon, ed. Ishii Shinji (Tokyo: Takarajimasha, 1993), 150-155. 
18 AM, Ainu Moshiri.
19 Arturo Escobar, “Discourse and Power in Development: Michael Foucault and the Relevance of His 
Work to the Third World,” Alternatives: A Journal of World Policy 10.3 (Winter 1984-85): 392-393. 
20 Etter quoted Basil Hall Chamberlain as having written “As a way to others who might be inclined to 
accept statements of facts made by the Ainu with regard to their own history, the present writer would 
remark that his own impression is that such statements made by an uncultured people are quite 
untrustworthy, unless supported by extraneous evidence” (Carl Etter, Ainu Folklore [Chicago: Wilcox 
& Follett, 1949], 29; original in Basil Hall Chamberlain, Memoirs.)
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Powers.”21 It was the ambiguity in the Treaty that led to the dispute. Scholars have also 
largely ignored those peoples that fall outside of the state, or who have only recently been 
incorporated into the state. In other words, by focusing on state to state relations, whether 
bilateral or multilateral, scholars have taken the Ainu, whom traditionally lived on these 
lands, out of the debate. This gives an impression that the Ainu have no particular place 
in such discussion because they are Japanese citizens that are represented by the Diet. 
Other inferences could be that the Ainu no longer exist, or that Ainu do not care about 
this issue, or simply that what they have said and done was and is of no importance to the 
matter. The views presented herein do not propose to completely counter previous 
scholarship: instead they add one more dimension of the issue to further complicate and 
enrich this area of historical negligence: non-state centered voices. This, however, 
indirectly conflicts with the foundation on which previous scholarship is based. 
The concepts of modernity, progress, development, colonialism/imperialism, 
nation-state, and Cold War, are interconnected with scholarship on the Ainu and 
Indigenous peoples. In the case of the Ainu, these violent processes along with ecological 
changes such as disease and decline in resources led to placing the Ainu within local 
history in an isolated area of the Japanese nation. Ainu historical writing and histories of 
the Okhotsk region are abundant. However, placing Ainu within localised history along 
with the difficulties associated with publishing in English for international markets, 
versus publishing in Japanese in Japan, has helped to keep work on the Ainu and the 
Okhotsk within a relatively small community of writers and audiences. For this reason, 
any publication in English has potential to have larger (though likely still very small) 
impact in the sense that it would have a broader audience. Therefore, a publication on the 
Ainu has greater potential to disrupt or enhance the status quo of understanding about this 
part of Northeast Asia, making any publication on the Ainu a very sensitive subject 
matter with inherent academic responsibilities. Looking back at the historiography of the 
Northern Territories, the English sources to date have enhanced the official Japanese 
view that the Ainu are negligible, and that they can be conveniently and easily 
sidestepped to spend more time on the “important” or authoritative issues and 
perspectives.  
Richard Siddle recognised the highly politicized nature of Ainu history and wrote 
that since most of the sources are written in Japanese, many of which are biased, it makes 
it difficult to view Ainu history through such distorted lenses.22 If I were talking strictly 
in terms of the Ainu, rather than pointing to the Ainu as an example of greater 
international trends relating to Indigenous peoples in general, I would be highly 
exaggerative in the importance I give to the Ainu. Although each group of Indigenous 
peoples has its own unique set of historical interactions and experiences, making cross-
cultural comparisons rather incoherent in some respects, the international community is 
moving to further accept a body of peoples that includes some three-hundred and seventy 
million individuals worldwide, thus creating greater unity among different groups. Since 
 
21 Gregory Clark, “Northern Territories Dispute Highlights Flawed Diplomacy,” Japan Times, 24 
March 2005. 
22 Richard Siddle, “Ainu History: An Overview,” in Ainu: Spirit of a Northern People, ed. William 
Fitzhugh and Chisato Dubreuil (Washington, DC: Arctic Studies Centre National Museum of Natural 
History Smithsonian Institute, in association with University of Washington Press, 1999), 67. 
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there appears to be a sort of international blanket of scholarship that covers and obscures 
topics related to Indigenous peoples there are definite trends that require attention in each 
discipline.  
Consequences of Ainu Non-Inclusion 
When land disputes began to arise after the end of World War II between the Soviet 
Union and Japan, which involved third parties such as the USA, the common trend of 
ignoring the Indigenous inhabitants continued and was unquestioned. However, this issue 
has ramifications beyond that of state conduct; third parties are also influenced and 
affected by the return movement. For example, in 1988 the National Museum of Natural 
History held a celebration of peoples and cultures from the west coast of Canada to the 
Amur River Region and Sakhalin in the eastern Soviet Union in the form of a special 
exhibition. The three-hundred and sixty page book that accompanied this exhibit, 
Crossroads of Continents, is a magnificent compilation of colour pictures and maps with 
a wide assortment of articles on each of the peoples from this region. Upon closer 
inspection, it is odd that a large two-page map that illustrates the native groups in the area 
does not mention the Ainu. Hokkaido, Sakhalin, and the Kuril Islands are all drawn and 
labeled on the map, but this rather comprehensive collection did not recognise the Ainu.23 
In addition, none of the thirty-six articles addressed the Ainu. Eleven years later, William 
Fitzhugh, one of the main organisers, revealed the reason for this when he helped the 
National Museum to host an exhibition dedicated to the Ainu. He explained in this 
exhibition’s book that the reason for not including the Ainu in the previous exhibition 
was because of “political reasons: Crossroads was organised under a bilateral 
arrangement with the Soviet Union, which did not want its political history involving the 
seizure of the Kuriles and Southern Sakhalin and the expulsion of Ainu peoples aired 
broadly to the public.” The exhibition book used a much smaller version on the same 
1988 map but superimposed “Ainu” with arrows pointing to Hokkaido, southern Sakhalin 
and the Kurils.24 
Another example, in the international realm, is that of the International Kuril 
Islands Project (IKIP). This project was an international collaboration project between 
American, Japanese and Russian scientists which performed an extensive biological 
survey of the Kuril Islands. Although this project had its roots in 1991, it did not take 
shape until 1995, and Archaeology was only added in 2000, the last year of the project. 
Scotty Moore, a member of the Archaeology section of the project, explained that “no 
Ainu or other Indigenous personnel were involved in the project” for several reasons. 
First, since Archaeology was added late in the expedition, it adopted prior IKIP structures, 
and more importantly the logistics were organised by the Russian funding agencies, even 
though the majority of funding came from the United States. He also mentioned that after 
World War II the Soviets removed the Ainu living on the Kurils to Hokkaido and that the 
lands upon which they worked were in Russian hands.25 Although Moore did not mention 
 
23 William Fitzhugh and Aron Crowell, eds., Crossroads of Continents: Cultures of Siberia and 
Alaska (Washington, DC: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1988). 
24 William Fitzhugh, “Ainu Ethnicity: A History,” in Ainu: Spirit, 11, 12.
25 IKIP, <http://artedi.fish.washington.edu/okhotskia/ikip/index.htm> (17 November 2006). Scotty 
Moore, email to author, 4 June 2006. 
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it, the Ainu could have been included in the archaeological aspects of the project but the 
political sensitivity of their study on the Kurils encouraged Russian, and possibly even 
Japanese, sides to keep the Ainu out of the picture. Even though IKIP personnel 
recognised prior Ainu inhabitation, it was easily discredited as having potential to enrich 
their scientific studies because of the “fact” that the expedition took place on Russian 
lands. 
 The research of IKIP also gives us an example of discussion and research 
concerning bio-geographical boundaries in the Kurils. Most important is the Miyabe Line, 
or De Vries Strait, between Etorofu and Uruppu, which has been a standardised 
geographic boundary of vegetation and flora in the Kurils. The Miyabe line, first 
established in the late 1890s by Miyabe Kingo from his 1890 publication, represents the 
most significant Japanese research on the biodiversity of the Kurils before World War II. 
“Tatewaki (1947, 1957) presented evidence for a floral break between Irurup and Urup. 
He named this boundary the ‘Miyabe Line’ after the famous Japanese botanist Miyabe 
Kingo (1860-1951), who was one of the very first scientists to study the Kuril Island 
plants. Tatewaki’s conclusion was quickly accepted and is now almost universally 
recognised among Japanese botanists.”26 The creation and support of the idea of the 
ecological border at the De Vries Strait supports the government’s claim over the 
southern Kurils. This is also a reflection of prior Wajin limited bio-geographical studies, 
showing a greater knowledge of the southern Kurils than the central or northern part of 
the archipelago. The supported ecological border became a split between the known and 
the unknown, or in other words the claimed and the unclaimed. 
Perhaps it is accurate to say that the Ainu who lived on Etorofu and Kunashiri 
were “Hokkaido Ainu” and not “Kuril Ainu,” following the thinking first proposed by 
those Ainu scholars like Takakura Shinichiro, who became the return movement’s first 
institutional supporters, who also followed the idea that Japan had rightful sovereignty 
over all lands that the Ainu inhabited since they were “Japanese.” However, arguing that 
it was Hokkaido Ainu that lived on the two larger southern islands and turning the Kuril 
Ainu into “Shikotan Ainu” should not imply that all four islands are not a part of the 
Kuril Chain for geographical and historical study tells us otherwise. Even though Nemuro 
prefecture had jurisdiction over this part of the chain (political and economic), it does not 
necessarily mean that it is not a part of the Kurils, because Nemuro also had jurisdiction 
over the rest of the archipelago as well. The use of the label “Shikotan Ainu” distorted 
their forced dislocation from their lands and livelihood that were largely influenced by 
Russians at the time. The Ainu that call for inclusion in negotiations do not see the 
distinction of Hokkaido Ainu and Kuril Ainu, or the “extinction” of the Kuril Ainu as 
important, since they stress communal Ainu history. Emphasising the death of the last 
“pure” Kuril Ainu implied that the Ainu were an isolated people and denied the fluid 
contacts the Ainu in the north had with Russians, Kamchadals, Aleuts and other peoples 
of the area. The Japanese government and its supporting activists’ politically charged 
argument that the Northern Territories are separate from the Kurils has shaped their 
thinking of geography and the Ainu. 
 
26 Theodore W. Pietsch et al., “Biodiversity and Biogeography of the Islands of the Kuril 
Archipelago,” Journal of Biogeography 30.9 (September 2003): 1297, 1299.  
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IKIP’s Takahashi Hideki’s findings led him to doubt the foundation of the 
prominence of the divide at the De Vries Strait, because of the large number of plants that 
are found in all the Kurils, with no clear cut distinction as the Miyabe Line suggested.27 
When the members of IKIP debated the Miyabe Line they did so in terms of scientific 
bio-geographical findings and did not address the coincidental issue that the Miyabe 
Line’s northern extent is identical to that of the claimed political boundary of the 
Northern Territories. To keep their research “safe” they avoided political comments that 
are connected to supporters of the Miyabe Line.28 Pietsch et al. found that while the De 
Vries Strait and the fourth Kuril strait between Onekotan and Paramushir do represent 
minor transitional zones, they are not as important as the distinction at the Bussol Strait 
between Uruppu and Simushu (see Figure 2 and Figure 3). The coincidence that 
Tatewaki’s boundary is the same as Takakura’s boundary of cultural, economic and 
political influence should not go unnoticed. Neither should the virtual acceptance of both 
theories during the same time period as the Japanese government and local scholars 
began the return movement. 
 Building on research initiated by the International Kuril Islands Project, The Kuril 
Biocomplexity Project formed in 2005.29 They have support from the FRPAC to include 
one or two Ainu students/teachers in their 2006-2008 expedition, but for 2006 they were 
unable to recruit any Ainu due to the inability of FRPAC to pay salary and most likely 
other political issues that would make Ainu participation difficult. Ainu representatives 
are also supposed to be involved in any exhibitions created in the Kurils that make use of 
research from the project. While the project members try to stay as politically neutral as 
possible, they did gain attention and criticism from the Japanese government after 
American project members went to Kunashiri and Etorofu on Russian visas for research 
in summer 2006. They felt they could not promise to not go to the southern Kurils, as it 
would set a precedent for future American scientists and felt they were in no position to 
take part in state negotiations. However, by using Russian visas to go to the islands it 
seems that they did set a precedent for future US scholars by showing support of Russian 
sovereignty for the purpose of research. The visit to the southern Kurils, and subsequent 
government protests, will likely make it increasingly difficult for the project to work with 
Japanese and Ainu organisations in their future research in the Kurils.30 
27 Takahashi Hideki, “Phytogeography of the Kuril Islands,” Session 8: Distributional Patterns and 
Biogeography, Dispersal and Vicariance, 21 May 2001, International Symposium on Kuril Island 
Diversity, Sapporo <http://www.museum.hokudai.ac.jp/activity/symposium/IKIPhomepage/> (13 
December 2006).   
28 Amaoka Kunio, “A History of Japanese Research on the Kuril Islands and an Overview of Japanese 
Contributions to the International Kuril Island Project,” Session 1: History of Biological Investigations 
on the Kuril Islands and Adjacent Regions, 19 May 2001, International Symposium on Kuril Island 
Diversity, Sapporo <http://www.museum.hokudai.ac.jp/activity/symposium/IKIPhomepage/ > (13 
December 2006). 
29 The Kuril Biocomplexity Project <http://depts.washington.edu/ikip/index.shtml> (8 January 2006); 
“The Kuril Biocomplexity Project: Human Vulnerability and Resilience to Subarctic Change,” 
National Science Foundation <http//www.nsf.gov> (7 October 2006). 
30 Benjamin Fitzhugh, email with author, 8 September 2006 and 18 October 2006. Also see the 
organization Friends of the Kurilsky Reserve (“Become a Friend of the Kurilsky Reserve,” Japan 
Times, 17 March 1999) which formed in 1998 and changed its name to Kuril Islands Network (KIN) 
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This dispute also affects the Ainu indirectly through third party organisations. The 
denial of the Ainu’s connection to the lands in question has potential to also deny the 
existence of the Ainu in other discoursive realms and reveals the close relationship 
between politics and academia. These examples illustrate how the term Northern 
Territories is no longer simply a term of imagination and propaganda. This term (which is 
often used in quotation marks), no matter how fluid or controversial it may be, has real 
power that effects more than dogma, but real peoples, real places, and real things 
(research). 
Reasons for Non-Inclusion of the Ainu in the Literature 
The Northern Territories is an example of an international hegemonic scholastic blanket 
that covers issues of Indigenous peoples. Despite the abundant literature written on the 
Northern Territories, the Ainu have received little attention in terms of this territorial 
dispute. Why is it that writing about the Ainu and Northern Territories has been so 
scarce? Possible answers are numerous and may include: the Ainu had no state of their 
own; the Japanese government and/or scholars feel that attention paid to Ainu land rights 
would weaken their claim to the Northern Territories;31 the Ainu population is marginal 
and “pure” Ainu no longer exist; the Ainu reduced their demands as they pushed for the 
ratification of the proposed Ainu New Law;32 recent Japanese scholars consider studying 
the Ainu as a sensitive area that makes it difficult to be objective,33 dissuading academics 
to study topics likely to encounter protest and funding issues; possible international 
movements became less inviting for their arguments; officials and academics view Ainu 
movements as a “trend that will blow over” and that the Ainu are assimilated so their 
interests should be in line with national interests, so the Ainu will not produce counter-
arguments and thus there is no need to mention them34 (which implies expectations and 
responsibilities as a citizen); and/or the Ainu are giving up the fight for land rights. This 
 
in 2001. They are working to preserve the natural habitat amidst the political debate over the islands’ 
ownership (Kuril Islands Network <http://www.kurilnature.org> (20 January 2007). 
31 Kelly Dietz, “Ainu in the International Arena,” in Ainu: Sprit, 364. Kimura Hiroshi is also an 
advocate of this position. 
32 “Getting Back Our Islands,” 8. 
33 S.C.H. Cheung, “Japanese Anthropology and Depictions of the Ainu,” in The Making of 
Anthropology in East and Southeast Asia, ed. Yamashita Shinji, Joseph Bosco and J.S. Eades (NY: 
Berghahn Books, 2004), 136-151. Cheung does not relate the issue to the Northern Territories but 
recent Japanese Anthropological studies on the Ainu in general.  
34 Katrina Sjoberg writes this point not applied to the Northern Territories, but to general positions of 
officials in the 1990s to give little heed to the Ainu. On the subject of Ainu occupational sectors a 
government official she interviewed said that “‘choice’ is a luxury few of us enjoy.” This stance has 
consequences beyond job markets and to me appears to be an extension of Tokugawa images of the 
Ainu supported by social Darwinist thinking (Katrina Sjoberg, The Return of the Ainu: Cultural 
Mobilisation and the Practice of Ethnicity in Japan [Chur: Harwood Academic Publishers, 1993], 
150-151, 154). However, Kimura Hiroshi has been cited as saying that “When the Ainu claim 
indigenous rights, the background of the governments demand to Russia for the return becomes 
complicated. Because the Ainu enjoy the rights and obligations as Japanese citizens, it is preferable 
that they claim their special rights (in case of a quick return) at the time when the islands are returned” 
(“Utari kyokai / hoppo ryodo / ketsugi e / rainendo nimo / Akita rijicho ga iko,” Hokkaido Shinbun, 
evening edition, 17 May 2002).  
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last explanation, however, is not convincing since many Ainu have been involved in 
protests against the annual 7 February “Northern Territories Day,” as well as involvement 
in land disputes in 1997 in relation to the Nibutani Dam35 in Hokkaido and the Ainu 
demand for participation in the Shiretoko National Park, now a UNESCO World Heritage 
site. The reasons listed contribute to understanding why government views and scholars 
alike have written out the Ainu as insignificant. While these views and practices appear 
highly domestic in nature, they are not limited to Japan. These reasons could be 
generalised to fit reasons of non-inclusion or discrediting the importance of indigenous 
claims elsewhere as well, where most of the reasons tend to originate from the first 
mentioned above – their lack of a prior nation or state. 
Indigenous writers and their supporters are often labeled as “activists” because of 
the lack of a universal arena at the same level of current academic discourse in which 
they are permitted to contribute to our scholastic understanding. The only way to have 
Indigenous voices heard in the past was through Anthropological appropriation, as a 
product of participant observation or through travelogues. As Beier suggested, academic 
disciplines need to reform to the point where a space exists where Indigenous peoples, 
including the Ainu and their supporters, can be heard on the same plane as other 
disciplines.36 The problem with this and other claims is that their voices take the tone of 
petitions to a higher moral order than realistically exists either within the state system or 
academia. Opening up a “space” that Beier sees as necessary also implies the need for the 
re-conceptualisation of the supremacy of the state, an ideal theoretically vital but 
practically implausible at this time. The Ainu voice is now working to be heard on equal 
terms, but through a hegemonic lens are reinterpreted as little more than petitions, 
petitions with no power or legitimacy. 
Borrowing a Canadian example posited by Ken Coates, we could look at the 
Japanese government’s (and that of the Russian government’s as well) fear of losing 
battles to Indigenous or minority peoples. For example, Coates says that the Canadian 
government is slow to act on Indigenous claims because of the challenge of their scale 
and complexity. If the Canadian federal government lost all claims currently before the 
courts, the sum would surmount “many billions of [Canadian] dollars.” With potential for 
such substantial liability, the federal government has decided it more practical to spread 
such claims, and therefore costs, over a longer period of time.37 While the Japanese 
government likely views accepting the Ainu as Indigenous peoples as directly related to 
rising costs and potential territorial loss, it sees Ainu claims hindering the status of their 
nation or country, and view the Ainu as a challenge to the further strengthening of the 
state. Supporting the Ainu in this case is considered a “loss” and un-enriching for Japan, 
so the Ainu are seen as existing outside of the nation for their perceived inability to 
contribute to it. In the case of Russia, openly reflecting and responding to Ainu claims 
 
35 For an English translation of the court case and in-depth discussion of this case see “Kayano et al. v. 
Hokkaido Expropriation Committee,” trans. Mark Levin, International Legal Materials 38 (1999): 
394-477 and Mark Levin, “Essential Commodities and Racial Justice: Using Constitutional Protection 
of Japan’s Indigenous Ainu People to Inform Understandings of the United States and Japan,” 
International Law and Politics 33 (2000): 419-526. 
36 Beier, Uncommon Places.
37 Ken Coates, “It’s Time for Canada to Do better,” The Record, 30 October 2006. 
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could trigger other claims by Indigenous people within their borders. The failure to view 
the resolution of Indigenous claims as beneficial to the state justifies slow governmental 
response and signifies the perceived state benefit by ignoring them.  
Many problems exist when dealing with issues of indigeneity and how to deal 
with associated rights and claims. For example, in situations where first peoples replaced 
first peoples, who were then replaced by today’s first peoples, we see a possible 
continuum of dislocation and relocation from one group to the next (which is a possible 
pattern that took place in the Kurils). In this somewhat Social Darwinist way of thinking, 
why should we now start treating dislocated peoples with an equal voice? It appears that 
issues involving the Ainu and other Indigenous groups today are products of 
colonialism/advanced colonialism and the creation of nation-states, or in Coate’s 
argument of the interaction between surplus and non-surplus societies, 38  and not 
necessarily that of an open ended history or historical plane.  
The potential explanations provided above work towards an answer, but 
individually fail to provide a comprehensive reason why History, Political Science, 
Museumology, and many other disciplines that are connected to this imbroglio, portray 
the Ainu as unimportant. They only touch the surface of the issue. This thesis builds on 
answering this question by further connecting it to themes of nation-building, 
globalization and autonomy, and colonialism/advanced colonialism. These forces resulted 
in what Marshall Beier has termed the “hegemonologue.” To rid ourselves of further 
jargon, this word refers to “that decidedly Western voice that speaks to the exclusion of 
all others, heard by all and yet, paradoxically, seldom noticed, the knowledges it bears 
having been widely disseminated as ‘common sense’ rather than as politicized claims 
about the world and our way of being in it.”39 We have been taught to view knowledge 
as defined by a Western universalistic sheet of understanding the world which has spread 
a thin cover over the globe, silencing or manipulating Indigenous voices (knowledge) in 
attempt to add credibility and thickness to the same fabricated cover.40 While Beier wrote 
his book specifically with International Relations in mind, this idea is transferable to the 
field of History, and applicable when analysing Ainu-Wajin relations. As Johannes 
Fabian wrote “Writing need not have the Other as its subject matter in order to oppress 
the Other.”41 This study views the issue in a broader historical context, one that works to 
give agency and coherence to Ainu history, and arguments presented by the Ainu, and 
reveals how a discourse based on the state denies agency of Indigenous peoples.  
 The next chapter looks at a more expansive historiography of Indigenous peoples 
in the Japanese colonial empire, which is deeply connected to the emergence of the 
 
38 Coates, Global History.
39 Beier, Uncommon Places, 15. 
40 A question that rises from this that this paper is too limited to answer is: Are Indigenous peoples 
(including the Ainu) becoming increasingly more audible because they now have institutions such as 
the United Nations to speak through that is breaking through the guise of traditional hegemonic ways 
of understanding? Or perhaps their voices are taking audible shape under the guidance of an 
international system in terms of our current form of knowing, and presenting arguments that work to 
further appropriating them. 
41 Johannes Fabian, “Presence and Representation: The Other in Anthropological Writing,” Critical 
Inquiry 16.4 (Summer 1990): 767-768; quoted in Beier, Uncommon Places, 178. 
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modern Japanese state. This is necessary to promote further understanding of the 
background of perceptions of the Ainu and Indigenous peoples in Japan and how the 
Ainu fail to be a part of the Northern Territories issue.  
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Figure 2: The Bussol Strait (Pietsch, 
“Biodiversity and Biogeography,” 1298) 
 
Figure 3: The Kuril Islands (Pietsch, 
"Biodiversity and Biogeography," 1308) 
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CHAPTER 2 
Rethinking Indigenous Peoples in the Japanese Colonial 
Empire 
 
This chapter focuses on approaches authors have used and how they addressed 
Indigenous peoples in writing on colonial history of East Asia. This survey represents a 
start to better understanding Indigenous peoples in colonial Japan, to draw connections 
between indigenous people and policies in other colonies, and more importantly, to 
broaden the scope and ways of understanding the Northern Territories issue through 
Japanese colonial experience. 
The history of Indigenous people in the Japanese empire as portrayed by writers 
of East Asian history in English is, to say the least, inadequate. There are similarities with 
conclusions drawn by human rights scholar James Walker in 1971 while addressing the 
Indian in Canadian history: “The picture of the Indian as a human being that is presented 
by writers of Canadian history is confusing, contradictory and incomplete. Certainly he is 
not often considered to be deserving of attention, or his society of scholarly analysis.”1
While this was an explicit conclusion about Canadian historical writing to that time, this 
idea also applies to Indigenous people in historical writing on Japan to the present. In a 
similar historiographical note, more specific to the Ainu, “descriptions of colonization in 
academic and official history represent the dominant political interests of post war 
Japanese elites. The descriptions are romanticized and nostalgic and ignore the violence 
of colonization. The history of the Ainu and Hokkaido was made to coincide with the 
interests of those with power.” 2 Broadening this statement to include wider ranging 
geographical contexts within the colonial empire outside of Hokkaido is non-
exaggerative. 
Examining influences contact with the Ainu or other Indigenous peoples had for 
later colonial enterprises is important for revealing other aspects from which to scrutinize 
and contemplate colonialism and for further understanding processes of discourse around 
the Ainu and the Northern Territories dispute. It adds a characteristic of colonialism as an 
organic set of interactions that were mutually influencing activities between the colonised, 
specifically aboriginal peoples, the metropolitan coloniser and other international third 
parties. Therefore, discussion on this point of “influences” involves presentation of few 
ideas and trends found in the literature. The historical story herein is one of how literature 
has slowly moved toward inclusion of the ever increasingly audible colonised voice. 
Nevertheless, it is possible that these audible voices are appropriated recreations through 
the hegemonic academic disciplines as pointed out by Beier.3 This characteristic of the 
 
1 James St. G. Walker, “The Indian in Canadian Historical Writing,” Canadian Historical Association, 
the Historical Papers (1971): 21. 
2 Yamaguchi Kenichi, “Poststructuralist Political Ecology: Cultural and Ecological Destruction and 
Modern Discourse on the Case of Colonization and Development of the Ainu and Hokkaido,” (MA 
thesis, University of Regina, 2004), 84. 
3 Beier, Uncommon Places.
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literature continues in the present time when it appears that Native Studies is becoming a 
recognised area of global studies.  
Stating that there was significant borrowing from policies in the two poles of 
Japan, Hokkaido and Okinawa, this chapter acts to encourage further understanding of 
the Ainu within discourses on the Northern Territories problem. There is a connection 
with the silencing of Indigenous peoples in the Japanese colonial empire to the silencing 
of the colonial history of integrating the Northern Territories into Japan in both the past 
and present. Therefore, a brief look into literature that addresses Japanese colonialism is 
informative to provide a broader context of the use of History in the Northern Territories 
issue in relation to the Ainu, colonialism and nation-building. 
Approaches of Literature: Local or Regional; Top-Down or Bottom-Up; 
Savage or Noble Savage?  
When authors brought up discussion on Indigenous groups in the reviewed literature, 
focus was largely localised to a particular area, such as Sakhalin (or Karafuto as the 
Japanese called it), or Taiwan (or Formosa as Europeans commonly dubbed it). John 
Harrison’s 1954 article, for example, explains Sakhalin trade between the Ainu and 
surrounding peoples to show the reader that the Ainu were far from an isolated people 
and that trade influenced change in the Ainu social system, such as their concept of 
leadership. Such a narrow focus has limitations on introducing the Ainu as inhabiting 
various lands. To Harrison’s defense, this must have been a modest scholarly contribution 
to broadening recognition of the Ainu over fifty years ago, and he recognised his own 
study as “fragmentary.”4 Some authors, like anthropologist Kodama Sakuzaemon (1895-
1970) and more recently historian Brett Walker, have been more inclusive than Harrison 
and regionalised their study to include Sakhalin, the Kuril Islands and Hokkaido.5 Still, 
this expanded scope pays little attention to connections between Indigenous groups and 
Japan’s expansion as a whole.  
 Historians in general have given the topic of Japanese colonialism more attention 
over the last decade, particularly in Manchukuo, yet they have muted the roles of 
Indigenous people in their writing. Recent work by Rana Mitter, Louise Young, 
 
4 John Harrison, “The Saghalien Trade: A Contribution to Ainu Studies,” Southwestern Journal of 
Anthropology 10 (1954): 278-293. For other works that focus on Sakhalin see, Tessa Morris-Suzuki, 
“Northern Lights: The Making and Unmaking of Karafuto Identity,” The Journal of Asian Studies 
60.3 (August 2001): 645-671; Emiko Ohnuki-Tierney, The Ainu of the Northwest Coast of Southern 
Sakhalin (Prospect Heights, IL: Waveland Press, 1974); Tanaka Ryo, Saharin hokui 50 dosen (Tokyo: 
Kusa no ne shuppansha,1993); John Stephan, Sakhalin: A History (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971). 
For those dealing with the Kurils see, Stephan, Kuril Islands; AM, Ainu Moshiri. Writing dealing with 
Hokkaido include, Baba Yuko, “A Study of Minority-Majority Relations: The Ainu and Japanese in 
Hokkaido,” Japan Interpreter 13.1 (Summer 1980): 60-92. For a sample of Taiwan see, Paul Barclay, 
“An Historian among the Anthropologists: The Ino Kanori Revival and the Legacy of Japanese 
Colonial Ethnography in Taiwan,” Japanese Studies 21.2 (2001): 117-136. 
5 Kodama Sakuzaemon, Ainu Historical and Anthropological Studies (Sapporo: Hokkaido University 
School of Medicine, 1970); Brett Walker, The Conquest of Ainu Lands: Ecology and Culture in 
Japanese Expansion, 1590-1800 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001). 
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Matsusaka Yoshihisa Tak, to name but a few, fit this description.6 This reflects how, until 
recently, there were few institutions in which so-called Indigenous peoples were able to 
speak.7 This point will receive attention later on. While not addressing Indigenous issues 
in depth, it appears that scholars concern themselves with battling out theoretical 
approaches to how the historian should approach colonialism. Should they approach 
Japanese colonialism through a top-down or bottom-up approach? In other words, should 
diplomatic state affairs and large institutions, or individuals, press and minor institutions, 
be the focus of study? If scholars mention aboriginals in regional areas of the empire, 
they tend to associate them with issues of identity,8 legitimacy of conquest or expansion9
and labour, 10  which could be viewed in either of these two approaches. However, 
literature has tended to portray them as inactive recipients (victims) of Japanese (or 
Russian) subjugation, hinting at the dominant top-down perspective. On the surface, this 
is a problem of sources used, but deeper down it is the sources and their interpretation 
that is reflective of ideology as well, where the state holds all authenticity. 
In more recent work, there have been some small gestures to portray these peoples 
as active participants in history by showing their resistance to the “invaders.” 11 
Sympathetic, or possibly even empathetic, non-indigenes have written most of the better 
known work that includes and gives a “voice” to Indigenous people on their behalf. 
While a smaller selection of work written by Indigenous people themselves does exist, it 
appears that it is less well known and distributed. One reason for this is that very little of 
what they have published has been translated into English, thus narrowing the 
international audience. A few examples of Ainu who have written rather extensively in 
 
6 Rana Mitter, The Manchurian Myth (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000); Louise Young, 
Japan’s Total Empire (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999); Matsusaka Toshihisa Tak, The 
Making of Japanese Manchuria, 1904-1932 (Cambridge: Harvard University Asia Centre, 2001). 
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lowest possible level in the hierarchy of any UN human rights bodies. In late 2000, the General 
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Forum on Indigenous Issues, <http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/unpfii/index.html> (6 April 2006) and 
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8 Howell, Geographies; Siddle, Race, Resistance; Tessa Morris-Suzuki, “Creating the Frontier: Border, 
Identity and History in Japan’s Far North,” East Asian History 7 (1994): 1-24; Michael Weiner, “The 
Invention of Identity: Self and Others in Pre-War Japan,” in Japan’s Minorities: The Illusions of 
Homogeneity, ed. Michael Weiner (London: Routledge, 1997). 
9 Takakura Shinichiro, “The Ainu of Northern Japan: A Study in Conquest and Acculturation,” (J. 
Harrison, trans.) The American Philosophical Review 50.4 (1960). 
10 David L. Howell, Capitalism from Within: Economy, Ecology, and the State in a Japanese Fishery 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995). 
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category, for example, Nomura Giichi, Ainu minzoku o ikiru (Tokyo: Sofukan, 1996); Kayano Shigeru, 
Ore no Nibutani (Tokyo: Suzusawa shoten, 1975). 
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Japanese include Kayano Shigeru, Chikappu Mieko, Keira Keiko, Nomura Giichi and 
Kawamura Kenichi.12 It is even more interesting to note that often when a person of 
Indigenous background writes about their own people, the general public, and academia, 
often label them as “activists,” which has potential to lead us to not taking them as 
seriously or as formally as academics or scholars. 
 In some cases the literature has taken on the global trend of moving from a view 
of the Native as “savage” to one as a “noble savage.”13 That is, they have moved from 
being “backward” and in need of civilisation to survive to a position that has 
romanticised them and suggests that they possess something valuable to offer “modern” 
peoples spiritually, medically, environmentally and/or theoretically. “Modern,” according 
to many authors, was something that aboriginals were not. The idea of “modern” was a 
dynamic and evolving term similar to that of the developing and somewhat overlapping 
terms of “race” (jinshu) and “ethnic” (minzoku). To simplify the matter, many Wajin 
associated modernity with westernisation, which partly consisted of industry and 
European and North American “high” culture and furniture, along with subjugation over 
others in the form of colonies. 
 Although this is a general trend in changing perceptions of aboriginal peoples 
both inside and outside of the Japanese empire, it would be misleading to say that the 
terms and ideas of “savageness” and “noble savage” were directly linked to 
“backwardness” and romanticism. For example, as Faye Yuan Kleeman indirectly 
pointed out, Wajin were able to perceive a “Native” as being “backward” and lacking 
“modernity,” and at the same time be an object of romantic ideals, which did not 
encourage pressuring them to become “civilised.” Kleeman’s account of Yanagi 
Muneyoshi (1889-1961) in her book Under an Imperial Sun demonstrates this. Yanagi 
was a creator of the arts and crafts movement (mingei undo) and a promoter of Japanese 
culture outside of naichi, mainland Japan. According to Yanagi, Ainu and other 
aboriginal folk arts were “pure,” since they had an ability to “resist Western modernity” 
and for this he praised them. This implies that to be pure was to be non-western. But at 
the same time he said that “they [aboriginal people] cannot tell good art from the bad. It 
will take a Japanese to discern the beauty [for them].”14 This is a good example of 
contradictions in the perceptions of Indigenous people that existed under the umbrella of 
Japanese influence and rule that grew out of stereotypes of concepts and ideas of the 
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Other that worked to reinforce Japan’s own identity. 15  Part of this identity is the 
attachment to national lands, or “inherent territory” including that of the four islands in 
dispute between Japan and Russia. 
Slow to Recognise Colonial Encounters, Trends Moving Against State-
Centered, Nationalistic History and the Silencing Effect of the Frontier 
Thesis 
In his article published in 2000, Andre Schmid pointed out that Western histories of 
Japan have isolated Japan to “island history” and have been slow to recognise its colonial 
encounters. 16  When they did, they separated colonial history from national history. 
Literature on Meiji Japan has been largely from a top-down orientation and in some cases 
developed similarities to Japanese colonial literature where authors centre on the nation.17 
Without literature on Japanese colonies, many characteristics of Japan’s sense of self and 
national identity that developed because of them would be absent. Louise Young, in her 
book Japan’s Total Empire, addressed this issue by making use of a bottom-up, or grass 
roots view of Japan. In doing so she debunked several myths regarding Japanese 
imperialism. For example, she noted that there was widespread public support for 
Japanese expansion and colonial enterprises especially in Manchukuo. However, she also 
recognised that there was some resistance, and not all Japanese people were cooperative 
or supportive of expansion in Manchukuo. In The Manchurian Myth, Mitter also took a 
grass roots approach by focusing on individuals and deflated the myth that there was 
widespread and strong resistance in Manchukuo to the Japanese between 1931 and 1933. 
These two scholars tried to offer a unique approach to scholarship on the area by 
avoiding the common top-down approach. Both authors would acknowledge there is an 
absence when it comes to the colonised voice, but neither addressed that of Indigenous 
peoples.18 
The oft-used top-down approach in the rich body of literature on modern 
Northeast Asian historical study has traditionally focused on the history of, and relations 
between, four states: China, Japan, Korea and Russia/Soviet Union. Whether the studies 
focus on the Sino-Japanese war, the Russo-Japanese war, the Manchurian Incident, the 
Korean War, the Asia-Pacific War, or even the Northern Territories dispute, the centre of 
discussion has been on these four countries. This is reflective of a historiography that has 
taken the nation-state as the focal subject and that from such a perspective these four 
states have dominated the region for centuries. Much of the foreign policy literature of 
Japan focuses on relations with the United States, thus scholars have added a fifth state. 
Ian Nish, known for his writing on Anglo-Japanese alliance, moved beyond this and 
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16 Andre Schmid, “Colonialism and the ‘Korea Problem’ in Historiography of Modern Japan: A 
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18 Young, Total Empire; Mitter, Manchurian Myth.
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added other European countries to his study on Japanese foreign policy.19 However, by 
viewing History of Northeast Asia in terms of these four, plus several American-
European dominating states, historians have tended to overlook much smaller and less 
formal communities that existed in between the states and that these communities were 
not given agency as state actors. It follows that since they did not have agency as a nation 
or state, scholars did not necessarily consider them worthy of study. The top-down 
approach mutes communities that include Indigenous peoples of Sakhalin, the Kuril 
Islands, Hokkaido, Manchukuo, Taiwan and the Pacific Islands.  
Before returning to the topic of approaches of historical study I will briefly 
address possible forces pushing against this trend. A professor at Keisen University in 
Japan, Uemura Hideaki, concluded one of his articles on Okinawa by asserting  
 
…for 150 years, due to the absence of a perspective on indigenous 
peoples’ rights Japanese history and social sciences in general has been 
deceived by the sophistry of the Great Japanese Empire. Hokkaido and 
Okinawa have been left out of the field of colonial problems. As a result, 
the idea of facing up to the fact that colonial policies and assimilation 
policies are continuing as before has been forgotten.20 
This idea of the nonexistence of “rights” dating back to “one hundred fifty years” could 
be extended because such an idea of “Indigenous rights” itself is rather new and did not 
begin significant international development until after World War II following the 
emergence and expansion of ideas and discourse on “human rights.” Connected with this 
discourse on human rights is the even more recent and slow development of the idea of 
“Indigenous peoples’ rights” that before World War II was not a pressing issue. The 
elaborate use of terra nullius when referring to lands inhabited by aboriginal peoples 
gives clear evidence that international law did not apply to such people. While the last 
sentence in the quote by Uemura refers to current situations on the two land areas on 
opposite poles of Japan, it would also be beneficial to think of this in terms of scholarship 
on the subject of Indigenous and colonial studies in general. The forgotten colonial and 
assimilation policies to which Uemura refers are particularly relevant to the Northern 
Territories. Writing the Indigenous habitants out of important roles and mutually 
influencing occurrences throughout Japan’s colonial experience is in itself also a type of 
colonialism of scholarship, which Beier would surely call advanced-colonialism.  
Prasenjit Duara, a History professor at the University of Chicago, would argue 
that Young and Mitter fit into typical scholarship that tends to take either one of two 
nationalistic perspectives in relation to Manchukuo. That is, one of victimisation/false 
Manchukuo or a puppet state. While it appears neither Young nor Mitter fully conform to 
either stance, Duara indirectly puts them in this category: 
 
19 Ian Nish, Japanese Foreign Policy in the Interwar Period (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2002). 
20 Uemura Hideaki, “The Colonial Annexation of Okinawa and the Logic of International Law: The 
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When writing of the experiences of people, whether ordinary or elite, the 
expectation is that they cannot but be reduced to symbols of victimization, 
collaboration, or resistance. My objection to this position is not that we 
should not denounce a brutal regime, but that this narrative itself is shaped 
by a nationalist politics that channels history into very narrow passages. 
This is true not only of contemporary Chinese writings, but also of much 
Western and postwar Japanese historiography. 
 
He also recognises that there has been a focus on negative affects on peoples’ lives and, 
as a result, historians have not done as much work on wider and potentially positive 
outcomes.21 Schmid illuminated that a top-town approach can fall prey to nationalistic 
history, now Duara has come to a similar conclusion for history written from a local 
perspective. This shows the importance of addressing the Ainu and the Northern 
Territories within three levels of interaction. 
 Duara does not appear to answer the question of whether the approach of focusing 
on individuals or grass root movements is a necessary evil or something that historians 
should avoid. Leaving the reader unclear on this question, he attempted to create a history 
that did not depend on nationalistic perspectives by utilising a global-systems approach 
towards Manchukuo. In doing so he made use of a geographical approach by taking on a 
Manchukuo-centered approach, which moved his scholarship one step away from 
becoming nationalistic in nature. This is also characteristic of how Brett Walker recently 
wrote about Yezo, the area now known as Hokkaido, in his book The Conquest of Ainu 
Lands. 22  Instead of looking at the island strictly as a frontier leading to inevitable 
conquest by the Japanese, he centered the land. This makes it difficult to see the island in 
terms of a unilateral northward movement of the Japanese.  Both Duara and Walker make 
use of this “new Western” history that works to avoid turning places into frontiers that 
ultimately silence the local populations and view expansion as inevitable.23 
One possible disadvantage of this method, as is evident in Walker’s book, is that 
inconsistencies may surface in the writing. For example Walker claims to write from the 
perspective of an ecological centre where disease and changing connection to the land is 
supposedly the focus of his arguments for change in Ainu society. Yet at the same time 
he shows indirectly and without explicitly admitting it that commercialisation and 
economics, which increased with Wajin encroachment, were two factors to changing 
relations and declining autonomy of the Ainu. This, therefore, indirectly implies that the 
Ainu could not be modern. If commerce disrupted the fragile pre-modern world of the 
Ainu it is further proof that they were incapable of surviving in a world of modernity, 
further supporting, albeit indirectly, concepts of Social Darwinism. Another example of 
such inconsistency is that it is unclear if he thinks Ainu “ethnicity” emerged around or 
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Politics of Sameness: Placing Okinawa in Meiji Japan,” Japanese Studies 20.1 (2000): 17-31). 
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before the sixteenth century following the Shakushain war in the seventeenth century.24 
Lastly, by adopting a geographical focal point he moves away from a teleological and 
deterministic history on one hand but this also makes it appear, to some extent, as though 
the Ainu were accidentally colonised and that neither the Wajin nor Russians had 
historical agency. Nonetheless, the approach he utilised worked towards moving away 
from nationalistic historical interpretations for which both Duara and Schmid have shown 
distaste. 
 For the purpose of identifying the role of smaller and less formal communities in 
so-called border lands, Duara and Walker open up more possibilities for egalitarian 
discourse. Older historical writing has not necessarily ignored writing on these 
communities, but the authors have traditionally approached them as frontier people, who 
were written off as pawns to their civilising and parental-like conquerors. Writers have 
used various words to describe these people including ignorant,25 barbarian, hairy26,
savage, lazy, beggars27 who were on the verge of extinction.28 In the case of the Ainu it 
almost seemed obligatory for writers to place the words “dying” or “vanishing race” 
either in the title or text.29 These perceptions, at least in part, justified the expansionists’ 
parental roles to “protect” and “civilise” them, where civilising them gave connotations 
of aboriginals learning the colonisers’ language, religion, and culture, while giving up 
their own. The global spread of ideas like Social Darwinism in the late nineteenth century 
nuanced earlier literature. While ideas of “survival of the fittest” and portrayals of 
“primitive” and “savagery” that were used in earlier writing has apparently died out in 
more recent literature, arguably these ideas have not ceased. Rather, they have taken a 
different form that exists in personal opinion, pop-culture and a tendency of non-
recognition or publication of aboriginal issues, unless they cause problems or 
inconveniences for majority societies.30 
Histories that dealt directly with colonialism tended to overlook the Indigenous 
populations as a result of utilising the frontier thesis. In other words, they put frontier or 
border lands in the scope of national interest or expansion. For example, John Stephan 
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dealt with Russian expansion into the “far east,” sensitively met the Indigenous person, 
but only mentioned them in passing and largely in relation to yasak, Russian fur tax.31 
Young did little more than confirm that the Ainu had existed in the early Japanese colony 
of Hokkaido while she addressed Japanese expansion before Manchukuo. Aboriginal 
populations of Manchukuo were not even referenced. Japanese scholar Takakura 
Shinichiro (1902-1990) also utilised this approach for his colonial history of Hokkaido. 
Although Takakura was (and still is) highly criticised by many in the Ainu community, 
he differs from others in his acknowledgement that most colonised lands were previously 
populated with aboriginal peoples. This in turn brought forth a “native problem” which 
itself was of key concern to colonial policy.32 It is curious that other “frontier” colonial 
scholars did not seem to pick up on this idea of challenging the notion of the “empty 
frontier,” which he presented in 1942. Perhaps this idea was too radical for the time. As is 
shown in Chapter Five, Takakura later used his concepts on the development of the 
native policy to support his claims that the Ainu were Japanese, and by default, so was 
the territory they inhabited. 
Faye Yuan Kleeman’s recent study on colonialism in Taiwan made a similar 
acknowledgment as Takakura. She stated that one of Japan’s first priorities on Taiwan 
was to tame and civilise the “barbaric people” which involved a “meticulous study of the 
aborigines.” However, Kleeman’s statement was less bold and even appeared slightly 
contradictory. While she recognised the importance of a “Native policy” in early stages 
of colonial efforts, she limited this idea to the case of Taiwan by stating that Taiwan was 
“Japan’s first colony.” This is somewhat odd, in that on the prior page she mentioned that 
the Japanese first moved to control Ainu and Okinawan lands before 1895. Apparently 
this did not fit Kleeman’s undefined definition of colonialism.33 
Similar to work on Manchukuo and Japanese colonial history in general, 
Indigenous studies have also had a phase of concentrating on resistance and victimisation 
(oppression). Two examples illustrate this trend. Richard Siddle, at the University of 
Sheffield, concentrated on modern resistance of the Hokkaido Ainu against the 
encroaching Japanese in his 1996 book.34 His book traces Ainu oppression and resistance 
from the late Tokugawa era to the early 1990s. The focus on resistance and oppression 
was perhaps what led him to see Ainu and Japanese histories as competing in nature.35 
Katrina Sjoberg’s account is a telling narrative of Ainu cultural mobilisation in the 1980s 
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as a means to resist complete assimilation.36 Here, the word “mobilisation,” if defined, 
could easily mean resistance against the dominant Wajin culture. At least in the case of 
the Ainu, the literature dealing with resistance to dominant cultures has faded with the 
ratification of the Ainu New Law in 1997. This also coincided with an increase in global 
interaction between Indigenous groups supported by the United Nations in such fora as 
the first International Year for the World’s Indigenous People in 1993, and the first and 
second International Decade for the World’s Indigenous People from 1995-2004 and 
2005-2014.37 
Making Connections among Japanese Colonies 
Other areas of Japanese colonies into which aboriginal people are incorporated include 
Taiwan, Manchukuo and Sakhalin.38 Nevertheless, many authors more often than not set 
these groups of people aside just as quickly as they introduce them. Huang Chih-huei, a 
researcher interested in Taiwan ethnology, did little more than acknowledge that 
Aborigines existed in Taiwan. Almost immediately after she mentioned that they were 
there during Japanese rule, she moved on.39 The 1977 work by Patricia Tsurumi went a 
little further, and in addition to seven pages of brief mention she included a five page 
appendix on aboriginal colonial education. Interestingly enough, she put the 
“concentrated” five pages at the end of the book instead of incorporating them into the 
main text, almost as if they were afterthought.40 Much of the writing on aboriginal groups 
in East Asia gives the sense that they were nothing more than objects; objects easily 
discarded after initial discussion of “first contacts,” historicising and eliminating them 
from the present and future, where they then fade into the region itself as if part of the 
flora and fauna. Much of the literature has not denied their historical existence, but 
neither has it purposefully given them attention. 
 
36 Katrina Sjoberg, The Return of the Ainu: Cultural Mobilization and the Practice of Ethnicity in 
Japan (Chur, Switzerland: Harwood Academic Publishers, 1993). It is unfortunate that her work is 
filled with errors and unnecessary complications (for example she continually refers to “Japan” as 
Nihon). Also see, Miyajima Toshimitsu, The Land of the Elms, translated by Robert Witmer, 
(Etobicoke, ON: United Church Publishing House, 1998). For work on North American and South 
American Native resistance and victimization from an aboriginal perspective see work by Ward 
Churchill and Eduardo Galeano. For example, Ward Churchill, Struggle for the Land: Native North 
American Resistance to Genocide, Ecocide and Colonisation (San Francisco: City Lights, 2002); 
Eduardo Galeano, Open Veins of Latin America, translated by Cedric Belfrage (New York: Monthly 
Review Press, 1973, 1997). 
37 Also see note 7. For a copy of the goals for the International decade starting from 2005 see, “Second 
International Decade of the World’s Indigenous People” E/CN.4/Sub.2/RES/2005/19 
<http://ap.ohchr.org/documents/E/SUBCOM/resolutions/E-CN_4-SUB_2-RES-2005-19.doc> (30 
November 2006). 
38 Duara, Sovereignty, 179-208; Tessa Morris-Suzuki, “Northern Lights,” 662-663; Emiko Ohnuki-
Tierney, The Ainu of the Northwest Coast of Sakhalin (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1974); 
Paul Barclay, “An Historian”; Patricia Tsurumi, Japanese Colonial Education in Taiwan, 1895-1945 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1977), 45, 231-235. 
39 Huang Chih-huei, “The Transformation of Taiwanese Attitudes toward Japan in the Post-colonial 
Period,” in Imperial Japan and National Identities in Asia, 1895-1945, ed. Li Naranoga and Robert 
Cribb (New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003), 297-298. 
40 Tsurumi, Colonial Education, 2-6, 9, 45, 231-235. 
35
Duara, in his dense chapter on the Oroqen of Manchukuo, delves even deeper into 
the issue. He challenged the centrifugal vantage point and showed how ideas of the 
aboriginal affected ideology of nationalism and identity. This was done by moving away 
from the frontier thesis and taking on Manchukuo as a centre area. He draws our attention 
to the idea that the Japanese had an “urge to see the Self in the primitive Other.”41 This is 
a highly provocative and suggestive statement. Duara argues that the Japanese 
encouraged the perception of Manchukuo to be similar to the Wild West, a land where 
agriculture was not the focus, and to portray the image of “aboriginals in the forests.” 
This is similar to the treatment of the Ainu in Wajin arguments legitimising conquest by 
stating that all lands where the Ainu lived are “inherent territory,” such as the Northern 
Territories. It is worth mentioning that he borrowed these ideas from Faye Yuan 
Kleeman.42 Indirectly through Duara, it is apparent that Kleeman also considered that a 
“romanticised” aboriginal view was important to not only Taiwan but also Manchukuo. 
Unfortunately, Duara in his own book did not further connect this idea to other 
“primitive” peoples within Japanese colonial rule, such as the Ainu and Okinawans. He 
borrowed this idea from Kleeman who viewed Taiwan as Japan’s first colony, and this 
was outside of the scope of his volume. Nonetheless, two years before the publication of 
Duara’s book, independent writing showed a similar situation on Karafuto (Sakhalin).  
In 2001, Tessa Morris-Suzuki wrote about how the Aboriginal peoples on the 
island of Karafuto were used to form an identity of that island. Not only is the use of 
identity similar to Duara’s description, but so is the accompanied denial or covering up of 
the existence of Chinese and Korean inhabitants through the use of romanticising the 
Native and building an image of a common ancestry.43 Duara, Kleeman and Morris-
Suzuki have similarly recognised the roles of Indigenous groups in relation to Japanese 
colonial efforts yet connections have not explicitly been made.  
 Other authors have acknowledged a similar connection between Okinawa and 
Hokkaido with later colonies. Most tend to either agree with or write similar ideas in their 
own work. Mark Peattie, in Nanyo: the Rise and Fall of Micronesia, draws our attention 
to similar Japanese administration policies between the Japanese mandated islands of 
Micronesia and Korean and Taiwan, but failed to elaborate.44 We need to trace Korean 
and Taiwanese polices back further through suggestions of other scholars.  
Siddle exposed some interesting documents, unearthed by then graduate student 
Inoue Kaoru in 1989,45 that reveal official contact by the Governor General of Korea with 
both Hokkaido and Karafuto governments seeking recommendations for Japanizing 
 
41 Duara, Sovereignty, 186. 
42 Duara, Sovereignty, 174, notes 11, 12 on page 177. 
43 Morris-Suzuki, “Northern Lights,” 645-741. 
44 Mark Peattie, Nanyo: The Rise and Fall of Japanese in Micronesia, 1885-1945 (Honolulu: 
University of Hawaii Press, 1988), 108-111.  
45 Inoue, a graduate student at Hokkaido University’s Department of Education, accidentally found 
these documents at National Diet Library. Sapporo Ainu Cultural Association’s Toyokawa Shigeo 
also says that the colonial policy in Korea relied extensively on Ainu assimilation policy (“Karafuto 
Ainu kosekiho ga shijiki – ‘Nominka’ shokuminchi keiei no shichu,” Asahi Shinbun, 21 October 
1989). 
36
names since such a policy had already been implemented in regard to the Ainu.46 He does 
not inform the reader if the responses given were used or influenced Korean policies. Nor 
does he inform us if they contacted Okinawan authorities on a similar matter. Siddle 
concludes this intriguing fact with: “The assimilation policies applied to Japan’s first 
colonial subjects were now informing policies of forced assimilation in the more recent 
parts of the empire.” An article by Steve Rabson provides an answer for the later question 
about if the same authorities contacted Okinawa. He wrote renaming to Japanese names 
was voluntary in Okinawa, unlike in Korea later on.47 Rabson did not mention that even 
before Korea, government officials gave Japanese names to the Ainu. From this, a 
possible reason why they wrote to Hokkaido and Karafuto authorities and were not likely 
to have written to those in Okinawa is because there was no such need for a forced policy 
of renaming the local populace in the later area. This is one example of how similarities 
existed between aboriginal colonies, yet they each had their own peculiarities. 
Uemura Hideaki also suggested how the strategy of first denying diplomatic 
rights of the people in the Ryukyu Kingdom, then having the central government declare 
diplomatic rights on their behalf, was a strategy the Japanese later used in Korea with the 
establishment of the Residency-General Agency in Seoul.48 Michael Weiner tells us that 
“The Meiji period also witnessed the establishment of a colonial order in Hokkaido. 
Employing institutional and administrative mechanisms very similar to those which 
would later be deployed in Korea and Taiwan…” Shortly after this passage he continued 
by stating that “in a process which would be repeated elsewhere in the empire, the Ainu 
were gradually constructed as a primitive and ‘racially’ immature ‘Other’ in a discourse 
which justified and rendered the colonial project inevitable.”49 It is unfortunate he stated 
this so matter-of-factly; he did not elaborate on this and give the reader details of what, 
where and how such processes were copied. The Indigenous contribution, direct or 
indirect, seemed to be quite important to the Japanese colonial order. 
Brett Walker, building on an idea presented by Peter Duus’ book Abacus and the 
Sword, also agreed that there are important connections between Ezo and Korean 
colonisation. The areas of resemblance are in the close connection between political and 
economic ties that occurred first in Ezo and later in Korea. Walker also mentioned that 
there are also “important distinctions” between the two. Regrettably, he fails to expand 
on explaining exact similarities or differences of such links.50 
Connection between policies in Ezo, Ryukyu and Manchukuo are also evident. 
For example, Duara wrote of how the Oroqen were segregated and banned from taking 
part in agriculture and from integrating with other people as a means to “preserve” them 
during the 1930s. This sounds familiar to Japanese policies towards aboriginal people in 
Taiwan and even prior to this towards the Ainu in the nineteenth century under Matsumae 
 
46 Siddle, Race, Resistance, 145, note 94 on 229. 
47 Steve Rabson, “Meiji Assimilation Policy in Okinawa,” in New Directions in Study of Meiji Japan,
ed. Helen Hardacre (New York: Brill, 1997), 646. 
48 Uemura Hideaki, “Colonial Annexation of Okinawa,” 116. 
49 Weiner, “Invention of Identity,” 10. 
50 Walker, Conquest of Ainu, 13-14. Also see Peter Duus, Abacus and the Sword: The Japanese 
Penetration of Korea, 1985-1910 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995), 23-24. 
37
rule. Some Ainu were even severely punished for learning Japanese during these times.51 
This was still the period in which the reaction to modernisation had not yet set in so the 
noble savage discourse should not have been well established.  
Another example is the connection between the Japanese Imperial line and the 
Ryukyuan King Shotai and that of Emperor Pu Yi in Manchukuo. In order to give Japan 
symbolic rule they connected the Imperial family to that of the Ryukyu Kingdom. Later 
on they used a similar strategy in Manchukuo, when they connected the newly enthroned 
Pu Yi (whom the Japanese forced back into rule) to the Japanese emperor as an official 
half brother in 1940.52 The question here remains to what extent did the experience and 
decision to “adopt” King Shotai to the Imperial line influence the decision making in the 
latter. This requires further investigation. 
It is also significant that many of the upcoming anthropologists were connected 
first to the Ainu and Okinawans and then branched off to various other areas where 
colonial institutions permitted them to operate. For example, after studying the Ainu in 
Hokkaido, Yoshida Iwao went to Taiwan; in the late 1920s Fujii Tanotsu went to 
Micronesia; and in the 1930s scholars joined research organisations like the East Asia 
Research Institute.53 Although European and American anthropological debates and ideas 
greatly influenced these anthropologists, they were able to apply them and blend them 
with prior ideas and stereotypes developed during the Tokugawa times. It would be 
interesting to investigate details of the spread of Anthropology that was largely initiated 
through contact with the Ainu. The newly developing academia in Japan during Japanese 
expansion produced many scholars who later became associated with the Northern 
Territories.  
To say that Japan’s colonies were completely similar would be to deny each area 
and people their own agency, experience and history. Yet we will find commonalities in 
ideas and policies that had roots in dealing with aboriginal peoples. These commonalities 
do not suggest that the policies had equal effectiveness in each of these areas during 
different times. To quote the Canadian Métis architect Douglas Cardinal, “A balance does 
not exist at this time as there is no input by Native people into this world.”54 In other 
words, the input they have made, either directly or indirectly, through relational discourse 
and experience, is often either not acknowledged or downplayed by academic writing. 
Summary 
Andre Schmid noted a lack of work on Japanese colonial history, and in particular the 
dearth of published materials on Korea in colonial affairs. 55  If he considers Korean 
history to be understudied within this genre, then Indigenous Studies in relation to 
Japanese colonial history lags even more. A large body of writing separates Aboriginal 
studies and colonial history, and, when they are connected, the literature tends to have 
 
51 Duara, Sovereignty, 182; Siddle, Race, Resistance; Kleeman, Imperial Sun, 140.
52 Duara, Sovereignty, 65-66. 
53 Siddle, Race, Resistance, 85. 
54 Douglas Cardinal and Jeannette Armstrong, The Native Creative Process (Penticton, BC: Theytus 
Books, 1991), 17. 
55 Schmid, “Korean Problem.” 
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centrifugal, local or regional characteristics. In other words, many authors have viewed 
Indigenous peoples as inactive reactors to outward and expanding influence from 
metropolitan centers in Japan and in isolated areas such as Okinawa, Taiwan, Sakhalin or 
Hokkaido. Scholars viewed these peoples as savages in need of civilisation and 
modernisation, and that paternalism was an important method for achieving these goals. 
As well, paternalistic acts have helped to ensure the muting of Indigenous perspectives. 
Since these people were “childlike” it allowed the fatherly nation-state to speak on the 
behalf of these people. A centering of geography and a movement away from 
nationalistic approaches have fostered a sense of potential worth, although the nation-
state still shows reluctance in releasing its prior control and portrayal of these peoples. 
International trends, at least partially supported by international bodies, have also 
supported theoretical centering of areas where aboriginal people live. This development, 
however, has been slow to catch on in Asia perhaps because the concept of state is 
increasingly questioned in the west and is for very specific reasons left unquestioned in 
Asia.  
Regional historical studies alone are unsuccessful in bridging connections 
between Indigenous peoples through colonial experiences. With the build up of regional 
studies on Indigenous peoples within colonial Japanese history, scholars do not appear to 
have made a serious attempt to make connections between the areas, despite the active 
debates on approaches historians should use (top-down, bottom-up, centering geography 
or people) to move away from state-centered interpretations. While more literature brings 
Indigenous peoples into the picture of Japanese colonialism, on a grander scale it is stuck 
in an era of perceived irrelevance. While the distinction is perhaps superficial, it appears 
there is a separation between Native Studies and colonial studies. This is rather ironic 
because they are intricately connected as the latter helped create the former and vice 
versa. Native Studies is often seen as an extension of Anthropology, thus denying 
Indigenous people a history. However, growing efforts by international nongovernmental 
organisations (both aboriginal and non-aboriginal) and international bodies such as the 
United Nations WGIP and PFII have been encouraging general comparative Indigenous 
studies to both include and move past the study of their traditional culture, bringing them 
into the present. Colonial studies scholars, on the other hand, are still having difficulty in 
seeing that colonial experiences were and are mutually influencing, especially in regards 
to Native peoples. When a writer combines these two areas of research a hybrid of 
Anthropological-History emerges. It is possible that this merger between two (artificially) 
separated areas of study presents a problem for dealing with Indigenous peoples within 
the context of Japanese colonial history. The case of the Northern Territories fits into this 
area, because the lands in question were previously Ainu lands that were absorbed by 
Japan as a result of long periods of contact between Ainu and Wajin and external forces 
from Russia, and later other Western colonial nations, which directly and indirectly 
encouraged Japan to “develop” the lands during their nation-building endeavors. 
Connecting this dispute with Indigenous colonial studies also requires the addition of 
Political Science and International Law, to which the dispute is academically associated. 
Unlike other empires which were forced into a slow, painful and protracted 
decolonisation, such as France and England, the Japanese empire disappeared overnight 
from the official record. The trauma of war surrender has allowed Japan to forget the 
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empire and the imperial courses of war.56 And in the post-World War II period, the 
Japanese have not been forced to confront domestic and international effects of their 
colonies. As well, there are common elements to the colonial experience that would shed 
light on Japan’s experience. One such experience is that of their involvement with the 
Okhotsk region and its peoples in which the Northern Territories are a part. Such ideas 
encourage working towards further connecting Indigenous peoples with colonial history 
in the Asia-Pacific region from a non-centrifugal, non-nationalistic approach starting with 
the case of the Northern Territories in a broader context, including colonialism and 
nation-building, than scholars have traditionally used. 
Many of the ideas presented by Japanese colonial scholars may strike a parallel 
with recent Canadian history on First Nations. The now popular usage of “Native-
newcomer relations” implies a movement away from the idea of frontier, and a push 
towards “centering” geography or even centering aboriginal peoples themselves.57 This 
shows an emerging overlap between Indigenous (Native) and historical studies. In 1996, 
Siddle called Indigenous history and other histories to be “competing histories.”58 It is 
possible with such an emergence of studies based on Native-newcomer relations that 
these histories may begin to be less competing and more complimentary in nature. 
Perhaps this is still a little too optimistic for the majority of current research, but we need 
to start somewhere, and this thesis is starting with the Ainu and their relation to the 
Northern Territories dispute.  
 
56 For an analysis of Japanese World War II memory loss in post-war years see, Igarashi Yoshikuni, 
Bodies of Memory: Narratives of War in Postwar Japanese Culture, 1945-1970 (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2000). 
57 Two such examples are J.R. Miller, Reflections of Native-Newcomer Relations (Toronto: University 
of Toronto Press, 2004) and Alan Cairns, Citizens Plus (Vancouver: University of B.C. Press, 2000). 
By “centering Indigenous peoples” I imply taking them as legitimate actors and limiting them to 
subjects or participants of history. 
58 See note 35. 
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CHAPTER 3 
Historical Overview of Ainu-Wajin Relations 
 
If little is generally known either in Japan or in Europe concerning the 
Natives of Yezo, the reason must be sought in the remoteness of the 
subject from topics of general interest.1
Although Basil-Hall Chamberlain wrote the above quote in 1887 while teaching at the 
Tokyo Imperial University, the nuance of this excerpt still applies to a large extent 
today. 2 Chamberlain foreshadowed later treatment of Indigenous peoples in general 
through prisms of academic and government-centered interests. Literature involving the 
Ainu is ever increasing in both journalistic and scholastic writing by both Ainu and non-
Ainu peoples.3 However, as Chamberlain bluntly pointed out, this large body of literature 
goes fundamentally unnoticed – and if read, as the Ainu cultural-political leader Kayano 
Shigeru (1926-2006) noted, not taken seriously – due to its “remoteness.”4 This sense of 
remoteness underlies current scholarship on the Northern Territories when the issue of 
the Ainu is brought to the discussion table. 
This chapter introduces Ainu history as a means to provide important and 
necessary historical background to the region and to the modern day territorial dispute. 
Without better understanding the local and regional history of the Ainu and Hokkaido, 
the territory in question loses much of its significance. This chapter brings the topic of the 
Ainu closer to an important debate by outlining a local and regional Ainu history that is 
not only important but necessary to further understanding the Northern Territories today. 
Although directly tied to Japanese history, this chapter does not see the history of the 
Ainu as being underneath the hegemony of it despite its inherent interconnectedness. Due 
to the relational aspects of the Ainu and Wajin, informing a history based strictly on the 
Ainu experience fails to tell a larger portion of the whole and Wajin historical analysis 
without inclusion of the Ainu is itself incomplete and supportive of the status quo that 
works to mute Indigenous peoples in Japan and abroad. The incorporation of Ainu history 
deserves attention in its own right and works to build a better understanding of the Ainu 
and their relations to the land, time and peoples associated with the Northern Territories 
dispute. The history of Ainu as documented during Tokugawa and Meiji eras is well 
 
1 Basil-Hall Chamberlain, “The Language, Mythology and Geographical Nomenclature of Japan 
viewed in Light of Aino Studies,” Memoirs of the Literature College, Imperial University of Japan No. 
1 (Tokyo: The Imperial University, 1887), 1.  
2 According to Beier’s argument we could consider this connected to what he labeled the 
“hegemonologue.” 
3 For a look at articles concerning the Ainu in Japanese newspapers see, Table 1: Ainu in the Press. 
4 Charles T. Whipple, “Voice from the Dust,” < http://www.charlest.whipple.net/kayano.html > (10 
November 2006).  
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established; this chapter highlights relevant background information on the Ainu, putting 
the issue of the Northern Territories into context in terms of Ainu history. 
Only since 1869 has Hokkaido referred to the large island north of Honshu. 
Discussion on the Northern Territories focuses for the most part on events subsequent to 
the name change and official incorporation of Hokkaido lands into the national. The 
notion of discovery used when discussing areas such as the Kurils, Mamiya Strait, and 
Sakhalin completely ignores one very important facet, that is, the Indigenous people of 
these areas.5 Strategically planned or not, using the Northern Territories as a debate 
which primarily utilises documents associated with World War II and the Cold War takes 
the focus away from Hokkaido and its absorption into Japan. This dispute reinforces 
Japan’s claim to Hokkaido and other islands that were inhabited by the Ainu. As 
stipulated by the San Francisco Peace Treaty, Japan had to renounce all lands that they 
had taken by force or greed. If too much attention was placed on Hokkaido perhaps their 
claim and recognition of sovereignty would have been or could be questioned. 6 A
strategic way to avoid such attention was to remove it by redirecting it to lands that lay 
outside of their current sphere of control, in this case the southern portion of the Kuril 
Islands. In such an interpretation, the Northern Territories dispute acts as a mechanism by 
which to strengthen national borders and ultimately the state – a continuation of state-
building in the present. 
Before Meiji’s renaming and incorporation of Hokkaido, the Japanese called these 
northern lands, minus the southern extremity of Hokkaido, including Sakhalin (Karafuto) 
and the Kurils (Chishima), Ezo or Ezochi and considered them largely foreign lands and 
not an “inherent” part of Japan. To the Ainu their lands were not a frontier or a middle 
ground, but their home, where they lived off the land and traded with their neighbours for 
means of sustenance and cultural growth, where traditions and customs were in flux, far 
from the static image portrayed in many museums in Hokkaido. They later came to work 
as labourers in Wajin semi-capitalistic fisheries in the Tokugawa era and act as guides for 
Wajin explorers and surveyors. Their relationship with the land and trade were 
intertwined and interconnected with their culture and beliefs, they were far from an 
isolated people.  
Ainu Cultural Formation and Life-Ways 
The Ainu relied heavily on hunting and gathering and small scale plot farming for their 
livelihood. Trade was also an important part of Ainu culture, as they were in contact with 
the surrounding peoples such as the Chinese, Koreans, Russians, and Wajin.7 The Nivkhi, 
Uilta, Aleut and Kamchadals are other Indigenous groups that also lived near the areas 
 
5 The Uilta and Nivkhi are also indigenous to Sakhalin. 
6 For example, there were talks of Hokkaido separation at the end of World War II (Kono Hiromichi 
Hokkaido jiyu kokuron [Sapporo: 1946]). 
7 See, Kikuchi T., “Ainu Ties with Ancient Cultures of Northeast Asia,” 47-51 and Sasaki S., 
“Trading Brokers and Partners with China, Russia, and Japan,” in Ainu: Spirit, 86-91; and Tezuka K., 
“Long-Distance Trade Networks and Shipping in the Ezo Region,” Arctic Anthropology 35.1 (1998): 
350-360. 
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the Ainu occupied, making for a rich and complex set of interactions among many 
different peoples. Having once lived throughout northeast Honshu, Hokkaido, Sakhalin, 
the Kurils, and probably around the Amur River in Siberia,8 the Ainu of today live for the 
most part in Hokkaido, numbering around 25,000 people, with smaller, yet important 
populations in Sakhalin and throughout the rest of Japan – most notably in the Kanto 
region.9
The word Ainu, which holds the meaning of human being, refers to a people that 
were physically, culturally and linguistically distinct from the Wajin.10 Archeology has 
worked to further define the birth of Ainu culture, taking attention away from internal 
creation myths. Accordingly, around 250 BCE when the agricultural society of the Yayoi 
emerged in Honshu, the cultures of Japan began to grow in different directions. Those in 
the north continued in the Jomon until the emergence of the Satsumon/Okhotsk culture 
around 700 CE, when the two cultures went through a merging period. Ultimately those 
that were part of the Satsumon culture predominated in northern Hokkaido and Sakhalin, 
resulting in the emergence of a new-Satsumon culture around the twelfth century,11 
congruent with recognisable Ainu culture. 
Ainu creation myths on the other hand are numerous and focus not on cultural 
creation but on the world of kamui or spirits. One example of such a myth is that the 
creator spirit, kotan-kor-kamuy, and his sister descended upon Mount Daisetsu, the 
largest mountain in Hokkaido, as it was emerging from the ocean and they created Ainu 
Moshir, the land of the humans, from the clouds.12 Some of the clouds became rivers and 
 
8 Amur River inhabitants see, “Amur River Peoples,” 
<http://www.mnh.si.edu/arctic/features/croads/amur.html> (4 December 2006). 
9 Estimates for the Kanto region range from 2,700 to 10,000 Ainu depending on the definition of 
Kanto. Sakhalin Ainu however small in number are bound to exist. See, Ogasawara Nobuyuki, Ainu 
sabetsu mondai dokuhon (Tokyo: Rokufu shuppan, 1997), 109-116 and AM, Ainu Moshiri.
10 David Howell aptly points out that “ethnicity” is not an applicable term to nineteenth century period 
of Ainu-Wajin relations as differences were seen in terms of customs and not ethnicity (Howell, 
Geographies). 
11 Mark Hudson, Ruins of Identity (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1999), 208. For more 
discussion about the formation of the Ainu and archaeology see pages 206-232. See also, Mark 
Hudson, “The Perverse Realities of Chang: World System Incorporation and the Okhotsk Culture of 
Hokkaido,” Journal of Anthropological Archaeology 23.3 (2004): 290-308. In early European 
writings on the Ainu, when classification of “race” was deemed important, it was often noted that the 
Ainu were a type of Caucasoid. Since then, this thesis has been proven incorrect. See, S.A. Arutiunov, 
“Ainu Origin Theories,” 29-31 and W. Fitzhugh, “Ainu Ethnicity: A History,” in Ainu: Sprit, 13-14, 
and Omoto K., “Ethnicity survived: the Ainu of Hokkaido,” Human Evolution, 12-13.1-2 (1997): 69-
70. It is interesting when archaeologists talk of Ainu creation they tend to do so in terms of culture, 
which differs greatly from concepts of ethnicity, race and status, which the Ainu were subjected to in 
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Howell talks of the Ainu in terms of status and 
customs in the nineteenth century, while Siddle, who focuses on the twentieth and twenty-first 
centuries, tends to focus on issues of ethnicity and race (Howell, Geographies and Siddle, Race, 
Resistance). 
12 Ainu Moshir means “the land where the Ainu live” or “quiet land where humans live.” Kayano has 
also translated it as “the peaceful land of the Ainu.” 
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others became rocks, soil and islands.13 John Batchelor, a British missionary who lived 
and worked close to many Ainu for over half a century, recorded several creation stories 
involving Aeoina kamui (also called Ainu rak-guru) or “the divine tradition holder” 
where it was said that humans were created from willow and earth.14 
No matter the specific date of the arrival of Ainu culture, it is unquestioned that 
they inhabited the islands of Hokkaido, southern Sakhalin and the Kurils before the influx 
of Wajin and Russians into the area.15 Ainu livelihood has often been referred to as a 
hunter-gatherer people, but as Tessa Morris-Suzuki notes, many Ainu had similar 
agricultural practices not so different to many Wajin.16 The aspect of the Ainu being 
strictly a hunter-gatherer society has led many scholars to overlook the agricultural aspect 
as raised by Morris-Suzuki. Trade was also important for Ainu livelihood. Many Wajin 
trade goods gradually became a part of their customs by the mid-eighteenth century in the 
Kuril chain (even earlier in other parts of Ezochi).17 It is this trade network that initially 
encouraged both Russians and Wajin to move further and further into the traditional Ainu 
lands. During early contacts between the Ainu and Wajin both parties gained from trade. 
With Wajin expansion into northeastern Honshu from late eighth century well into the 
tenth century18 and southern Ezochi from the fifteenth century to the late nineteenth 
century,19 the trade gradually became a means by which Ainu were disadvantaged and in 
many communities Wajin forced Ainu to work for their interests, which included, fishing, 
hunting, and farming, which along with the disastrous effect of disease, displaced much 
of the Ainu way of life and religion.20 
13 Ogihara Shinko, “Mythology and Animal Tales,” in Ainu: Spirit, 274.
14 John Batchelor, Ainu Life and Lore (Tokyo: Kyobunkan, 1927; London: Johnson Reprint 
Corporation, 1971), 113-126. Brett Walker addresses the creation myth involving wolves and canines 
The Lost Wolves of Japan (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2005), 9, 20, 83-85, 169.  
15 It is debated how far south into Honshu the Ainu lived, as there are Ainu derived names all over 
Japan. See, Suzuko Tamura, “Ainu Language: Features and Relationships,” Ainu: Spirit, 60-62. 
16 Tessa Morris-Suzuki, “Creating the Frontier: Border, Identity and History in Japan’s Far North,” 
East Asian History 7 (1994): 17-22. 
17 Such goods included rice, tobacco, sake, lacquer ware, iron pots, and textiles. See, Kaoru Tezuka, 
“Long Distant Trade Networks and Shipping in the Ezo Region,” Arctic Anthropology 35.1 (1998): 
355, 357; Iwasaki Naoko, “Zendaikin Ainu no ‘takura’ to sono shakaiteki kino,” Shirin 78.5 (1995): 
107-128. Ezochi was divided into Eastern and Western sections. 
18 For discussion on Wajin military movement into Northern Japan see, Karl Friday, “Pushing Beyond 
the Pale: The Yamato Conquest of the Emishi and Northern Japan,” Journal of Japanese Studies 23.1
(Winter 1997): pp. 1-24. See also, Brett Walker, Conquest of Ainu, 21-22. 
19 During the twelfth and thirteenth centuries Ezo was used for exiling Wajin criminals, but this does 
not constitute conquest of the lands. For discussion on establishment of Wajin controls in southern 
Ezo see, Friday, “Pushing Beyond,” 17-24. See also, Siddle, Race, Resistance, 32-38. 
20 The Ainu religion is closely related to the Ainu way of life in which daily activities are considered 
interactions with the spirits. Humans and spirits must rely on each other. See, Yamada T. and Irimoto 
T. eds., Circumpolar Animism and Shamanism (Sapporo: Hokkaido University Press, 1997), 3-63 and 
Yamada Takako, The Ainu World View (London: Kegan Paul, 2001). 
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The Tokugawa shogunate granted the Kakizaki family in southern Ezochi the 
name of Matsumae and in 1604 Tokugawa Ieyasu’s black-seal order accorded the 
Matsumae clan exclusive trading rights with the Ainu. The order had three points, 
outlining first, that nobody was to enter or exit Matsumae for the purpose of trade with 
the Ainu unless they had been authorised by Matsumae. Second, Japanese people should 
not “cross freely into Ezo for the purpose of trade, [but] Ainu should be considered free 
to go where they please.” The last point stated: “[i]t is strictly prohibited for [Japanese] 
people to inflict injustices or crimes upon the Ainu.” It ended by stating anybody who did 
not follow these edicts would be severely punished. The shogunate continuously renewed 
this policy with only minor changes, until 1799,21 ten years after a battle in eastern Ezo. 
 The result of the spatial and political distance between Edo and Matsumae and 
those living in the area not considering Matsumae, and to a greater extent Ezochi, as a 
part of Japan provides one example of why this black-seal order did not appear to be 
strictly adhered to. When dealing with Christian missionaries moving to the area, 
Matsumae claimed in 1618 that “Matsumae is not Japan.”22 This attitude affected actual 
conditions of trade that occurred. Unlike many other areas in Japan, wet rice cultivation 
was not as profitable in the area Matsumae occupied.23 This combined with effects of 
receiving daimyo status in 1716 made those Wajin in the area incredibly dependent on 
trade with both Ainu in Ezochi and also Wajin domains in Tohoku.24 As David Howell 
explains, without the Ainu, the Matsumae could not justify their presence in Ezochi.   
 
The Japanese in Hokkaido could allow neither the assimilation nor the 
extermination of the Ainu population because, quite simply, if there were 
no Ainu, the Matsumae house would have no formal reason to exist. The 
Ainu’s barbaric identity was consequently a cornerstone of the feudal 
institutional structure of the Matsumae domain. They had no intention of 
interfering in internal Ainu world orders and stuck to outwardly visible 
symbols as stressed in the Wajin order of customs, not ethnicity.25 
The Ainu suffered the brunt of providing Matsumae with legitimacy of rule and badly 
needed income as the Matsumae gradually fell into financial despair in the eighteenth 
century; a similar situation in many domains in naichi, mainland Japan, during this 
 
21 Walker, Conquest of Ainu, 37, original in Kaiho Mineo, Chusei Ezo shiryo (Tokyo: San’ichi shobo, 
1983), 222-3. 
22 “Anjerisu no daiichi Ezo hokoku,” in Hoppo tankenki, ed. H. Chisuriku (Tokyo: Yoshikawa 
kobunkan, 1962), 49-60. Emphasis added. 
23 Morris-Suzuki, “Creating the Frontier,” 20-21 and John J. Stephan, Kurile Islands, 53; Brett Walker, 
“Reappraising the Sakkoku Paradigm: the Ezo Trade and the Extension of Tokugawa Political Space 
into Hokkaido,” Journal of East Asian Studies 30.2 (1996): 172. 
24 Siddle, Race, Resistance, 36. 
25 Howell, Geographies, 140. 
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time.26 Howell calls the early modern Japanese state (1600-1868) the mark of a new 
relationship between Ainu and Wajin, not because contact was new, but for its scale and 
political and diplomatic significance.27 
The Kunashiri-Menashi Battle of 1789 
The Kunashiri-Menashi battle of 1789 resulted from unequal trade networks based on 
short term goals (both Japanese and Russian), which exploited both human and natural 
resources in eastern Ezochi and the Kuril Islands.28 The forfeit by the Kunashiri Ainu 
chief Tsukinoe, Akkeshi chief Ikitoi and Nokamappu chief Shonko shows that there was 
intricate trade reliance and influences of Wajin over Ainu chiefs and Ainu power 
structures in eastern Ezochi. Ogawa understood this battle in terms of historical irony in 
that the outbreak of the French revolution occurred the same year that led to further 
Bakufu interest in lands that were largely outside of Edo’s political sphere, resulting in 
further Ainu dislocation from their lands in the Kuril Islands.29  
The Ainu living in the northern Kurils had been subjected to Russian 
assimilation policies since at least the mid-eighteenth century when Russians began to 
penetrate the Kurils from Kamchatka in search of “soft gold” or seal pelts.30 However, 
this was not comparable to the severity of direct assimilation policies the Bakufu 
implemented towards the Ainu of eastern Ezochi and southern Kurils ten years after the 
1789 battle.  
Wajin movement into these lands had a drastic effect on the Indigenous people’s 
lifestyle. Hidaya Kyubei, a prominent lumber merchant from Honshu, moved to Ezochi 
in 1702 to exploit Ezo pine. By the third generation his family was able to take advantage 
of Matsumae’s weak financial situation to expand their own trading territories. Hidaya’s 
 
26 Partially due to the Tokugawa shogunate’s requirement to have daimyo or domain leaders spend 
alternate years in the capital, Edo (Walker, Conquest of Ainu, 159-160). 
27 Howell, “The Ainu and the Early Modern State, 1600-1868,” in Ainu Spirit, 96. Walker wrote that 
between 1624 and1862 there were about nineteen recorded epidemics in Ezochi, including syphilis, 
which cripples peoples’ ability to reproduce. “This epidemiological history reveals that Ainu society 
underwent widespread upheaval and dislocation as a result of foreign contagions, compelling scholars 
to reexamine the early contact between Ainu and Japanese to understand how Ainu lands were 
conquered by the Japanese.” Disease limited ability to resist the Japanese. Ainu culture was dynamic 
and could change for the times but it was not enough to curb the effects of disease. In the long run this 
led to loss of faith in their cosmological world view (107). In his book on page 178 he writes, “By 
about 1800, however, following two centuries of trade, war, economic development, and cultural 
exchange, Ezo lay firmly within the realm of Japan’s disease ecology.” Before this Ezochi’s disease 
ecology was distinct (Walker, “Foreign Contagions, Ainu Medical Culture, and Conquest,” in Ainu: 
Spirit, 102, 107 and Walker, Conquest of Ainu, 178).  
28 Other major battles between involving Ainu and Wajin were the Koshamain War of 1457-57 and 
the Shakushain War of 1669. According to Okuyama battles between Ainu and Wajin were 
continuous between 1456 and 1525 (Okuyama Ryo, Ainu suiboshi [Sapporo: Miyama shoten, 1966], 
44). 
29 Ogawa, Ainu sabetsu, 102. 
30 Miyajima, Land of the Elms, 41.
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lucrative lumber trade with Edo and Osaka enabled him to send large sums of funds to 
Matsumae. Instead of paying back these loans, Matsumae granted Hidaya five additional 
trading posts in 1774-75, and secured a thirty year contract for trading rights to four of 
the areas including the Menashi area and Kunashiri, establishing the first non-permanent 
posts there. At this time eight to ten year contracts were generous, so this exceptionally 
long contract gave the Hidaya family an abundance of time to expand their interests 
beyond lumber. Their family was able to further exploit the land and people in lands 
considered unknown and independent of Matsumae.31 
In 1774, the Kunashiri Ainu leader, Tsukinoe, refused Hidaya’s request to open a 
trading post on the island. The boat and crew that Hidaya sent to make the request was 
sent away after the local Ainu removed all the goods on his boat. The Wajin responded 
by cutting off trade between the Ainu of the Menashi area and Kunashiri.32 During this 
trade sanction, Tukinoe continued trade relations with the Russians in the north. 
 The first Russian movement into the Kurils took place in the form of an 
unorganised excursion to Shumshu, the island closest to Kamchatka, in 1711. After this 
time, they moved further south along the island chain collecting prized sea otter pelts 
from the Ainu as forced tribute called yasak. Russians employed a similar pattern in Ainu 
homelands (Kurils and Sakhalin) as they had in central and eastern Siberia with Mongols 
and China of first implementing economic trade and then gradually annexing lands under 
the guise of friendship. 33  In response to Russian traders demanding ever increasing 
amounts of yasak, many Ainu moved southwards down the archipelago while the Ainu 
around Shumshu continued trading and were subjected to Russian assimilation, adopting 
Orthodox Christianity and Russian style clothing. 
Before Russian movement into the area, the Ainu were in contact with the 
Itelmens, an Indigenous group from Kamchatka. 34  Russians came to replace these 
aboriginal peoples as their main northern traders, and both the Kuril Ainu and Itelmens 
came to rely on the trade from yasak for sustenance. In 1770, the yasak system led to 
disputes as the Ainu on Uruppu refused to pay tribute, whereupon Russians killed several 
Ainu. The following year, when a group of Russians returned to the island the Ainu 
retaliated in an organised attack showing how Ainu in this part of the Kurils thought of 
themselves as benefactors of trade mediators, rather than subjects of the yasak system.35 
As Bakufu officials began to probe the area for suspected Russian trade, 
forbidden under Bakufu regulations, Wajin in Menashi gradually became more reluctant 
to accept Russian goods the Ainu had been bringing to eastern Ezo, ignoring the Hidaya 
 
31 Ezochi ikkenn (1766), np, in Ogasawara, Ainu sabetsu mondai, 102-4. 
32 Miyajima, Land of Elms, 65; Ogasawara, Ainu sabetsu mondai, 104. 
33 S.C.M. Paine, Imperial Rivals: China, Russia and Their Disputed Frontier (Armonk, NY: M.E. 
Sharpe, 1996). 
34 James Forsyth, A History of the Peoples of Siberia: Russia’s North Asian Colony 1581-1990 (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 137. 
35 Walker, Conquest of Ainu, 161-3; Stephan, Kurile Islands, 48-50. 
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sanction.36 In 1782, the Ainu of southern Kurils, reacting to the pressure of the trade 
restrictions and increasing cost of goods, especially rice, due to famine in the Tohoku 
region, agreed to let Hidaya open a trading port on Kunashiri, the first permanent Wajin 
trading post in the Kurils. The Ainu in Kunashiri, Etorofu, Akkeshi and Kiritappu had 
been out of the reach of Matsumae control and largely independent until this time.37 This 
resulted in the Ainu fishing and trading lifestyle to quickly wane as many became 
labourers of the post, a scenario that had already occurred in many other parts of Ezochi. 
Hidaya, adapting to changing times and depleting reserves of lumber and animal 
resources that were common items of wealth, began producing fish fertilizer for export to 
Honshu. In 1788, under the direction of Hidaya, Kunashiri became a fish fertilizer 
production factory run by forced Ainu labour under severe working conditions. Pay was 
poor by eighteenth century standards, and by forcing both men and women to work, the 
Ainu became unable to supplement their diet by hunting, fishing or trading. The rape of 
women and poisoning or murdering of old or weak Ainu, who were unable to work, 
became increasingly common. Those who tried to resist were beaten, fined, killed or 
threatened. Such threats included the shaving off the men’s valued beards, being 
poisoned or being boiled to death in large pots that had been prepared. A similar situation 
was also occurring in the Menashi region, across the strait from Kunashiri.38 
After the poisoning of several Ainu, a few young Ainu men, who decided to fight 
against Hidaya’s authoritative control, organised around two-hundred people in both 
Kunashiri and Menashi to take action. While the Kunashiri and Menashi Ainu chiefs 
were away in the northern Kurils, their sons planned and carried out the attacks. First, on 
7 May 1789, five Japanese posts on Kunashiri were attacked. Six days later Wajin in 
Menashi were assaulted. In total, seventy-one Wajin were killed in well organised 
incursions.39 News of the attack reached Matsumae twenty six days later, and by July, 
they sent two-hundred and sixty Wajin warriors to the Nemuro Peninsula. 
 On 21 July, thirty-seven of thirty-eight Ainu directly responsible for the Wajin 
deaths were given the death sentence of decapitation (one Ainu was killed while trying to 
run away). All other Ainu involved had to pay an Ainu form of compensation, tsugunai.
The first five were executed one by one in succession. Before the sixth could be put to 
death a few Ainu in the cell started to scream “Pewtanke!” The cry spread throughout the 
cell and soon the thousand or so Ainu spectators joined in on the cry. Pewtanke was a cry 
the Ainu used to signal the spirit world for help in times of distress. This startled the 
 
36 Walker, Conquest of Ainu, 165-172. Okuyama wrote that the first official Bakufu investigation in 
Ezochi was around 1785 or 86, where the focus was on the coasts of the Kurils and Karafuto. The 
Bakufu had more official knowledge of the Kurils and Karafuto than it did of the interior of Ezochi 
(Okuyama, Ainu suiboshi, 124). 
37 Takakura, “Ainu of Northern Japan,” 37. 
38 Miyajima, Land of Elms, 65; Ogasawara, Ainu sabetsu mondai, 105-6; Takakura, “Ainu of Northern 
Japan,” 31. 
39 Walker, Conquest of Ainu, 172-4; Miyajima, Land of Elms, 65-6. The date of attack has also been 
listed as 5 May involving 130 Ainu in, Ogasawara, Ainu sabetsu mondai, 106 and Okuyama, Ainu 
suiboshi, 104. See also, Kawakami Jun, “Douto Ainu no rekishi – Kunashiri Menashi no tatakai o 
chushin,” in Heisei 14 nendo fukyu keihatsu hokuku shu, 146-148. 
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Wajin, and in panic, they approached the cell, where the remaining thirty-one Ainu were, 
and either shot them at close range or bayoneted them to death.40 After the battle, Chief 
Ikitoi went to complain of Matsumae actions to the Russians on Etorofu.41 
News of this fight attracted the attention of the capital Edo, and with rumors of 
Russian involvement on the Ainu side, officials were sent to survey all of the resources, 
population and trade occurring in Sakhalin, Ezo and most importantly the Kurils. This 
represented the fall and end to exclusive Matsumae and Hidaya control in Ezochi. The 
Bakufu saw Matsumae as being unfit and under resourced to quell disputes, or defend 
themselves against any potential Russian movement into the area. This became the start 
of the Bakufu’s direct involvement in Ezochi.42 In 1799 they took direct control over 
eastern Ezochi, marking the beginning of official assimilation policies, and by 1808 all of 
Ezochi was under Bakufu rule. This was done to ensure no such battle would occur again, 
to prevent Russian penetration into the region and to add Ezochi resources to the 
Japanese economy.43 The most energy in enforcing the new policies was in areas closest 
to Russian contact, the Kuril Islands. Takakura argued that it was during this first stage of 
Bakufu rule in the area when “Japanese sovereignty in Ezo was confirmed…”44 Even 
though their initial direct control in this northern region only lasted until 182145 neither 
Matsumae nor Hidaya were able to receive the same amount of autonomy it had in the 
past.46 
The Kunashiri-Menashi battle represented a dynamic turning point of official Japanese 
government involvement with the Ainu and their lands, especially in the Kurils. The 
Wajin living in Ezochi and Bakufu officials had separate views of the Ainu as being 
“barbarian.” While locals viewed them from the situations of slavery, which had become 
common throughout the north, the Bakufu saw the Ainu in the light of legitimising 
Japanese expansion into the area, in attempt to keep the Russians at distance.47 These 
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views, not entirely exclusive of each other, justified both the local and Bakufu officials’ 
treatment of the Ainu to be used for their own political and economic needs. These 
included both to exploit the resources of the north and to quell any foreign (European) 
movement into the area. Implemented policies further dislocated the Ainu from their 
lands as their movement was continuously restricted. 
 Today, this battle can be looked back upon as the Russo-Japanese disputes in the 
Kuril region that started in the eighteenth century continues today. There is one 
difference however. The Ainu history in this area has been greatly marginalised by both 
governments and academics. This battle is an important part of modern Ainu recognition 
of their Indigenous rights in the Kurils, and is important for understanding Ainu 
movements for inclusion.48 
Bakufu Control of Ezochi 
The year 1799 marked the end of the black-seal order and the beginning of direct Bakufu 
administration of Ezochi, with a specific emphasis on eastern Ezo and the southern Kurils. 
The ten year delay between the battle and the beginning of Bakufu control can at least 
partially be understood through examination of Honda Toshiaki (1744-1821) in which we 
see that expansion and developing Ezochi was not a widely accepted idea before this time, 
nor was Russian threat a major concern until the late eighteenth century. Honda, the 
teacher of the famous Wajin explorer Mogami Tokunai, interested in British models of 
expansion, proposed assimilation of the Ainu, since he feared their Russification, 
expansion of navigation to survey the northern islands and increase trade. While he called 
for colonisation, most wanted nothing more than trade they could easily retreat from.49 
After the Kunashiri-Menashi battle some Bakufu officials, such as Kondo Juzo, 
sought to define previously obscure northern boundaries. In a solo trip to the island of 
Etorofu in 1798, his sixth trip to the island and seven years after the establishment of the 
first permanent trading post on Kunashiri, Kondo knocked down Russian Christian 
crosses and erected a stone pillar with the words “Etorofu of Greater Japan” inscribed on 
it.50 When the Bakufu took control over eastern Ezo, they worked to implement law there. 
Takakura, signifying the difference between Ainu and Wajin noted, however, that “It is a 
very difficult thing to enact legislation for people of a different race, language, customs, 
 
48 It was such military conflict with the Wajin that, according to Howell, encouraged Ainu to close 
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and cultural standards, for if the law is not brought into line with their habits, it can exist 
only nominally and, if the law is forced on these people, they will rebel and the result will 
be contrary to the original purpose of the laws.”51Ainu movement to Uruppu, where 
many traded with Russians, was prohibited in 180252 after Russians had set up a camp 
there, rendering them even more dependent on the Wajin for food, goods and clothing. 
Shortly afterwards, policies of Ainu assimilation and pacification were implemented 
often involving force. Many Ainu were given Wajin names and encouraged to use the 
Wajin language and wear their clothing, stressing the need to change external 
characteristics of the Ainu.53 However, upon their return to their villages they continued 
using the Ainu language and wore their own clothing.54 
The Ainu standard of living had been in continual decline since Wajin influence 
increased in eastern Ezochi. Near the end of the nineteenth century, Ainu ways of life 
were undermined, as foreign contagions spread and policies limited Ainu trade routes.55 
In an attempt to win support of the Ainu, and have them further rely on Wajin influence 
rather than their own means of sustenance, the Bakufu tried to improve their living 
conditions. Improvements thought beneficial to the Ainu, more often than not, involved 
encouraged adoption of Wajin culture, which had previously been forbidden to them. 
However, under the new assimilation initiatives and Bakufu legislation, treatment 
towards the Ainu continued on par with the previous severity. Interests in surveying and 
creating more efficient communication networks throughout the north contributed to the 
turmoil of the Ainu role as traders. The construction of roads and other 
communication/transportation networks and continued work in fisheries were main areas 
of forced Ainu labour.56 It was mainly due to these policies that the Kuril Ainu moved 
closer to Ezo, ceased their contacts with other traders in the north, and became unable to 
sustain their previous means of livelihood.57 
When the Russian threat in the Okhotsk subsided with the rise of the Napoleon 
War, the Bakufu reinstated the Matsumae clan in southern Ezochi in 1821, whereupon 
assimilation policies and trade habits returned largely to pre-1802 standards. Takakura 
noted that after an 1808 Russian invasion on Etorofu most Ainu there reverted back to 
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their own ways and by 1856 only one elderly Ainu remained wearing Japanese clothes as 
a means to obtain a government subsidy.58 
During the second period of direct Bakufu control (1855-1868) officials stopped 
using the word Ezo (a compound which uses the Chinese character “i” or other) to refer 
to the Ainu and began to call them dojin, or natives, as a means of gaining acceptance of 
their inclusion within the cultural core of Japan.59 The ka-i world view, which Japan 
adopted from the Chinese world-view in which a cultural core was civilised and lands 
and people farther away from the core were barbarian and uncivilised, was used to 
interpret its boundaries. This world view focused not on concepts of race or culture but 
on fuzoku or outward appearance. Fuzoku was easily manipulated and changed in 1850s-
60s as Ainu were “assimilated,” in order to provide a barrier between Wajin and Russians. 
Russian invasion threatened Japan’s security and they responded by trying to absorb the 
northern regions into their ka-i world order through assimilation of the Ainu. Taking a 
similar stance as Takakura, Howell argued that this showed “unequivocally” that the 
northern boundary of Ezochi in the Kurils and Sakhalin was a part of Japan even though 
until 1869 most Wajin lived along the coasts and worked in herring fisheries with limited 
knowledge of interior lands.60 
Meiji Japan and the Ainu 
As Howell, Siddle and Walker show, by the time of the Meiji Restoration in 1868 the 
traditional Ainu way of life by hunting, gathering and trading had been seriously 
compromised, the Ainu relied to some extent on capitalist structures of trade and wage 
labour, and Japanese goods, which had for centuries under the Matsumae, gradually 
become a part of changing and adapting Ainu life-ways.61 Howell wrote, 
 
Ironically, by defining the Ainu’s barbaric identity vis-à-vis the status 
system, Matsumae paved the way for the shogunate and later the Meiji 
regime to negate the validity of Ainu identity entirely. In 1855 the 
shogunate assumed direct administration of Hokkaido in response to the 
threat posed to Japanese sovereignty over the island by Russia. 
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Magistrates dispatched to Hokkaido oversaw an assimilation program 
designed to win international recognition of the Ainu’s Japanese 
nationality and hence secure Japan’s territorial rights to areas inhabited by 
the Ainu, including the Kuril Islands and southern Sakhalin, as well as 
Hokkaido. The Meiji state continued this policy after it succeeded to 
power in 1868.”62 
The newly modernising Meiji state differed from the Tokugawa system in that the latter 
did not try to impose itself on every aspect of “the individuals’ lives and minds as to 
efface any distinction between individual and national identity.”63 In 1869 Ezochi was 
renamed Hokkaido for reasons the former Utari Association director, Nomura Giichi, was 
unclear on, 64 but it is sufficient to say it aided Japan’s claims to the island, expanding 
their influence to areas north of their northern gateway, and to quell European influence 
in the area. The name “Ezochi,” using the Chinese character for “other” or “foreign,” 
meaning “foreign land” or the “land of the barbarians,” was an inappropriate name for an 
island the government considered “inherently Japanese.” Ainu customs, such as wearing 
earrings and tattooing, were banned in 1871 as an outcome of Kuroda Kiyotaka’s policy 
to treat the natives with affection, protect them and educate them.65 
Four years after the Meiji Restoration the Land Regulation Ordinance (jisho 
kisoku) declared Ainu lands as terra nullius and officially transferred all Hokkaido lands 
to crown ownership. In the same year there were ninety-two households and four-
hundred and forty-six Ainu in the Kurils recorded under the jurisdiction of Nemuro.66 
Between 1882 and 1886, Hokkaido was divided into three prefectures: Hakodate, 
Sapporo, and Nemuro. Nemuro prefecture consisted of three kuni: Nemuro, Kushiro and 
the Kurils (Chishima), along with Kitami these made up four counties. Even ten months 
after the creation of Nemuro prefecture the population of Ainu outnumbered that of 
temporary and seasonal Wajin worker-residents. 67  The official history of Nemuro 
prefecture rarely recorded accounts of the Ainu in the area. When it did, it called them 
dojin or kyudojin, indigenes/former indigenes, and recorded them in relation to Wajin 
sympathetic benevolence or population census, foreshadowing early post-World War II 
positions on the “return movement.”  
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Hokkaido Former Aborigines Protection Act, 1899 
Even before the 1899 law, the Ainu had already experienced assimilation policies. What 
makes the Hokkaido Former Aborigines Protection Act (HFAPA)68 significant is that it 
dictated and represented Wajin official Ainu policy that the government kept on the 
statues until 1997. 
The HFAPA is important to mention when discussing Ainu-Wajin relations, 
because it was one of the tools used to help further secure Wajin claim and legitimacy to 
the northern lands by encouraging Ainu to become more Japanized and further fit into the 
argument that Ainu were Japanese, a mechanism for both domestic and international 
recognition. This Act worked to further change both external and internal structures of 
Ainu lifestyle. The official reason for the introduction of the Act was written as follows: 
 
Since the beginning of the Meiji era, measures have been taken as to the 
protection of the indigenous people of Hokkaido in accordance with the 
Emperor’s notion to love every one of his subjects equally, without 
discrimination. However, they have not been completely fruitful as yet. It 
is because the benevolent influence of the Emperor’s fine government has 
not spread itself widely enough and also because the indigenous people 
were unenlightened. The natural blessings on which they had been living 
were taken away from them by the immigrants from the mainland little by 
little. As a result, they gradually lost their sources of livelihood and they 
were left in extreme poverty. It is an irresistible course of nature that the 
superior gets the better of the inferior. Nevertheless, the indigenous people 
are the subjects of the Emperor also, and so they should not be ignored 
and abandoned in their suffering. It is the duty of the nation to cure their 
misfortune through remedial measures and secure their livelihood by 
means of the appropriate industries, which is believed to meet the 
Emperor’s wishes also. This is the reason this bill shall be submitted.69 
The three main pillars of the Act were land grants to promote Wajin style agriculture, 
welfare, and establishment of schools and hospitals in Ainu communities. This Act was 
applicable to Ainu in Hokkaido and the Kurils, but not those of Sakhalin. Similar to the 
Dawes Act in the United States (see Chapter Four), the overriding purpose of the 
Protection Act was to have the Ainu move to a position within the Japanese as 
“commoners” despite their continued status as “former natives.” Provisional land granted 
to the Ainu up to 5 cho per household (15,000 tsubo or 12.25 acres) for the purpose of 
agriculture was often not surveyed, resulting in often less than this amount on wasteland 
unfit for farming. Traditionally, many Ainu in Hokkaido did have small plots where they 
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grew grains, but it differed from Ainu practices: in the Japanese system, the Ainu man 
was expected to raise crops, traditionally work of Ainu women, and no longer work as 
wage labourers or hunt which often paid better than farming. Any lands uncultivated after 
a period of fifteen years reverted back to crown lands. Innately flawed and under the 
guise of moral duty to save them, a direct influence of Social Darwinism, the Act did 
little to help the majority of Ainu for whom it was enacted. It was rather an Act to the 
Ainu for the benefit of Wajin.70 The HFAPA is addressed again in the next chapter. 
 The concepts of civilisation, progress and nation, which Siddle argued had 
become self-evident by the end of the Meiji in 1912,71 are connected to the foundation of 
the Northern Territories return movement. Tracing the movement of Wajin and Russians 
into Ainu lands during the Tokugawa era alongside the development of these concepts in 
the Meiji era helps broaden the narrow historical interpretations and concepts that current 
return movements have built on. The return movement stresses the progress Wajin 
initiatives led to, in other words, development and civilising missions of the Ainu led to 
the incorporation of these lands into first, a part of the Japanese cultural core, and then 
the nation, which acted to solidify fluid cultural borders. The Ainu were integral to this 
process. 
 
70 For more on the HFAPA see David Howell, “Making ‘Useful Citizens’ out of Ainu Subjects in 
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71 Siddle, Race, resistance, 107. 
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Table 1: Ainu in the Press 
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*Although the source used in the above graph is far from comprehensive for the time 
period in question, it does give a general trend of attention to Ainu in the press. 
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CHAPTER 4 
The Ainu at the Time of the Åland Islands Settlement 
 
[U]nderstanding of history can have a real impact on current perceptions 
of the “other,” especially as the nation-states involved in past conflicts 
have not withered away.1
There is potential that to learn lessons applicable for resolving the Northern Territories 
issue through examination of the Åland Island settlement in northern Europe. 2 This 
chapter works to utilise this idea while including issues relevant to the Ainu by 
addressing connections between the Åland settlement, the Ainu and the Northern 
Territories dispute. Involving the Ainu in this issue challenges many of the current 
perspectives on this territorial/border demarcation dispute, but doing so is necessary to 
help break past the stale foundation of dominating discourses. In this respect examining 
the Åland settlement and the international setting of the time are paramount for 
understanding why Ainu are not included in negotiations today. This chapter briefly deals 
with issues of Åland’s connection to Japan, Ainu and Russo-Japanese Treaties, Japanese 
colonialism, and the League of Nations.  
The Åland Islands Settlement 
Situated between Sweden and Finland in the Baltic Sea, Åland has about 6,500 islands 
with a Swedish-speaking population of approximately 27,000. During the eighteenth 
century when the Swedish empire extended eastward engulfing present day Finland, the 
islands had little strategic significance because they were in the middle of that empire. 
This changed as the islands moved to the border of that empire and Russia after 1809. 
After the Crimean War, the islands, still a part of the Grand Duchy of Finland, were 
demilitarised and 2006 marked the one-hundred and fiftieth anniversary of its initial 
demilitarisation. 
Following the independence of Finland in 1917, Ålanders began to seek 
reunification with Sweden. Leaders of the reunification movement were regarded as 
traitors and a few of the leaders were imprisoned. This prompted the League of Nations 
to deal with the Ålanders’ minority issue. The League wanted to reward Finland for 
services during the war and saw it as a country that could accommodate a Swedish-
speaking minority. The 1921 Autonomy Act (Act on the Autonomy of Åland), although 
initially against the wishes of the residents, became the League’s first successful 
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2 See, Scott Harrison, New Initiatives for Solving the “Northern Territories” Issue between Japan and 
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“minority solution,” which confirmed the 1856 demilitarisation and added neutralisation 
of the islands. As the Act became outdated, it was replaced by newer versions, first in 
1951 and most recently in 1993. The Åland settlement has continued to prove successful 
for Sweden, Finland and the Ålanders, and continues to grant the residents a high degree 
of autonomy allowing for their cultural and linguistic preservation. Today, Åland is the 
only place in the world that has autonomy, demilatarisation and neutralisation.3
Connecting Åland to Japan 
From a Japanese perspective, a common way of connecting the Åland settlement to Japan 
is through the twentieth century agriculturist and scholastic figure of Nitobe Inazo (1862-
1933). Nitobe, the former face on the Japanese 5000-yen bill note for a twenty year 
period staring in 1984, is commonly known for his international prowess and 
involvement with the League of Nations from its birth in 1920 to his retirement six years 
later at the age of sixty-five. It was during this time in Geneva as Under-Secretary 
General that he is thought to have taken part in the Åland settlement in 1921. It is his 
possible involvement in this successful dispute resolution involving a minority group that 
brings us to unite Japan to Åland. Perhaps if we continue from this point and learn from 
Nitobe and his self-proclaimed position as a “bridge across the Pacific” then we would 
better be equipped to deal with the current half century old dispute between Russia and 
Japan.  
Logic and reason are both able to support and justify such an argument, but before 
being too supportive of this stance it should also be noted that Nitobe was and is a highly 
controversial figure. Although this questioning of Nitobe is less common, it should not be 
overlooked, as it will better enable us to understand Japan during the early twentieth 
century. More importantly, questioning Nitobe and those around him illustrates major 
flaws in the current dispute that academics need to challenge if any sort of serious effort 
is to be made for a solution. If we are to adapt the spirit of Nitobe, then we should be sure 
to be selective, and not adopt “Nitobe as was.” To do so would reinforce some current 
scholastic perspectives that we should confront, as they are interlinked and present in the 
background of this issue. And if we do not wish to become too involved in policy 
recommendation as academics, at minimum it can be a clear indication that ideas from 
the Åland example are applicable for addressing the Indigenous Ainu peoples 
involvement and the politically and nationalistic manipulative use of History in this issue. 
Before examining one of Nitobe’s controversial areas of being involved in colonial 
enterprises, and his support for perpetuating hardship for Ainu through scholastic work 
and policy recommendation and creation, let me first address the Ainu.  
The Ainu and Russo-Japanese Treaties 
The Ainu, living on numerous islands in the Okhotsk region had early contact with other 
Indigenous groups in the Amur region as well as north of the Kuril Archipelago in 
Kamchatka. These cultural and trading contacts also involved overlapping expansions of 
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larger communities of China, Japan and Russia. By the mid-nineteenth century the Ainu 
had become the centerpiece people between the emerging nation-states of Russia in the 
north and Japan in the south in the Okhotsk region. The conquest of Hokkaido and other 
Ainu homelands was not as abrupt as, say, those invasions by the Spanish and other 
European groups into the Americas but the Ainu did become to rely on the Wajin for 
trade goods. Likewise, the Matsumae clan, in the southern tip of Ezochi (currently 
Hokkaido) relied on the Ainu for justifying their existence on the island, as well as for 
obtaining daimyo status. Nonetheless, the consequences of their interaction included 
cultural and ecological destruction of the area. As well it had a marginalising effect on 
Ainu voices as the surrounding society demoted them to one of the lowest levels of 
subject status within the Meiji world view.4
Caught between two expanding powers, many Ainu, especially in eastern Ezo, 
managed to maintain their own language and culture by adapting to the changing times 
and circumstances with their neighbours. Yet, there were also Russo-Japanese treaties 
signed, that had devastating consequences for some Ainu groups, especially those Ainu 
living in south-eastern Sakhalin and the Kuril islands. The first of these, the Treaty of 
Shimoda (1855), impeded the Kuril Ainu’s use of their normal trade routes, extending 
from Nemuro peninsula to Kamchatka. These trade relations, on which they relied for 
exchanges of both food and goods, not only helped sustain a balanced lifestyle for the 
Ainu, but also provided them with foreign goods that they reinterpreted as treasures,
greatly valued as signs of prestige, that had become an important dimension of their 
society.5 The Shimoda Treaty split the Kurils between Russia and Japan at the Etorofu 
Strait, thus forcing the Ainu to adapt to the new situation and theoretical limitations of 
their trade. They most probably continued to both trade with each other and act as 
middlemen between Russia and Japan.  
 Precisely twenty years later after much dispute over joint control over Sakhalin, 
Russia and Japan decided to sign another treaty to further clarify the rather fluid 
boundaries in the Okhotsk region. The result was the Treaty of St. Petersburg, or the 
Sakhalin-Kuril Exchange Treaty of 1875, to which a Supplementary Treaty was added in 
1876. The supplementary treaty added specific details, especially to Article Five of the 
original treaty that addressed aboriginal issues. However, very little of what the treaty 
specified concerning Indigenous rights were carried out in practice.  
 There are several examples of this, but perhaps the most drastic, which is directly 
relevant to the area the southern Kurils, was the forced relocation of the Ainu living on 
Shumshu and Paramushir, the northernmost islands on the Kuril chain. According to 
Article 5 section “d” of the treaty, the Indigenous peoples residing in Sakhalin and the 
Kurils were to be given three years to decide their country of residence.6 If the Ainu on 
Shumshu wished to stay under the influence of the Russians, they would have to move to 
 
4 For discussion on changing status of the Ainu within the Tokugawa era and Meiji nation building see, 
Howell, Geographies.
5 Walker, Conquest of Ainu, 109-117 and Iwasaki, “Zenkindai Ainu no ‘takura,’” 107-128. 
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Kamchatka, a short distance away; if they stayed they would become Japanese subjects. 
The Ainu of the northern Kurils had by this time learnt to speak Russian, and had 
accepted partial Russification to the extent of adopting Orthodox Christianity. The right 
to preserve their religion was stipulated by the treaty. Most of them chose to stay where 
accustomed to live, but did not want to become Japanese subjects. In 1884, after three 
unsuccessful attempts to persuade them to move closer to Hokkaido, 7 the Japanese 
government forced ninety-seven Ainu living in the north (nine Ainu chose to go to Russia) 
to move to the island of Shikotan, burning their homes, boats and other belongings, and 
killing their hunting dogs,8 representing the Japanese government’s first political decision 
involving the Ainu in the north. 
The most common justification given for this action was that the Wajin saw 
Russian-speaking, Orthodox Christian Ainu as a potential security threat in their 
“northern gateway.” Leaving part-Russified Ainu as they were conflicted with both of 
two major opposed academic discourses on the Ainu and Japanese colonial discourse in 
general, that taking over Ainu lands was justified because (1) they were a mirror of the 
Japanese people’s ancient past, leftover ancestors of the Yamato race, whom Japan 
should protect, or because (2) they were completely different from the Japanese, a 
primitive relic that had not progressed as quickly as the Yamato race, and were therefore 
inferior and would die out if not for Wajin benevolence and civilisation.9 The second 
point was influenced by Social Darwinism which grew in popularity in Japan through the 
work of Edward Morse at Tokyo University in 1877, but did not reach a reading public 
until 1879 with the translation of Thomas Huxley’s Lectures on the Origin of Species,
and “became widely known after the publication in 1881 of Morse’s lectures,” the same 
year Darwin’s own The Descent of Man became available in Japanese.10 
This dislocation psychologically damaged the Ainu, and combined with 
geographical and ecological issues contributed to a rapid decline in Shikotan’s 
population.11 For example, in the north their diet consisted mostly of seal meat and fish, 
which they hunted with the help of their dogs, and were free to gather and trade. In 
 
7 Togawa Tsuguo, “Hoppo ryodo no rekishi,” in Hoppo ryodo, ed. Kimura Hiroshi, 46. 
8 Most of the Sakhalin Ainu were forced to move to Hokkaido prior to the three year period. For 
discussion on the physical dislocation on both the Karafuto and Kuril Ainu see, Miyajima Toshimitsu, 
Chikisani no daichi (Tokyo: Nihon kitokudan shuppansha, 1994): 158-173. On the Karafuto Ainu 
relocation see, Karafuto Ainushi kenkyukai, Tuishikari no ishibumi: Karafuto Ainu kyosei iju no 
rekishi (Sapporo: Hokkaido shuppan kikaku senta, 1992). The Portsmouth Treaty of 1905 affected the 
return of Sakhalin Ainu from Hokkaido.  
9 Yuchi Sadamoto, Governor of Nemuro, was directly responsible for the relocation of the Kuril Ainu 
(Yuchi Sadamoto to Yamagata Arimoto, “Uruppu-to ito keibi no gi ni tsuki joshin” [July 15, 1884], in 
“Nemuro ken kyudojin,” in Howell, Geographies, 190). 
10 Siddle, Race, Resistance, 11. 
11 Within a year of signing the 1875 treaty the Meiji government forced 841 of the 2, 378 Ainu in 
southern Sakhalin move to Hokkaido. These Ainu were used as labourers, and in an eleven year 
period forty-six percent of the relocated Ainu died, mainly from starvation and disease. “It sends 
shivers up one’s spine to imagine more than ten funerals a day in a population of only eight hundred” 
(Karafuto Ainushi Kenkyukai, Tuishikari no ishibumi, quoted in Miyajima, Land of Elms, 98).  
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Shikotan seals were few, and they were forced to take up farming on unsuitable land, 
resulting in a drastic change for the worse in their diet.12 By 1888, a total of forty-nine 
Ainu died on Shikotan, or Nu-Pemoshir, the island of tears. 13  The difficulties they 
encountered reinforced Social Darwinist influenced scientific notions that the Ainu were 
a lesser race which was naturally “dying out.” 14 
This example shows Ainu connection to the area in question through Russo-
Japanese Treaties. Aside from the newly-transplanted northern Kuril Ainu on Shikotan, 
Ainu had lived on other islands, including Kunashiri and Etorofu, and frequently moving 
between Hokkaido and Uruppu for trade and sustenance. By the end of the eighteenth 
century work in fisheries established through the Matsumae-han in the Menashi area 
rivaled traditional ways of sustenance in the area15 and as a corollary increased the 
transfer of disease. The long Ainu history in the region is proven by the Ainu place 
names in the Kurils, still in use today.16 
Nitobe Inazo, the Colonial Agency and the Sapporo Agricultural 
College 
Nitobe was not a stand-along figure, but was deeply connected to other newly-developed 
colonial institutions and scholars of the day. At the age of nine he moved from his upper-
class home in Morioka, to Tokyo to study. Given his love of English and things of a 
western nature he opted to continue his studies at the newly established development-
minded Sapporo Agricultural College that supplied him with an English and American 
style of education. From its conception this institution was closely linked to the Ainu. 
The College was first established in Tokyo as the Tokyo Kaitakushi Gakko (Tokyo 
 
12 Despite recognition of Indigenous populations’ right to hunt seals to sustain traditional lifestyles in 
the North Pacific in Articles 11 and 12 in the 1911 Convention Respecting Measures for the 
Preservation and Protection of the Fur Seals in the North Pacific Ocean this right was domestically 
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13 Miyajima, Land of Elms, 100-104. It is possible that there are further unidentified decedents of these 
lands. 
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Colonial/Development Agency School) in 1872. The same year, Kuroda Kiyotaka, the 
secretary of the Colonial Agency (kaitakushi), sent thirty-six Ainu to the School as a test 
to see if they could be “civilised.” The result was a complete failure.17 In 1875, after four 
of the Ainu had died, the authorities transferred the school to Sapporo and renamed it. 
This College in Sapporo opened a mere seven years after the Meiji government changed 
the name of this large northern island from Ezochi to Hokkaido.18 
In return for Nitobe’s free education, in which he specialised in agricultural 
development, he was required to stay in Hokkaido after his graduation to undertake 
development work. Nitobe took this colonial framework with him and returned to it later 
in his life, with grave consequences for the Ainu. He took up similar views towards 
Native people as the Americans that were hired to help with the development of 
Hokkaido, such as William Clark, Horace Capron and his many companions. Like 
Capron, Nitobe did not write or talk about the Ainu on a regular basis. Capron was more 
interested in moving the Japanese on Hokkaido away from manual labour and 
supplementing it with “all known forms of mechanical science and ingenuity.” 19 
Exploiting nature was far more important than seriously dealing with the Indigenous 
inhabitants. Since until then Wajin saw the Ainu only as a source of manual labour they 
further lost out in the dialogue of “progress.”  
Capron’s associates tended to take more interest in the Ainu, since they spent 
more time on Hokkaido than he did. The Chief Geologist and Mining Engineer took the 
liberty of weighing and measuring the twenty-six Ainu he had hired before the Ainu left 
for home. William Blake, a geologist and mining engineer on the American team, 
reported that both Japanese and American developers used Ainu as guides and to gain 
knowledge of the interior. Unlike Capron he saw a use for the Ainu as labourers, when he 
wrote, “Physically they are well formed, muscular, and active. Under the proper guidance 
they would, undoubtedly, be of great use as labourers. Their habituation extends even to 
Sagalin and the Kuril islands, and all names of rivers, mountains north of Volcano Bay 
are Ainu.” 20  The Ainu were only mentioned and used when it suited Japanese or 
American needs; otherwise they were not worth mentioning. Though the Meiji 
government included the Ainu as one of its subjects around this time, the Ainu were seen 
as very different and separate from the Japanese. 
Nitobe’s views on the Ainu came out when he later took a teaching position at the 
College. He occasionally told his students that Ainu “are ‘barbaric’ and have no notion of 
making a living from working; their capacity for work is very poor. ‘They may spend 
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19 For comments on the Ainu by Horace Capron and his associates see, Horace Capron and his 
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three or more days without sleep when they go hunting bears, but if they are made to 
work with the plough, they will not stand even a couple of hours of labour.’”21 In his 
1912 publication The Japanese Nation he wrote: “as they are now found, they have not 
yet emerged from the Stone Age, possessing no art beyond a primitive form of 
horticulture, being ignorant even of the rudest pottery. Their fate resembles the fate of 
your American Indians, though they are much more docile in character.”22 Since Nitobe 
was apt to follow his teachings to create a Japanese civilisation based on agriculture, 
there was little room for the Ainu in his daily work. The College and the Colonial 
Agency connected to it viewed Ainu lands as terra nullius. To them the Ainu did not 
exist, except where suited to their needs to aid “progress” and development.23 
Many Ainu today see Nitobe as a figure who wanted nothing more than to turn 
them into farmers, and a key contributor to the creation of the 1899 Hokkaido Former 
Aborigines Protection Act (HFAPA). 24  One Ainu has said, rather accurately, that 
“scholars always do things in line with what the Japanese government wants. Every time 
rules are made [regarding the Ainu]; it is the scholars that make them. The rules are made 
for the Japanese government and not for the Ainu people.”25 In fact one of the three main 
issues this Act addressed was setting the Ainu up to be farmers. The other two issues of 
the HFAPA focused on were Social Darwinist education and welfare policies towards the 
Ainu. So what exactly was Nitobe’s connection to this act?  
Nitobe had knowledge of native policies from New Zealand and the United States 
which the British Missionary John Bachelor introduced to the Docho in the 1890s. He 
translated and published a speech presented by an American in 1894 on the 1877 Dawes 
Act, which attempted to turn American Natives into good farming citizens.26 By this time 
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Nitobe had been working for the College for three years and further entwined himself 
with the Colonial Agency’s successor, the Docho (Hokkaido Agency). He had first hand 
knowledge of both the Ainu and international native policies. 
 The issue of the HFAPA was brought up for the third time and passed in the form 
of a Docho-sponsored law in the 13th Diet in 1898. It took effect in 1899 and although it 
remained in force until 1997, it was by that time a dead letter. Two years before the 
League’s decision on the Åland Settlement, the Act was first amended to include medical 
coverage and construction of native medical clinics, that Japanese also took the liberty of 
using. Like the 1872 experiment of “civilising” the Ainu in Tokyo, the HFAPA failed to 
turn Ainu into farmers. It further devastated their traditional ways, culture and language 
by forcing them to adopt unsuitable Japanese ways of sustenance on marginal land.  
Nitobe and those peoples and institutions linked to him were significant actors in 
encouraging and perpetuating the notion of Ainu inferiority, through both their actions 
and the consequences of their ideas. His scholastic and international approach, of opting 
for Western ways of progress and development gave legitimacy and justification for his 
actions that internationally went largely unchallenged in his own time.27 
The League of Nations, Minority Rights, Indigenous Rights and Japan 
Through the example of the League during the time of the Åland settlement we can better 
understand the situation regarding the status of the Ainu during the twentieth century and 
beyond. A brief analysis of early twentieth century League of Nations movements and 
their applicability to the Ainu and Japan are important to gauge the spirit of the times. 
While perhaps less so today, there was then an important historical distinction between 
minority rights and Indigenous rights; the latter did not yet exist as a concept. Japan was 
active in the League as a promoter of rights, as it sought a restricted form of equality to 
suit its own needs.  
League of Nations, Minority Rights and Indigenous Rights 
After 1919, colonised people around the world began to speak out with anger towards 
their colonisers. These outbreaks of newly emerging nationalism from within encouraged 
the League of Nations to take particular interest in minority issues after its conception in 
1920. This post-Great War conglomerate of winning states founded itself on the idea that 
the “state” was both desirable and universally applicable, but that not all peoples were 
necessarily ready for statehood. Therefore, the League ranked people according to their 
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closeness to, and likelihood of, becoming a state. This approach, seeing varying degrees 
or levels of “state-ness,” was important and of international concern to the League. 
Likewise there were peoples seen as not ready for statehood, and as being in need of 
paternalistic assistance until they could learn to be a state. Their tutelage would continue 
until they could “stand on their own,” as indicated by five standards. These included a 
settled government, ability to keep public peace and have political independence, 
adequate financial recourses, and ability to make law and have equal justice. The last 
requirement that resulted from their taking the state as core was for “effective protection 
of racial, linguistic and religious minorities.” 28  Consequently, the League-supported 
highly political minority framework presumed that new nations would have minorities 
within their borders, and should be expected to accord them special group rights. 
 This stance was rather ironic, since member states (the United Kingdom in 
particular) saw the League’s protection of minorities as a hindrance to their assimilation. 
Mark Mowazer has agued that the League’s willingness to listen to and attempt to protect 
minorities encouraged the formation of such groups.29 The idea of “minorities” came 
from dealing with nation-state formation after the war, and thus was applicable only to 
certain states as designated in peace treaties. Finland was one such state, while Sweden 
was not.30 Many minorities did not, or could not, apply or demand support to create their 
own states. The League required the state in which they belonged to speak on their behalf, 
to help create special minority group rights. This is perhaps one reason why the Åland 
Islanders were not consulted in the settlement process. The League supported giving 
special rights to groups of people who did not previously have a state, and the Ålanders 
did not qualify under that heading.  
Dorothy Jones offers another way of looking at the minority issue. She argues that 
the League was not protecting minorities but borders. Her reasoning was that the League 
thought that peace relied on the stability of borders, so if they protected minorities, they 
would stop unrest at the borders, and therefore prevent conflict. This explains why 
minority protocols only applied to certain “trouble” areas. The League did not want to 
interfere in states other than those designated as potentially problematic, because it feared 
disrupting borders which its members wanted to remain intact.31 However, within the 
boundaries of already established and newly formed or forming nation-states, many 
linguistic and religious minority groups existed that did not fit their interpretation of 
minorities. Even though the number of minorities in East and Central Europe far 
outnumbered those in Western Europe the lack of a universal minority system was an 
embarrassment to the Powers that made up the League. A universal plan had been 
proposed in 1919 only to be rejected for fear that it would challenge the basis for state 
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sovereignty and fear for having to address their internal, peripheral and external colonial 
subjects in a much less profitable manner.32 
The people now called “Indigenous peoples” are included in this group, but in the 
early twentieth century they were usually termed native, Indian or aborigine. The South 
Pacific was one region where the numerous groups of Indigenous islanders qualified for 
tutelage under the League’s mandate system,33  but these peoples were not accorded 
minority status because there could not be a minority without a state. Those of 
Indigenous descent within established states such as Australia, Canada, and New Zealand, 
were not given attention in the same manner as European minorities in the designated 
states, even though many of these groups had signed treaties with the British Crown that 
recognised their status as nations.  
The first opportunity for the League to actively treat Indigenous peoples as fitting 
into their minority clauses came in the early 1920s. Travelling on a Six Nations, not 
Canadian, passport, Haudenosaunee Chief Deskaheh (Levi General) was the first 
aboriginal to visit Geneva with grievances.34 He approached the League as representing 
not a minority but a nation to be treated equally with other nations. He and his supporters 
gained much attention, traveling on Six Nations passports and wearing their traditional 
regalia. They even received some sympathy from the Council: “Mr. Branting [President 
of the Council] thinks it would be on the one hand rather inopportune for the Swedish 
government to ask for the case to be examined; on the other hand he thinks it rather hard 
if the poor Indian cannot even be heard.”35 During the delegation’s one-year stay in 
Geneva, it also received support from several countries, and, ironically, Japan was one of 
them. Meanwhile the Canadian government under Mackenzie King was worried about 
scarring Canada’s “excellent reputation.” Britain eventually used its influence to protect 
Canada from the potential embarrassment of permitting Deskaheh to be heard, and he and 
his entourage returned to Canada empty handed.36 
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up (and still do) the Six Nations of Iroquois, a confederacy that had its own self government and 
international relations prior to European settlement. Deskaheh represented the traditionalists of Six 
Nations who wished to retain their traditional form of self-government. The government of Canada 
did not recognise them as self-governing, but only as subjects of the British crown. League of Nations, 
“La tribu indienne des Six Nations: petitions diverses,” Doc. 11/33687 and 11/33556. Palais des 
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International Movement of Indigenous Peoples,” Comparative Studies in Society and History 42.1
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35 Niezen, “Recognizing Indigenism,” 125. 
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Since an organisation or institution can only be a sum of its participants, this 
interpretation is not surprising. Knowing that the League was formed by dominant 
colonial powers on the winning side of the Great War, that minorities were limited to 
specified states, and that Nitobe was the first Under-Secretary upon the League’s 
conception, it is not difficult to see why they largely ignored the Indigenous issue, despite 
opportunities to do otherwise. While we can say that Britain was the centre for 
discrediting Indians of the day, as it feared border issues in its dominions, Japan 
supported Deskaheh for its own purpose of gaining equality with the West. Japan and its 
search for equality is the next topic of discussion.  
League of Nations and Japan 
Mark Caprio noted that “the events following the end of World War I and the initiation of 
the League of Nations did not factor heavily in the administration of their colonies.”37 
Whether defined as an internal or peripheral colony or a mix between the two, Hokkaido 
was nonetheless a Japanese colony. Within this colony existed the Ainu people, who had 
been registered as subjects of the emperor in 1872, yet were classified in the registries as 
“former natives” (kyudojin) and subjected to a policy of assimilation. Before the Meiji 
Restoration the Matsumae clan forbade them to adopt the Japanese language or customs 
except for two periods (1802-23 [eastern Ezochi from 1799] and 1855-67) when the 
Bakufu took direct control over Ezochi (Hokkaido and the southern Kurils). So how can 
we explain the difference in Japanese behaviour towards the aborigines within its borders 
and those from Canada, who internationally stood up to the League?  
For starters, the Ainu had not signed any treaties with any other Crown, as had 
Native peoples in parts of Canada; the Ainu were unilaterally acquired as subjects. More 
importantly, while the League was building its minority framework, Japan was seeking 
its own racial equality with the West while maintaining superiority over the rest of Asia. 
At the Paris Peace Conference in 1919 Baron Makino proposed an addition to Article 21, 
to ensure that there would be no discrimination between League members on grounds of 
race or nationality. 38  Japan tried to enthusiastically adopt Western methods of 
development and ways of thinking show the international world it could continue to 
compete and stand with Western nations. This movement differed from the way equality 
is understood today, because it envisioned equality between only Japan and other League 
members, one of the criteria for equality with the West being that Japan was mature and 
civilised enough to have its own colonies and operate internationally as an imperial 
nation.  
Japan justified this limited equality through the framework of colonialism during 
the late 1910s. During this time Japan “had a two-tiered conception of ‘race.’” On one 
hand Japanese saw themselves as part of Asia as being “yellow” as opposed to “black” or 
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“white,” but on the other hand they saw “race” in terms of the concept of “nation,” where 
they differentiated themselves from the Koreans and Chinese. Shimazu argues that Japan 
sought to include a racial equality clause within the League’s covenant in order to raise 
its own position and gain equality with the West, since it was the only non-white member 
of the League. But in order to convince the West it was equal, Japan tried to use 
international pressure to have the League accept it, so sought and gained support by many 
in the Afro-Asian world. 39  Essentially Japan sought to impress those that had been 
oppressed in the international arena, including Deskaheh. 
Nitobe represented this spirit of gaining global acceptance of Japan, as 
demonstrated by his internationalised education and staunch work to turn Hokkaido, 
among other colonies, into an agriculturally based colony on land the Japanese 
considered terra nullius. His goal of being a “bridge across the Pacific” had little to do 
with universal equality, or rethinking the ideas of race and Social Darwinism of the time. 
It had everything to do with being a part of this dialogue, and manipulating it to raise 
Japan’s status to that of the Powers that dominated the League of Nations. 
 Although the Japanese proposition of equality found support, it was ultimately 
discouraged and thrown out by Britain. In October 1921, about three months after the 
League settled the Åland issue, the British Foreign Office wrote:  
 
The white and the coloured races cannot and will not amalgamate. One or 
the other must be the ruling caste; and countries where the white 
population is in power have determined from a sure instinct for self-
preservation that they will never open their doors to the influx of the 
coloured race, which might eventually become dominant. … Japan is the 
only non-white first-class Power. In every respect, except the racial one, 
Japan stands on par with the great governing nations of the world. But, 
however powerful Japan may eventually become, the white races will 
never be able to admit her equality. If she can enforce her claim she will 
become our superior; if she cannot enforce it she remains our inferior; but 
equal she can never be.40 
Since the Japanese proposal was eventually thrown out, Japan needed to continue to 
impress the Western Powers by further adopting Western practices within its emerging 
empire. This included using those they designated “former aborigines” as they saw fit, 
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either ignoring them or using them to submit claims over colonised areas. The Ainu 
served as a yardstick to judge Wajin modernity.41 
Åland itself was a historical part of the League’s minority protection system. As 
the League tried to create a Europe comprised of homogeneous nation-states, it 
encountered the problem of minorities which had different ethnicities and languages than 
the majority within them. The League realised that it could not create all nations based on 
such a narrow definition. For this reason, as a multinational organisation, it took 
particular interest in protecting minority peoples within designated new nation-states as a 
means of ensuring border stability. The minority rights program it supported was based 
on ethnic or language-centered group rights as a means to ensure security in the region. 
Another way of thinking about this is that, during the time of the Åland settlement, 
minorities were considered part of the civilised or modern world, while those considered 
to be indigenes or Indians were not. Europeans who dominated the League’s Council 
denied such people civilisation and modernity, because in their minds the natives 
represented a past that was long forgotten. This theoretically and psychologically aided 
the preservation of the status quo in their colonies, upon which they relied to justify their 
own modernity and civilisations.   
As the only non-white founding member nation of the League, Japan strove for 
acceptance, which meant challenging the status quo. However, this was confined to the 
framework of the League. Challenging the status system within its own colonies would 
have removed them from being classified as modern and civilised in the eyes of the 
Western powers.  
New Initiatives for Solving the “Northern Territories” Dispute: 
Inspiration from the Åland Experience 
The situation during the times of the Åland settlement reveals a striking continuity of 
views from the past through to the present, the most important of which is taking the state 
as the centre of all arguments. However, if we are to take any sort of lesson away from 
the Åland process as a whole (i.e. 1921 to the present) that can be applied to current and 
future study of the Northern Territories issue, it is the need for flexibility, adaptability 
and compromise. The Åland settlement, seen as a package, appears more like a fluid and 
changing process than clear-cut decisions from a particular point and place in time. All 
three potential lessons directly conflict with the majority of literature surrounding the 
issue. For example, if we discuss the situation of the Ainu in relation to this dispute, we 
directly challenge some of the most embedded and stale arguments on the market (yes it 
is a marketable dispute as it is profitable) that perpetuate non-resolution. One such 
dispute occurs with the facts upon which the “movement for the return of the northern 
territories” premises itself, namely that the islands are inherent Japanese lands.  
 Further examination is necessary to provide and detailed answer on why the Ainu, 
current residents and former Japanese residents where not included in contemporary 
research. As a minimum, the Ainu treatment (or non-treatment) in the matter extends 
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beyond the scope of the Northern Territories dispute extending into the academic fields 
of History, Anthropology, Geography, Political Science, International Relations and Law. 
So the argument that the Ainu are not included because the Northern Territories issue is a 
border dispute between two states is not convincing. The Ainu in the discourse of the 
Northern Territories challenges the surrounding academic hegemony. In Marshal Beier’s 
words the hegemonologue, or domination of solidly fixed Western ways of thinking, 
prevents academics from seriously looking into issues with Indigenous peoples.42 Rather 
than continue to ignore or suppress such Indigenous issues, it would be best to address 
them and move towards new ways of understanding not only the Northern Territories 
dispute but the many academic fields that are intrinsically connected to it. Bringing the 
Ainu to the table is one step towards putting all relevant material on the table, which 
many scholars believe is a necessary condition for any sort of satisfactory resolution of 
this Russo-Japanese issue. Examining the situation of the Ainu and Japan’s connection to 
the Åland settlement of 1921 is one such way to broaden the current framework.  
Studying the Åland settlement and rights pertaining to the Ainu and how rights of 
the current and former inhabitants relate to the Northern Territories issue would enable 
additional critique on this issue. Further examination of Ainu history around the time of 
the Åland settlement is both appropriate and valuable.  
 
42 Beier, Uncommon Places.
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Figure 4: “Exchange” The Japan Punch 187543
 
43 Charles Wirgman, “Exchange,” The Japan Punch (August 1875) in The Japan Punch, vol 5 (Tokyo: 
Yushodo shoten, 1975), 88. 
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CHAPTER 5 
The Japanese Government’s and Supporting Academic Views 
on the Northern Territories 
 
According to Prasenjit Duara, “First, as a modern state, the colonial state was built upon 
the imperative that all global resources be controlled by territorially sovereign polities, 
whether nations or empires.”1 This quote is reinforced by International Law thinkers of 
the nineteenth century, such as Henry Wheaton (1785-1848): 
 
The right of every independent state to increase its national dominions, 
wealth, population, and power, by all innocent and lawful means, such as 
the pacific acquisition of new territory, the discovery of and settlement of 
new countries, the extension of its navigation and fisheries, the 
improvement of its revenues, arts, agriculture and commerce, the increase 
of its military and naval force, is an incontrovertible right of sovereignty, 
generally recognized by the usage and opinion of nations.2
The pre-World War II era of Japan was one of colonialism, where within the nation-state, 
nationalism and imperialism became blurred as the state tried to incorporate alien 
territories (resources) and people (bio-power) wherever possible, creating a multi-ethnic 
greater-Japan, while simultaneously supporting a dogma of homogeneity of the nation. 
Development, progress and civilisation ideologies dominated the pre-War era. An 
example of this in relation to the Ainu was in the first official history of Hokkaido written 
in 1918, where editor Kono Tsunekichi, a well known Ainu scholar, wrote that 
“responsibility for colonisation of Hokkaido had fallen to the Japanese as ‘no other 
superior race’ (yuto jinshu) was in contact with the Ainu.”3 These ideologies and power 
structures of the nation-state were refined and redefined, while ideas of progress and 
development continued in the post-War era. The ideas of progress and development 
became an advanced form of colonialism, where historical violence was muted, buried 
and then largely “forgotten.” 
Ainu and Wajin activities regarding to the Northern Territories are relational and 
in constant flux, and the Ainu were/are hardly the static, dead, and obsolete people that 
writing since World War II on the Northern Territories has portrayed them as. This 
chapter presents a historical account within local, regional/national and international 
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levels of first, how, why and when, the Ainu went from being an intricate part of the 
territorial debate, to outside of it from academic and government movements.  
Literature from the nineteenth century and earlier that addressed territorial claims 
or border demarcation in the Okhotsk region for the most part acknowledged that the 
Ainu lived on these lands and that the lands were Ainu territory. However, as Russo-
Japanese negotiations concerning these northern islands proceeded, the less the Wajin 
recognised the Ainu’s historical existence in these areas. Following Wajin claims to these 
islands during post-War negotiations illustrates how Wajin moved from recognising Ainu 
in the area, using them as a positive card in which they saw no negative side effects, to a 
point of complete oblivion and denial while adamantly insisting that the islands were 
their “inherent territory.” 
The End of World War II to 1981 
Soviets troops began their invasion of the northern Kuril Islands on 24 August 1945 
proceeding southward, and stopped at Uruppu ensuring American troops were not present 
further south. When they confirmed that American troops had yet to establish themselves 
in the area, a separate fleet from Sakhalin invaded Etorofu, Kunashiri, Shikotan and 
Habomai, successfully gaining control by 5 September. Approximately seventeen 
thousand “Japanese” people on the islands were “repatriated” to Hokkaido. Included in 
these “repatriated Japanese” were those Kuril Ainu descendents living on Shikotan, along 
with the Ainu from other islands south of Uruppu. Those Ainu that were hastily relocated 
from Shikotan were dispersed throughout eastern Hokkaido; reports on these Ainu were 
few in number after their second forced relocation. One year later, three Ainu still living 
in the Kurils were found by the Soviets and moved to Hokkaido, they were the last of the 
identified Ainu living on the island chains.4 During the 1950s and 60s these Kuril Ainu 
were an integral part of territorial “return” movements, ignoring those Ainu from the 
other Kuril islands.5
After the Japanese defeat in World War II, the government signed the San 
Francisco Peace Treaty on 8 September 1951, in which Article 2 stipulated that they were 
to renounce all claims to the Kuril Islands, where the “Kurils” were left undefined and a 
recipient unmentioned. Hara pointed out that post-War conflict over these islands began 
as a result of the ambiguity surrounding the definition of the “Kuril Islands.” Drafts of the 
treaty included exact measurements of the boundaries of the Kuril Islands and other lands 
the Allies planned to force the Japanese to renounce. Drafts also included recipient 
countries of Japanese-renounced territory, and the Soviet Union was at one time listed as 
the recipient of both Sakhalin and the Kurils.6 However, on the final treaty version the 
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longitude and latitude of these territories along with mention of the Soviet Union were 
deleted, creating territorial ambiguity, purposefully creating various post-War conflicts in 
the Asia-Pacific region, which the Northern Territories is a part.7
Before the signing of the Peace Treaty, the Gaimusho (Japanese foreign ministry) 
drafted a pamphlet in 1946 that somewhat contradicts the more current claim for a four 
islands return. Here, the government treated the two islands of Etorofu and Kunashir as 
the “Southern Kurils” and it said that Shikotan and Habomai were separate from the Kuril 
Islands “geographically” as well as “topographically,” so Japan did not renounce them in 
the Peace Treaty.8 The Gaimusho’s 1946 “two islands claim” is also reflective in local 
and national newspapers.  
The first mention of Kuril Ainu in the press after the war was in 1950, when a 
journalist made a brief outline of their relocation to Shikotan Island, Wajin benevolence 
towards the Ainu, and Kuril Ainu Koizumi Shukichi’s movement to search for the Kuril 
Ainu Mutual Aid Fund that totalled just over seventeen thousand yen in 1923, a value of 
approximately two to three million yen in 1950.9 Since this article was printed before the 
San Francisco Peace Treaty, the Kuril Ainu were not yet a designated symbol for the 
return movement or territorial negotiations. This changed, however, in 1953, when 
Hokkai Taimusu published an article that mentioned Koizumi Shukichi and his 
movement to find the Mutual Aid Fund, but rather than building on such details, it moved 
towards connecting the Kuril Ainu’s existence to a surfacing movement for territorial 
returns. Kuril Ainu even accompanied the League for Appealing the Return of the 
Chishima and Habomai (established in 1950) as “living witnesses” to meetings in 
Nemuro and Tokyo in 1953. The press reported Koizumi stating that he accompanied 
them as a “living witness” to support their cause because “Chishima was not greedily 
taken by Japan.” The appeals of Koizumi and other Kuril Ainu from Shikotan to hold 
memorial services for their ancestors and retrieve lost assets were meant to please their 
ancestors, and gain sympathy from the Soviets and the rest of the world.10 
The reported aim for using the Kuril Ainu in the movement was to insist upon the 
return of Shikotan, and not claim rights to their traditional lands in the northern Kurils. 
For this reason, the press often labelled the Kuril Ainu as “Shikotan Ainu.” This aided 
Wajin movements’ cause by converting their second homeland of Shikotan into their 
ancestor’s home, while at the same time it encouraged amnesia over their forced 
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relocation. One article alleged that even though the fate of these Ainu as a “dying race” 
was pitiful, they had “a stronger feeling than anyone else to return to their second 
homeland of Shikotan.”11 Fascinated with the “dying race” concept, newspapers worked 
like a countdown every time a known “pure-blood” Kuril Ainu died: “five people left in 
Hokkaido” (1956), “now only four people” (1958), “only one person in Japan” (1964), 
and “the Kuril race about to die out” (1964).12 The decedents of the repatriated “Shikotan 
Ainu” received only scant attention as it would have taken away from the dramatic 
headlines. During this countdown of human lives, the famous Ainu grave-plundering 
anthropologist at Hokkaido University, Kodama Sakuzaemon (1895-1970), continued to 
insist that their existence was also important for Anthropology.13 
During the late 1950s, a notebook on pre-War paternalistic actions towards the 
Kuril Ainu was “rediscovered” and reported to have been held in a village administration 
office before Soviet occupation. It became an important plea to have the Soviets return 
this valuable resource that supposedly recorded the detailed process of taking the 
Shikotan Ainu out of their primitive state and civilising them, looking after them and 
treating them as “new countrymen.”14 This was the Wajin proof of their single-handed 
development of the region. Some years after the discovery, newspapers again mentioned 
this book when they supported the idea that “this is an important history of ‘civilising 
another race and is an important book for the management of Hokkaido during this time.” 
Insistence to have this resource returned continued until 1967, when news on the matter 
suddenly stopped.15 
Again in 1961 Koizumi Shukichi made another appearance in the news. The press 
showed sympathy and worry over the Kuril Ainu, and the “return” movement’s loss of 
contact with them. Koizumi reportedly continued his movement for reclaiming the lost 
Mutual Aid Fund and offered a warm hand in helping those around Nemuro, who felt the 
issue of the Kuril Ainu should be addressed first when dealing with this territorial issue.16 
Three years later, with only one known “repatriated” Kuril Ainu alive, the press reminded 
its readers of the “Shikotan natives or ‘Kuril race,’ and stressed that ‘the Kuril Islands, 
Shikotan and the Habomai Islands are inherent Japanese territory.’” The press regretted 
the soon loss of these valuable “living witnesses” to their territorial claims.17 These few 
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articles from the 1950s and 60s show that the Ainu were valuable “living witnesses” 
connected to the Wajin foundation of claims to these territories, especially those of 
Shikotan and Habomai. The historical existence of the Shikotan natives was symbolic of 
the “return,” and provided the Wajin a base from which to launch claims aimed at gaining 
sympathy from locals, Soviets, and the international community. 
Researchers also played important roles during the 1950s and 60s for making 
connections between the Ainu and territorial claims. 18  Of these, perhaps the most 
important were Hokkaido University Professor Takakura Shinichiro (1902-1990), who 
had in 1942 completed the most comprehensive history of Ainu policy through a Wajin 
colonial lens,19 Kindaichi Kyosuke (1882-1971), known for his extensive work on Ainu 
folklore, and Kodama Sakuzaemon.20 Academics expanded on connections between the 
Ainu and Shikotan and Habomai to include Kunashir and Etorofu in what was then 
known as “southern Chishima.” In 1956, Takakura reported that he had completed 
extensive research on the discovery, lifestyle, culture, and economics of the area and that 
from these angles Kunashir and Etorofu were definitely “inherent Japanese Territory.” 
Examples he gave included that archaeologically the lands were within the cultural 
sphere of Hokkaido, a large portion of place names were in the Ainu language, the 
southern Kuril Ainu had a very similar disposition and culture to those Ainu on Hokkaido, 
the few northern Kuril Ainu had minor differences but were nonetheless similar to the 
Hokkaido Ainu as well, and that all these Ainu were under the influence of Wajin trade 
supplies.21 Higashimura Takeshi wrote that he has not seen the systematic research which 
Takakura claimed he had done at the time, but perhaps Takakura was referring to his 
1955 article “The Development of the Kurils and Karafuto and its affect on the 
Aborigines,” then six years later he wrote his Chishima gaishi or general Kuril history, 
which was directly connected to the return movement.22 
Shortly after the Japanese were defeated, Takakura found out about the Yalta 
agreement, and the Gaimusho asked him for his opinion and to provide pertinent 
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information. He “happily responded as a fellow countryman,” and with his own “meagre 
efforts started the return movement.”23 Subsequently, soon after the signing of the San 
Francisco Peace Treaty, Takakura argued that Japan had not acquired the Kuril Islands by 
force or greed from another country. In the south the “primitive peoples,” who occupied 
the lands, had no nation or state, this allowed the Japanese to “peacefully” advance into 
the area, and from joint cooperation they were able to develop the lands leading him to 
see the islands as “inherent Japanese territory.”24 Takakura continued these claims by 
making use of a history that interpreted the Ainu as belonging to the Wajin even prior to 
the formation of the Japanese nation-state, and more importantly through the Wajin 
“development” the lands became inherently theirs.25 
During the late 1950s and early 1960s, however, the “return” movement was 
rather slow. When the movement gained followers in 1969, after the “return” of Okinawa 
was formally decided to take place in 1972, newspapers still reported a lack of interest in 
the Northern Territories, even though a LDP general election slogan in 1969 was 
“Okinawa has come back! Now for the north!”26 The difference in this post Okinawa 
return movement was that the Ainu were no longer used as “living witnesses,” and 
Higashimura explained that the mobilisation of paternalistic civilising of the Ainu and 
their historical importance were “driven into the depths of oblivion.”27 
The Northern Territories Issue Countermeasures Association, established in 1969, 
(hoppo ryodo mondai taisaku kyokai) started producing books on the matter from the 
early 1970s in both English and Japanese. The logic and reasoning behind their 
arguments followed Higashimura’s suggestion that movements after the late 1960s 
adhered to those of Takakura and Kindaichi. These groups openly viewed the territorial 
issue in dramatically different ways than in the 1950s and early 60s; politicians also took 
part while this movement fit nicely in line with the growing popularity of nihonjinron or 
theories of Japanese uniqueness.28 In 1973, one year after the last known “repatriated” 
 
23 Takakura Shinichiro, Chishima gaishi (Tokyo: Nanpo doho engo kai, 1962), 2. 
24 Takakura Shinichiro, “Chishima,” Hokkudai kikan 2 (1952):20; taken from Higashimura, Zenkoki,
200. 
25 In a 1966 article, Takakura completely denied the existence of contemporary Ainu identity, and 
strictly thought of them as relics of the past. He, interestingly enough, wrote that, “In the sixteenth 
century the Ainu were distributed more broadly than on Hokkaido alone – throughout all the Kurile 
Islands, the southern part of Sakhalin, and the northern edge of Honshu, the largest of the Japanese 
islands” (emphasis added, Takakura Shinichiro, “Vanishing Ainu,” 17), thus further pushing the Ainu 
back to a time in history some four centuries earlier signifying their irrelevance to the situation during 
the 1960s. Takakura was also the representative of the Committee for the International Appeal for the 
Return of the Northern Territories (three-hundred members), which went to the UN in New York to 
appeal in 1979. Some Ainu tried unsuccessfully to join the Committee in order to voice their own 
opinions (Dokusha no koe, “Senju minzoku o wasureru na,” Hokkaido Shinbun, 20 May 1979). 
26 Stephan, Kurile Islands, 197. 
27 Higashimura, Zenkoki, 203.
28 On Nihonjinron see, Harumi Befu, Hegemony of Homogeneity: An Anthropological Analysis of 
Nihonjinron (Melbourne: Trans Pacific Press, 2001) and Harumi Befu, “Nationalism and 
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Kuril Ainu, Tanaka Kinu, died,29 Welfare Minister Saito Kuniyoshi openly stated in the 
Diet that “we strictly adhere to the view that they [the Ainu] are equal Japanese citizens 
under the law.”30 Then in 1975 during his short two year period as Prime Minister, Takeo 
Miki said that Japan does not have racial problems as other countries do, because Japan is 
a “homogeneous nation.”31 Another government official in 1976 said that “we sincerely 
hope that they [the Ainu] will be conscious of themselves as Japanese the same as 
everybody else,” which oddly enough implied that many Ainu did not see themselves as 
Japanese.32 These domestic citations fall directly in line with international claims that 
Japan sent to the United Nations in their initial report on the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights (CCPR) in 1980. In relation to Article 21 the report alleged, 
“The right of any person to enjoy his or her own culture, to profess and practice his own 
religion or to use his own language is ensured under Japanese law. However, minorities 
of the kind mentioned in the Covenant do not exist in Japan.”33 These consistent and 
adamant denials of the Ainu after government policy changed towards the disputed 
islands are contradictory in many ways. They viewed the Ainu as being equal to the 
Wajin and already fully and completely assimilated, yet ignored the relevant issues that 
the Protection Act still existed, and that the same government had supported the adoption 
of programs designated specifically for Ainu welfare since 1974 (Utari Welfare 
Measures), signifying an unspecified difference between Wajin and Ainu, despite Prime 
Minister Miki, in 1975 stating that “Japan has no racial problems.”34 
As the next section on the “Northern Territories Day” shows, the Ainu were no 
longer used as “proof” in Wajin claims after the 1970s, and the “Ainu card” moved from 
 
Nihonjinron,” in Cultural Nationalism in East Asia, ed. Harumi Befu (Berkeley: University of 
California, 1993), 107-135. 
29 Miyajima, Land of Elms, 104. Kodama listed “the last survivor as the pure Kurile Ainu” as Suyama 
Nisaku who died in 1956 (Kodama Sakuzaemon, Ainu Historical and Anthropological Studies 
[Sapporo: Hokkaido University School of Medicine, 1970], 61). It is possible that there are further 
unidentified decedents of these lands. See, “Getting Back Our Islands,” 8.  
30 71st Diet, Third Subcommittee of the House of Representatives Budget Committee, 5 March 1973, 
in AKS, 594; quoted in Siddle, Race, Resistance, 170. 
31 Siddle, Race, Resistance, 178-79. 
32 Head of Prime Minister’s Office and Head of Okinawa Development Agency Ueki Mitsunori, 77th 
Diet, House of Representatives Accounts Committee, 20 May 1976, in Ainu shi shiryo hen 3; quoted 
in Siddle, Race, Resistance, 170.
33 Human Right Committee, twelfth session, document CCPR/C/10Add.1, 14 November 1980; quoted 
in “Statement Submitted to the Fifth Session of the Working Group on Indigenous Populations,” in 
Hokkaido Utari Kyokai, Kokusai kaigi shiryoshu: 1987-2000 (Sapporo: Hokkaido Utari Kyokai, 
2001), 24. Hereafter KKS.
34 At the 71st Diet in 1973, in response to why three in ten Ainu lived in destitution and why Ainu had 
difficulty in obtaining stable jobs due to discrimination, Minister Saito said “Our basic attitude 
towards the Ainu people, or the Utari, is that they are equal Japanese citizens of the law. We never 
treat them as a different ethnic group living among us Japanese people” (The 71st Diet – the Third 
Subcommittee of Lower House Budget Committee Session, Material 2, reproduced in AAH, 
“statement submitted to the Fifth Session of the Working Group on Indigenous Populations,” AKS,
1167-1166. “The 76th Diet – Upper House Budget Committee Session,” AKS, 1151-1150. 
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a definite plus to a non-issue. The government and its supporting “activists” stopped 
using the Kuril Ainu because they modified claims to stress specifically a four islands 
return, and not only a return of Shikotan and the Habomai Islets as in the immediate post-
War era. In addition, the Kuril Ainu could only complicate their selective claims as they 
in turn supported an interpretation of the Peace Treaty where Japan renounced the 
northern Kuril Islands, the original homelands of the so-called “Shikotan natives.” This, 
however, does not fully address the non-inclusion of those Ainu on other parts of the 
Kurils who mostly lived on Kunashiri and Etorofu, they were simply not discussed. In the 
background of the growing movement, people like Nakasone Yasuhiro, involved with the 
LDP at the time, became a member and approved of the movement. Nakasone, after 
becoming Prime Minister (1983-87), is well known for reviving Japanese nationalism. 
With such supporters there is little surprise in the direction that the movement took. 
The Northern Territories Day, 7 February 
Starting in 1981, the Japanese government designated 7 February as the “Northern 
Territories Day” to “commemorate the day in 1855, when Russia and Japan set their 
border north of Etorofu,”35 by the Treaty of Shimoda. It is now a day for the right wing 
and other activists to spread propaganda concerning Japan’s claims. The date chosen is 
intriguing because many scholars do not want to include the Ainu in negotiations or even 
historical literature on the matter, because they were a decentralised people without a 
modern style nation or state. But in 1855, Japan was still under the Bakufu system, which 
was a feudal system very different in nature and structure than the Meiji government 
which followed it from 1868. And Japan did not begin to emerge as a modern nation until 
during Meji times. By historically calling back to a time prior to the nation, while at the 
same time imaging that the current Japanese nation has a timeless beginning, the 
argument of not allowing Ainu participation because of their prior lack of a modern 
nation tends to lose its durability. 
 The first official document compiled for the history of the disputed Northern 
Territories in relation to this “Day” under the title “Our Northern Territories” (wareware 
no hoppo ryodo) in 1981 failed to mention the Ainu. Every year since then the 
government has published similar PR booklets under the same name. An English edition 
is also available entitled “Japan’s Northern Territories.” The covers of these booklets 
have geographical pictures or maps of the islands in question which vary in scale and 
detail depending on the year. The contents tend to start with the 1855 Shimoda Treaty, 
proceed to briefly explain each major treaty affecting the islands, and then finish with 
more current developments between Soviet/Russian negotiations and exchanges. As in 
 
35 “A Voice of Reason Campaigns for the Return of Japan’s Northern Territories,” Japan Times, 3
February 2000.  Also in 1981, the Japan Travel Bureau placed a discriminatory advertisement in a 
national newspaper encouraging tourists to visit “famed hairy Ainu.” The Travel Bureau officially 
apologized for the advertisement one year later. 
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the first publication, the Ainu fail to receive recognition while stress is put on Japan’s 
sole “discovery” and peaceful “development” of the islands.36 
Most booklets contain maps that simply show the quintessential changes in 
boundaries that resulted from the various treaties, further demonstrating how the islands 
were inherently Japanese territory, using the “power of maps” to best suite their needs 
(Figure 5). In the words of Denis Wood, “the very point of the map [is] to present us not 
with the world we can see but to point toward a world we might know.”37 This shows 
knowing as being abstract and conceptual. These maps tell a story or narration about 
ownership and location of the Northern Territories. There are few who would argue over 
the story of the location presented in these maps; the crux occurs with the story of 
ownership over which the battle is fought. 38  This use of maps to disguise the 
government’s reproduction of these islands brings a very selective past to the present, 
resulting in a “scientific abstraction of reality”39 that works to simplify the matter and 
ensure that the position of the Ainu is irrelevant. The use of maps in these PR booklets 
fail to make the complex historical background understandable, rather they narrow our 
perspective by simplifying the complex. 
 To further support this special “Day” the Hokkaido Government set up a display 
on the first floor of their government building, a mere one minute walk away from the 
Hokkaido Utari Association office. This display commemorates August as the month to 
strengthen the “return” movement. Before entering the government building, a large 
permanent sign overhead the front doors of the building that reads “Return the Four 
Islands for Peace and Trust” greets the visitor, but does not specify for whom the peace 
and trust will be, certainly it is not the Ainu. Annually produced posters line the entrance 
to the display besides a booth, where one can sign a petition for the return of the islands 
(over seventy eight million people have signed as of August 2006). The display is full of 
colourful maps, displays and pictures. There are even stamps and colouring sheets and 
simple quizzes for kids, and take home application forms for high school students and 
older for the annual poster contest, where one can win between approximately one-
hundred and five-hundred dollars.40 While it almost feels like a there is something for 
everyone at the display, it mentions nothing of the Ainu or their prior residence on the 
islands before the Japanese and Russians.  
 At the annual 7 February rallies, where Prime Ministers have also been key 
figures to speak at the event, it appears that mentioning the Ainu is taboo. In 2004, 
former Prime Minister Koizumi attended the rally and spoke to the extent that it would be 
beneficial to both Russia and Japan to conclude a peace treaty. He remarked on positive 
 
36 Wareware no hoppo ryodo, Warera no hoppo ryodo, and Japan’s Northern Territories, produced 
annually by the Gaimusho (Ministry of Foreign Affairs) 1981 to 2004. 
37 Denis Wood, The Power of Maps (NY: The Guilford Press, 1992), 12.  
38 Woods, Power of Maps, 21-22. 
39 Anderson, Imagined Communities, 173.
40 The stamp reads “Etorofu, Kunashiri, Shikotan, Habomai, 150 yeas of history, 60 years of longing.” 
Since 1987, there have also been annual High School Students’ speech contests on the Northern 
Territories. 
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actions that Japanese people had done during times of war in Matsuyama towards 
Russian POWs,41 yet failed to remark on past actions of the Japanese military against the 
Soviets during World War II. While this statement appeared out of general context of the 
subject at hand, his mere appearance showed that the rally had official backing, and gave 
a sense of authenticity to the cause. Perhaps this is why he was later criticised for not 
attending the rally in 2005 or 2006, even though he showed his support in writing.42 At 
the 2007 rally, Prime Minister Abe Shinzo vowed to follow in his father’s (Abe Shintaro) 
performance as Minister of Foreign Affairs, who reopened negotiations, and continue to 
pursue the issue in line with the established government position.43 
Since 1981, this day has grown to a large extent along with accompanying 
literature for its promotion.44 However, the Russian interpretation on this day is far from 
supportive. Alexander Yakovenko said that Russians 
 
consider the very fact of the existence of such a “day” a regrettable 
survival of the Cold War era, when stereotypes of ideological contention, 
distrust and alienation prevailed in relations between our countries….a 
settlement of the differences that exist ought to be sought by the 
development of ties across the board and the deepening of trust and mutual 
sympathies between the peoples, and not by methods of propaganda 
pressure and political pressing.45 
41 “Prime Minister Attends 2004 National Rally to Demand the Return of the Northern Territories,” 
Prime Minister and his Cabinet, 10 February 2004 
<http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/koizumiphoto/2004/02/07hoppou_e.html> (17 November 2006). 
42 Koizumi Cabinet E-Mail Magazine, 10 February 2005 
<http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/magazine/backnumber/2005/0210.html> (1 December 2006). 
43 In order to promote “accurate” historical understanding, Minister of State of Okinawa and Northern 
Territories Affairs Sanae Takahaichi proposal for schools to actively address this issue in their 
classrooms.  
44 One book that is representative of the main ideas of the movement that is directed at a lay and 
student audience is, Fukasajiwa Kenji, Irasuto hoppo ryodo 100 mon 100 kotae: dare demo sugu 
wakatteshimau (Tokyo: Ningen no kagakusha, 1991), originally published in 1985, it was reprinted in 
1991 to coincide with Gorbachev’s visit. Yamagata Taizo, principle of a school on Kunashiri from 
1937 to 1942 wrote a book which he addressed a school curriculum for teaching on the Northern 
Territories that incorporated the Ainu, however he introduced little more than the three major Ainu-
Wajin battles and conformed to earlier thinking that the Ainu are “docile, loyal and honest” and said 
that we “cannot deny the fact that the Ainu are the same as the Japanese” (Yamagata Taizo, Naze 
“hoppo ryodo” ka [Tokyo: Sanseido, 1983], 110-127, 298-300). 
45 “Unofficial translation from Russian. Alexander Yakovennko, the Spokesman of Russia’s Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs, Answers a Russian Media Question Regarding the Holding in Japan of ‘Northern 
Territories Day’,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation Information and Press 
Department, 2 October 2003 
<http://www.1n.mid.ru/brp_4.nsf/0/bb6c83b36ff4378ac3256e36005c6766?OpenDocument> (26 
February 2004). See also, “Northern Territories Day irks Russia,” Japan Times, 12 February 2004 and 
“Russia displeased over Japan’s ‘Northern Territories Day,’” Japan Today, 11 February 2004. 
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However displeased the Russians have been about this day, Takakura Shinichiro would 
surely beam at the success and boom of this “day,” and the movement’s continued 
neglect of the Ainu.  
National Trends in the Japanese Government and Its “Activists” 
The government focused on Hokkaido resource exploitation before World War II and 
after the War ended the focus moved towards the goal of industrialisation of the island. 
Prime Minister Ikeda Hayato’s 1960 proposal to double the GDP in a decade is an 
example of this. Later, Prime Minister Tanaka Kakuei proposed the theory of 
reconstruction of the Japanese islands, which spurred infrastructure and industrialisation 
in 1972. Before this, the Liberal Party merged with the Democratic Party in 1955 to form 
the Liberal Democratic Party, which has been supportive of right wing ideology. Komori 
argues that the LDP functioned as the apparatus to erase the problem and responsibility of 
colonisation from the educational field and from memories of post-War generations. 
Foreign Affairs Minister Takasugi Shinichi echoed this, when in 1964 he said “Japan did 
a good thing” in relation to imperial colonisation. 46  With the merging of two CIA 
supported conservative ruling parties47and their planned industrialisation came economic 
progress and nationalism, which played a significant role in changing views and activities 
in relation to Japan’s claim over the two, and then four, islands return. 
The Hokkaido Development Agency (Hokkaido kaihatsucho) was established in 
1950, superseding the Hokkaido Agency (Hokkaido cho, 1886-1947), which was, until 
2000, a part of the central government and had quasi-colonial structures. The 
Development Agency was the next step in a long line of colonial bodies that started with 
the Colonisation Commission (kaitakushi) in 1869, a year after the Meiji Restoration. The 
goals of the Agency were, as expected from extending former Prime Minister Ikeda’s 
views, to develop Hokkaido’s abundant resources and increase food production to serve 
national shortages. 
Japanese claims to the Northern Territories, indirectly aimed at Hokkaido as well, 
were (are) based on their assertion that they acquired the islands in question through 
peaceful means and sole development. This way, the government ensures consistency 
with the Cairo Declaration and the post-War Peace Treaty. To say they claimed the 
islands without violence also indiscreetly implies that they were terra nullius, ignoring 
the Ainu whom they displaced through often violent measures. When they said they 
obtained the islands peacefully, they implied that they did not obtain them through 
violence with another people that were globally recognised as having a state of their own. 
This again reinforces the dialogue between nation-states and the importance of 
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“development” and “progress” to territorial claims within international law. Visual aids 
throughout Hokkaido act as constant reminders of peaceful Wajin and American-assisted 
development of these northern islands.48 
Ainu and Wajin activities in regard to the Northern Territories were relational and 
in constant flux. The Ainu were/are hardly the static, dead, and obsolete people many 
authors on this dispute have portrayed them as since the end of World War II. This 
chapter began by noting how the Kuril Ainu went from a positive card in the early stages 
of the return movement to a position in the “depths of oblivion,” which the government 
further advanced after it began to take a more active role in the return movement. Irony 
shows that the Ainu lie forgotten at the foundation of the return movement. 
 The next chapter covers various Ainu responses to the official arguments of the 
Northern Territories, and historically ties their movement to the international rise of 
human rights and Indigenous rights since World War II. 
 
48 In Odori park, a  thirteen block-long park situated in central Sapporo, for example, is home to  the 
Sapporo City Resource Building, formerly the Sapporo Court built in 1926, situated at the west end 
(housing an abundance of surveys and writing on Hokkaido’s development),  statues of Horace 
Capron and Kuroda Kiyotaka first erected in 1903 (and rebuilt after the war because they were used 
for materials in 1943) now stand on Nishi 10 chome, the development memorial monument on Nishi 6
chome, and the Statue of Development Mother is on Nishi 2 chome. There are William Clark statues at 
Hokkaido University and Histujiga Observation Hill. The Hokkaido Historical Museum (literally the 
Hokkaido Development Memorial) was built to commemorate the hundredth year history of Hokkaido 
development since the Meiji era. In 1983, a Historical Village was built on the site, mainly consisting 
of buildings from the Meiji and Taisho era from all over Hokkaido. The Hokkaido development 
monument statue “Winds and Snow Group” stands in Asahikawa Tokiwa Park, which contains one 
elderly Ainu sitting on a stump pointing the way forward to three Wajin men and one woman. While 
the young Wajin colonizers are given dramatic names, that of the Ainu man is kotan, or village, 
signifying his stationary status while the Wajin move forward (ie, progress). In addition to statues, it is 
almost impossible to entre a museum (besides those organised by Ainu) in  Hokkaido without 
repeatedly seeing the words “development” and “progress” in reference to Wajin, while Ainu 
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Figure 5: Maps from Japan’s Northern 




Post-War Internationalisation of the Ainu and Ainu Indigenous 
Diplomacy 
 
According to Susan Boyd et al.’s interpretation, Foucault conceives of  
 
power as a relational, reflexive, dynamic, capillary phenomenon that is 
intimately tied to the flow of knowledge relations and inherently embodies 
resistance as much as it does authority… [P]ower is not a static instrument 
of oppression, but rather a set of contention where every display of power 
ignites its own oppositions, and where even the most seemingly 
“marginal” people and groups are far from impotent.1
Foucault’s perception of power is applicable to further understand the Ainu in relation to 
the Northern Territories. Ainu resistance was not a separate reaction to the hegemonic 
Japanese government and leading academic discourses on the issue, but their movements 
grew together with, and a part of, the very hegemony that had (has) relentlessly tried to 
silence them. In other words, Ainu-Wajin relations were (are) relational at all three levels 
of interaction: local, regional/national and international. The Ainu were integral to 
changing relations, claims and methods used by the government and its supporting 
activists. This chapter outlines Ainu approaches to dealing with the mutation of their 
history and implications this had on their approaches to dealing with their own history. 
As Wajin supporters of the Ainu (a great number being of the political left and 
socialist groups) grew in number in the late 1970s, some Ainu and Wajin questioned the 
movement’s non-inclusion of Ainu history. This led to larger, but far from total, cohesion 
among different Ainu groups and organisations, as they took a new step in 
internationalising themselves as a part of the global movement of Indigenous rights. 
However, roots of Ainu internationalisation started before this post-War phenomenon.  
From the late nineteenth century, peoples outside of Japan had opportunity to 
learn about the Ainu through a few international events. Ainu goods and artifacts spread 
throughout the world as curious European visitors sought “authentic” goods of the pre-
modern era. The Japanese government sent Ainu artefacts to Philadelphia’s Centennial 
Exposition of 1876, the World’s Columbian Exposition of Chicago in 1883 and the 
Louisiana Purchase Exposition, and in 1890 the Smithsonian museum organised an Ainu 
Exhibit. The cumulative result of government and individual interest in the Ainu was the 
overseas accumulation of Ainu goods and artefacts, many of which are now on display 
 
1 Susan Boyd et al., ed., [Ab]Using Power: The Canadian Experience (Halifax: Fernwood Publishing, 
2001), 17-18. 
86
throughout the world. 2 For the 1904 Louisiana Purchase Exposition in St. Louis, 
Frederick Starr made a special trip to Hokkaido to secure live Ainu “specimens” for a 
human display of what the organisers believed to be primitive peoples. Starr, in 
collaboration with John Bachelor and the Governor of Hokkaido, acquired a total of nine 
Ainu men, women and children volunteers to make the trip to the United States to take 
part in the anthropological reserve. It was here in Saint Louis where four Ainu became 
the first Japanese to participate in Olympic Games.3 While the exact length of their stay is 
unknown, one or more Ainu may have stayed in the US for more than a six-month period 
before returning to Hokkaido.4
When the Akita Prefecture resident Shirase Nobu (1861-1946) led an expedition 
to the Antarctica in 1910, he was accompanied by two Sakhalin Ainu; Yamabe 
Yasunosuke (1867-1923) and Hanamori Shinkichi. Yamabe, as a result of the 1875 Kuril-
Sakhalin Exchange Treaty, was forced to move to Hokkaido at the age of nine, but 
nonetheless managed to return home at the age of twenty. Before the expedition both men 
were calling for Ainu independence, and ultimately joined Shirase’s team in hope to 
create more Ainu attention and brought sixty Karafuto dogs for sleds.5 Internationalising 
the Ainu to the West, in the modern era, began before the global movement for human 
rights or Indigenous movements, the major difference of more recent movements is the 
audibility of their Indigenous voice. Pre-World War II travels to Japan’s capital and 
abroad also differ from migration towards the capital and other urban areas outside of 
Hokkaido in post-War years. 6 More importantly, many post-War travels became 
associated with petitions to governmental bodies, which were also different than their 
pre-War petitioning. Changing petition methods, from the local and national to the 
 
2 Over 3,200 articles are in North America, 5,700 articles in Europe, and over 4, 700 items in Russia, 
overseas items represent one-third the numbers of collections within Japan In Canada, there are 
eighty-eight articles at the Royal Ontario Museum and five at the Canadian Museum of Civilization in 
Hull, Quebec. Such travellers include Isabelle Bird, Henry Savage, B. Pilsudsky, and Captain Snow. 
For early Russian travels to Hokkaido and the Kurils see, David Wells, ed. Russian Views of Japan 
(London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2004). For collections outside of Japan see, Josef Kreiner, “Image of the 
Ainu as Reflected in Museum Collections;” Ogihara Shinko, “The St. Petersburg Ainu Collections;” 
Kotani Yoshinobu, “Ainu Collections in North America;” Chang-su Houchins, “Romyn Hitchcock 
and the Smithsonian Ainu Collection” and Amy Poster, “Batchelor, Starr, and Culin: The Brooklyn 
Museum of Art Collection,” in Ainu: Spirit, 125-131, 132-135, 136-147, 148-154, 155-161. On 
Russian collections see, Russian Museum of Ethnography, 1902-2002 (St. Petersburg, 2001), 204-209. 
3 For Ainu involvement in Olympics see, Uemura, Senju minzoku no kindaishi, 15-35 and Miyatake, 
“Jinruigaku to orinpikku: Ainu to 1904 nen sentoruisu orinpikku daikai,” Hokkudai bungaku kenkyuka 
kiyo 108 (2002): 1-22. 
4 Starr, Ainu Group at the St. Louis; Vanstone, “Ainu Group at the Louisiana Purchase.” 
5 Uemura Hideaki, Senjumin no kindaishi: chikuminchi shugi o koeru tameni (Tokyo: Heibonsha, 
2001), 49-60. “Japanese to Visit Sakhalin in Memory of Ainu Explorers,” Kyodo News Service, 9 July 
2000; City of Wakkanai, “Shirase tai no nankyoku tanken to saharin,” July 2004 
<http://www.city.wakkanai.hokkaido.jp/section.main/sakhalin/vesti/v_04_07_a.htm> (22 January 
2007). 
6 For Ainu movements to the capital see, Mark Watson, “Kanto Resident Ainu and the Urban 
Indigenous Experience” (PhD dissertation, University of Alberta, 2006). 
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international level were interconnected with calls for a New Ainu Law and proper 
historical recognition, where Ainu organisations used the example of the Northern 
Territories issue to show historical negligence. 
The UN, Human Rights and Indigenous Diplomacy since World War II 
Beier signified the international context of Indigenous movements in the post-World War 
II era as a move from Indigenous globalism (vertical) to global indigenism (horizontal).7
Outlining this movement is important for clarifying the relation between the Ainu, their 
claims and demands for inclusion, the Japanese state’s views on both the Ainu and the 
Northern Territories, and the connection between historical discourses, and how the Ainu 
fit into the international. 
Indigenous diplomacies throughout the world occurred before encroachment on 
Indigenous societies, and have taken place among Indigenous peoples in differing forms 
for centuries. Increased interactions with encroaching societies (called “colonialism”) 
resulted in a continuation and modification of such diplomacies. In the early twentieth 
century people like Deskaheh (Chapter Four) began to petition, albeit unsuccessfully, to 
higher Western international authorities. Indigenous issues and “rights” however, did not 
internationally gain enough force to have their voices internationally heard until well 
after the formation of the UN and the International Bill of Rights amidst further processes 
of limited decolonisation, under a the guise of Western hegemony. Beier would call this a 
step towards advanced-colonialism. 
 The international development of human rights is important for understanding 
Ainu-Wajin relations in respect to the Northern Territories, since they are referred to by 
the state in procrastinating dealing with Ainu claims, and are a forum where Ainu 
representatives are seriously listened to, and this works to authenticate their indigeneity.8
Once we know how human rights came about, we can better utilise and apply them to 
specific cases involving Indigenous peoples. Briefly following the development of issues 
relevant to Indigenous peoples shows how policies are created as solutions to perceived 
problems, and importantly how every right is in conflict/contradiction with another right. 
The League of Nations was not motivated by concepts of human rights, the 
mandate and minority system worked to strengthen leading powers’ status quo based on 
their political interests. The UN, like the League, was founded and made up of recognised 
states, where states were the only entities with valid, coherent and authoritative voices. 
However, the UN, utilising concepts of the individual, while also operating through 
highly political processes, provided a more flexible international system than the League 
to which Indigenous peoples could petition and gain international attention.  
It was the developing world, especially countries in south America, and NGOs 
that worked to get human rights issues on the UN’s agenda, and not that of the ruling or 
 
7 Beier, Uncommon Places, 12. 
8 In relation to this Cairns noted that “Indianness and Aboriginality are now capacious concepts no 
longer confined to historical ways of life. Aboriginality now incorporate non-traditional beliefs, 
practices, and values from outside without ceasing to be Aborinality” (Alan Cairns, Citizens Plus 
[Vancouver: UBC Press, 2000], 105). 
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winning powers. For example, during the 1940s, Canada distrusted the UN and the 
concept of universal human rights, throughout the 1950s it did not actively participate in 
the dialogue due to domestic issues between federal and provincial jurisdiction, and in the 
1960s Canada supported human rights as a tool to help keep the UN together in post-War 
years and to promote its own identity as a middle power. 9 However, the Canadian 
government knew that, if it did not support them, they would be in minority alongside the 
Soviet Union during the Cold War. So, they agreed with the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights (UDHR), but said they could not implement them.10 The development of 
human rights was also, to some extent, connected to the advance of the Cold War, 
showing how the concept of human rights was also politically motivated state interests.  
In Canada, it was initially the political right, businessmen and legal associates that 
opposed the UDHR, because they had the least to benefit.11 Here, we can see similarities 
with Japan, with the ruling LDP, Japanese law – which has difficulty dealing with 
international law,12 and private interest groups that profit from the Northern Territories 
issue, which likely involves many Ainu for gaining political support. However, states are 
no longer the sole voice in the UN system since there has been a change in the perception 
and role of NGOs, from consultative to power positions. International instruments give 
NGOs power by providing a global forum to project their mandates.  
This is important to consider because Indigenous peoples and supporters often 
make use of NGOs and refer to UN treaties, especially CERD and Article 27 of CCPR. 
These treaties, however, are targets and not a reality, similar to the UDHR. These 
international agreements require individual states that make up the UN, to take on more 
responsibilities, but the same states do not commit comparable resources needed to carry 
them out. Human rights issues need to be voluntarily accepted, they need to be an active 
choice as exemplified by former UN Secretary-General Javier Perez de Cuellar in 1984: 
“I urge every government to dedicate itself to not only in law, but in practice, to 
respecting the inherent dignity of every human being.”13 In such a discourse, it may take 
longer to implement than with use of force. However, if states domestically change it will 
be a conscious decision for a conscious goal, representing values of that particular society, 
without choice there is no meaning behind the actions. Issues of human rights and 
Indigenous rights are relatively new, and will take time to further develop and implement, 
but will likely increase in global importance as concepts of the nation-state continue to 
 
9 Cathal Nolan, “Reluctant Liberal: Canada, Human Rights, and the United Nations,” Diplomacy and 
Statecraft 2 (1991): 281-305. 
10 Selections from Hector Mackenzie, ed., Documents on Canadian External Relations, vol. 14, 1948
(Ottawa: Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, 1994), 350-367, and Department of 
External Affairs, Canada and the United Nations, 1948 (Ottawa: King’s Printer, 1949), 247-249. 
11 A.J. Hobbins, “Eleanor Roosevelt, John Humphry, and Canadian Opposition to the Universal 
Declaration,” International Journal 53 (1998): 325-327. 
12 See, Iwasawa Yuji, International law, Human Rights and Japanese Law (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1998). 
13 Javier Perez de Cuellar, “A Message Made by the Secretary-General of the United Nations,” in The 
United Nations, Japan and Human Rights, ed. Buraku Liberation Research Institute (Osaka: Buraku 
Liberation Research Institute, 1984), np.  
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change and since issues involving resource extraction often involve Indigenous land 
(claimed, or operated). Resource issues are most prominent in former British colonies of 
Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the United states, but, as Stuart Henry argues, are 
gradually spreading further internationally.14 
Rights specific to Indigenous peoples have significantly developed since the late 
1970s. The United Nations Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and 
Protection of Minorities in 1971, in response to human rights complaints, appointed Jose 
Martinez Cobo to begin work investigating the situation of the world’s Indigenous people. 
This was the first action any organisation in the UN, besides the ILO, took towards 
Indigenous peoples. 15  Between 1981 and 1984 Cobo submitted five comprehensive 
volumes based on his findings. In response to his initial recommendations, ECOSOC 
authorised the creation of the Working Group on Indigenous Populations (WGIP) in 1982 
as a subsidiary to the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of 
Minorities.16 The position of this working group is located at the lowest level of the 
hierarchy of the UN’s human rights bodies (WGIP → Sub-Commission → Human Rights 
Commission → ECOSOC → General Assembly). The rules of the WGIP are flexible 
enough to accommodate those interested in participating, especially Indigenous groups. 
This flexibility and openness were crucial for addressing Indigenous issues. The first 
session took place with about fifty participants and more recently numbers have risen to 
more than eight-hundred, making it one of the UN’s largest forums on human rights.17 A 
draft Declaration on Indigenous Rights, based largely on Cobo’s reports, was adopted by 
the WGIP in 1993 and by the Sub-Commission in 1994. The Commission on Human 
Rights began considering it in 1995 and created the “working group on the draft 
declaration on the rights of indigenous peoples” with the goal to draw a draft that the 
General Assembly would approve by 2004. By 2003 the Commission had only accepted 
Articles 5 and 43,18 and a deadlock arose between governments and Indigenous peoples 
over the remaining forty-three Articles. The largest problem was with defining 
“Indigenous peoples” and Article 3 on self-determination,19 which states interpreted as 
complete independence, while it had varying meanings and degrees for Indigenous 
groups.  
 
14 Stuart Henry, “Senjuken to kengen,” Fukyu keihatsu hokuku shu, FRPAC (2004): 69. 
15 For ILO programs from 1950s to 1972 see, Lee Swepston, “Indigenous and Tribal Populations: A 
Return to Centre Stage,” International Labour Review 126.4 (July-August 1987), 447-454.  
16  See, Douglas Sanders, “The U.N. Working Group on Indigenous Populations,” Human Rights 
Quarterly 11.3 (1989): 406-433.  
17 See, Lola Garcia-Alex, The Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issue (Copenhagen: IWGIA, 2003), 
49-50. 
18 Article 5 reads, “Every Indigenous person hs the right to belong to a nationality” and Article 43 
reads, “All the rights and freedoms recognized herein are equally guaranteed to male and female 
indigenous individuals.” 
19 International Workgroup for Indigenous Affairs, The Permanent Forum for Indigenous Peoples 
(IWGIA, 2003). 
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The United Nations began to show more support for Indigenous issues, and after 
seven years in the making, the Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues, a direct 
subsidiary body of ECOSOC, held its first meeting in May 2002, with more than six-
hundred participants. In June 2006, ECOSOC, in a 30 to 2 vote, passed the draft 
Declaration, with only Canada and Russia in opposition.20 Although Canada changed its 
position after the Conservative party replaced the Liberals in early 2006, it is unlikely, 
given past Canadian perspectives at the WGIP that other political parties would have 
behaved differently. 21  Japan, despite not recognising Indigenous peoples within its 
borders, voted in its favour. At the present moment the draft Declaration is waiting for 
approval by the General Assembly, which in December 2006 deferred it. Stuart Henry 
advised that governments and peoples should become more open and willing to seriously 
discuss Indigenous rights issues, because they are not localised or insignificant issues, but 
will continue to grow in importance and consequence in the future.22 
The Hokkaido Utari Association 
The Hokkaido Utari Association became active in the international realm as a means to 
secure domestic rights. The Japanese government, by refusing to act on Ainu claims, 
because there is no international definition of “Indigenous peoples,” has encouraged this 
organisation to take a more active role in the international, furthering their international 
recognition and Indigenous status. Many Ainu and Ainu organisations have increasingly 
moved from domestic audiences to international ones. 
 The Hokkaido Utari Association is the largest Ainu organisation in Japan with 
around 16,000 members (as of 2007). The Association has drastically modified its goals 
from promoting Ainu conformity with Wajin, to promoting pride in their Indigenous 
history and culture. It is a public interest corporation sanctioned by the Governor of 
Hokkaido, and for this reason it receives a fair amount of criticism and suspicion from 
within the Ainu community as being an arm of the very government that traditionally 
worked to assimilate the Ainu, and that it ultimately works for the government and not 
for the Ainu.23 The Utari Association views their institutional history, since the early 80s, 
as a history of the movement towards having their draft Ainu New Law approved. It was 
from within this movement that issues relating to the Northern Territories were extracted, 
as pursuance of rights in the Northern Territories officially began in connection to their 
push towards enactment of a New Law. The two issues were not independent of each 
other; both were necessary and worked to justify the other. This section deals with the 
Association broadly as an institution, which informed “official” Ainu positions and 
policy, and individual members who took part in issues overlapping between the 
 
20 “U.N. council passes indigenous rights declaration,” Japan Times, 1 July 2006. 
21 See, Sanders, “U.N. Working Group,” 409-410. 
22 Henry, “Senjuken to kengen,” 69. 
23 Many Ainu think that Suzuki Muneo dominates affairs at the Utari Association (Mr. A. et al., 
personal communication with author, 3 January 2004 [Japan]). I use “Utari Association” to refer to the 
largest Ainu organisation and should not be confused with the “Kanto Utari Association” which I do 
not address.  
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Association’s and other non-sanctioned positions outside of it, tracing their movement to 
becoming ever more supportive of international agendas.  
In 1946, the incorporated Hokkaido Ainu Association was established, a revival 
from the original 1930 organisation, and soon began a movement to secure rights to their 
provisional lands from post-War land reforms. Following Japan’s surrender the HFAPA 
was at the mercy of the Allied forces and sweeping changes in Japan. It is rumoured that 
in 1945 American SCAP Officer Joseph Swing asked the Ainu if they wanted 
independence, and the Ainu declined saying that they were good Japanese citizens, 
showing the effect of Ainu education that strove to turn Ainu into the Emperor’s subjects, 
only to regret it later.24 But, as Siddle noted, even if they had asked for independence, the 
extent of which would not likely have resulted in more than a “glorified reservation,” 
given the American treatment to its own Indian population.25 
The Hokkaido Ainu Association did, however, petition the Hokkaido Governor 
and General MacArthur to ensure the Land Reform Ordinance did not apply to Ainu 
provisional lands administered through the HFAPA. Post-War petitions often involved 
gift giving to Japan’s new American Emperor. During the American occupation, General 
MacArthur received a great number of gifts from the Japanese, which he willingly 
accepted. Included in the long list of gifts over the years, Takahashi Makoto sent him, in 
autumn 1947, a deer pelt and antlers “as token of our grateful appreciation for what he 
has done to secure land for our people and give to Japan a democratic society, based on 
law and order.”26 After the war, Takahashi, an Ainu from Obihiro (Hokkaido), was one 
person, who called for the creation of an independent Ainu state. By 1948, over two years 
of petitioning by the Ainu Association yielded few results. Although the HFAPA was 
revised in 1946, eliminating Articles 4, 5 and 6, which dealt with free agricultural 
equipment, medical treatment and welfare, in 1948, the Land Ordinance Reform was 
applied to Ainu provisional lands, resulting in 1,271 Ainu farmers losing their land, 34 
percent of total arable lands.27 The Ainu Association, in shock, fell apart and had only 
about one-hundred and eighty members between 1948 and 1960,28 whereupon individual 
members revived it. Upon its revival, members voted to change the name to the Hokkaido 
 
24 “Shiiku Kenichi shi to Josefu M. Suingu shosho tono kaidan kiroku,” in Ainu shi shiryo shu 3, ed. 
Hokkaido Utari Kyokai (Sapporo: Hokkaido Utari Kyokai, 1990), 925-931. Hereafter ASS3. See also, 
Takeuchi, Nomura Giichi, 106-107. 
25 Siddle, Race, Resistance, 148. 
26 The quote in Sodei says, “to MacArthur, ‘the great hero of the present world who has shown 
generosity in the occupation of Japan, with prayers for Your Excellency’s good fortune and long-
lasting military success, on behalf of all the Ainu of Hokkaido’” (Sodei Rinjiro, Dear General 
MacArthur: Letters from the Japanese during the American Occupation [Haikei makkasa gensui-sama: 
senryoku no nihonjin no tegami] (Tokyo: Otsuki shoten, 1985; New York: Rowan & Littlefield 
Publishers, 2001), 141). The quote in my text is from John Dower, Embracing Defeat (NY: W.W. 
Norton & Company, 1999), 231.  
27 Siddle, Race, Resistance, 151. For copies of the Association’s petitions see, ASS3, 859-924. 
28 AKS, 241-242. 
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Utari Kyokai due to discriminatory use of the word “Ainu.”29 After the 1960s many 
more Ainu showed a desire to become a “nation” and be decolonised, following in 
Hokuto Iboshi’s 1930s thinking, who considered the “Ainu as a unified group linked by 
common ancestral and cultural bonds sharing common political aspirations: a nation.” 30 
Yuki Shoji (1938-1983), an Ainu who participated in the Association’s 1960 
reorganisation meeting, often openly criticised scholars and called for recognition of 
Ainu history and independence with the creation of an Ainu nation in the disputed islands. 
Born in Kushiro, he graduated from high school in 1958, and even though he is likely the 
one who proposed the name change of the Ainu Association to Hokkaido Utari Kyokai, 
he later personally opposed it. 31  He thought “Those that have awoken their ethnic 
consciousness want to be called Ainu…. In the background of Utari descendents and their 
artwork lay a large amount of distorted political issues and I feel the title ‘Utari’ is 
nothing more than unintelligible.”32 In 1968, he became the Association’s director, and in 
1972 founded the Ainu Kaiho Domei (Ainu Liberation League), whereupon he moved to 
Sapporo and protested against discriminatory treatment by scholars, especially against 
anthropologists and ethnologists.33 In 1973, the first memorial, or icharupa, was held on 
Nokamappu, of which he was an organiser, for the Ainu who died there in the 1789 battle. 
He continued to take a confrontational stance in many areas, where he considered the 
Ainu were being undermined, because he thought that “even if Ainu are Japanese citizens, 
they are not Japanese.”34 Jokingly, he questioned the status of the Ainu when he stated 
that in 1643, when a Dutch survey boat landed on Kunashiri, the Ainu in charge was 
given status as a Dutch subject, so are Kuril Ainu “Ainu descendent Dutchmen?”35 
The late 1970s represented a time when the Ainu, including Nomura Giichi, 
formally a conservative Ainu and supporter of assimilation, then the Executive Director, 
began to look abroad, rather than strictly domestically for inspiration for dealing with 
Ainu issues. The first official visits by Ainu through the Association to another country 
were to China. Nomura led the third delegation to China in 1978 and Kaizawa Tadashi, 
 
29 See “Kyokai meisho ‘Ainu’ wa minzoku no sabetsu ishiki o fukameru urami ga aru,” AKS, 242. In 
English they refer to themselves as “Ainu Association of Hokkaido.” 
30 Siddle, “From Assimilation to Indigenous Rights,” in Ainu: Spirit, 109, 115. 
31 Even though Yuki denied his support for the name change, Takeuchi shows how there is substantial 
evidence that leads to Yuki as the one who first proposed the name change (Takeuchi Wataru, Nomura 
Giicho to Hokkaido Utari Kyokai [Tokyo: Sofukan, 2004], 19-22). 
32 Ainu kaiho domei daihyo, “Ainu Utari – yori tsuyoi soshiki to rentaikan ga hitsuyo ni,” Hokkai 
Taimusu 7 August 1973, available in Yuki, Charanke, 21. 
33 Saidan hojin Hokkaido Utari Kyokai riji, “Jinruigaku minzoku gakkai shimpojiun o hirate – futatabi 
sono shies, mokuteki o tou,” Hokkaido Shinbun, 16 September 1972. 
34 Yuki, Charanke, 67. “Even if Ainu are Japanese citizens they are not Japanese.” (Yuki, Charanke, 5)
Howell argued that there was no middle ground in early modern Japan because the Ainu who changed 
between Ainu and Japanese identity for the purpose of rituals were no different than the peasant who 
posed as a samurai while on official business but who could return to their commoner status when 
they changed occupations. He views “Japanese” as encompassing more than Wajin during the early 
modern period recognising a flexibility of the term (Howell, Geographies, 130). 
35 Yuki, Charanke, 64. 
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then Assistant-Director of the Association and author of a historical column in the 
Association’s newsletter Senjuku no Tsudoi since 1976, led the fourth in 1983, on 
invitation from the China-Japan Friendship Association to study China’s minorities.36 
As the Ainu became more informed about other Indigenous peoples in Australia 
and North America, they adapted their approaches in securing rights. For example, the 
term Ainu Moshir, first used by Chiri Mashiho in the 1930s, became a common term, 
referring to the Ainu homelands of Hokkaido, the Kurils and Sakhalin. Somewhat similar 
to the term Northern Territories, it called on a pure and isolated past that did not involve 
the Other, in this case the Wajin. Yuki himself used the term, in relation to “Mother 
Earth,” a possible borrowing from North American Plains Indians’ spirituality.37 In this 
atmosphere Yuki first began to write about the Ainu and the Northern Territories in 1979, 
as a contributor to Seidan, the same year that Japan ratified the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESRC) and the CCPR.38 
Yuki derived many of his ideas on the Northern Territories issue from Sato Goji 
(1906-?), an elderly Wajin who, in 1967, ran for Hokkaido Governor using the slogan 
“Ainu Peoples’ Independence.” Sato managed his own paper in Obihiro and stressed that 
he wanted a return of the islands from an Ainu perspective and to create an independent 
country on them.39 Since the end of the war, Goji had taken such a stance, travelling 
throughout the country by foot often handing out pamphlets that read “Japanese 
government charged with breaching the constitution.” The pamphlet contained a song 
showing his thoughts on Japan’s contradictory stance between its peace constitution and 
military arrangements with the United States, how this was connected to Japan’s claims 
over the islands and how the Ainu should complain to the UN. Yuki thought that Sato 
was the first Wajin to inform such an opinion so bluntly.40 In his own arguments, Yuki 
often referred back to Sato’s “correct historical recognition,” and he too saw connection 
between the government’s involvement in the Northern Territories and militarism, 
kindling anti-Soviet sentiment and not being representative of public intentions.41 
He rebutted the return movement’s three most right wing opinions in relation to 
the Ainu in the 1970s that (1) Ainu had no sense of “territory,” or ownership, so the 
concept of annexation is not applicable; (2) through Wajin penetration into Hokkaido and 
the Northern Territories, Ainu ethnicity formed, so if it were not for the Wajin the Ainu 
would have remained in small tribal fashion and would not have formed a group; and (3) 
without Wajin penetration into the area, there would have been no Ainu ethnic 
 
36 “N.P.C. Vice-President Meets Ainu Delegation from Japan,” The Xinhua General Overseas News 
Service, 1 September 1978; “Wang Zhen Meets Japan’s Minority Nationality Delegation,” The Xinhua 
General Overseas News Service, 10 November 1978. 
37 Yuki, Ainu sengen, 43.
38 Copies available online at <http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/a_cescr.htm> and 
<http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/a_ccpr.htm.> (10 January 2007). 
39 “Hoppo ryodo wa Ainu no ryodo da,” Hokkaido Shinbun, 31 August 1972. 
40 Yuki, Charanke, 58-60. 
41 Yuki, Charanke, 73-74. 
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formation42 and, therefore, no current issue of an independence movement. He said such 
opinions indirectly admitted invasion into Ainu lands and that their movement was full of 
impudent and ignorant slogans.43 
In his pursuit to encourage the creation of an Ainu homeland on the Northern 
Territories, he questioned his own arguments, yet always ended in hope. He noted that 
specific projects would be difficult to set up, especially those of long term scope, but 
such challenges should become a main focus of Ainu liberation. Since the Japanese 
government incorporated the Ainu unilaterally, it would be unlikely that the government 
would ever support Ainu separation from the nation. The government never returned any 
of the rights that it deprived them, including land rights, so this is why the Ainu must 
stand up. Since the development of an Ainu perspective for an independent nation was in 
its infancy, he called on more Ainu to wake up and assert their rights as being Ainu. He 
pointed out the area of the four islands (5,036 square kilometres) is larger than Okinawa 
(2,271 square kilometres) and about the same size as Aichi prefecture (5,119 square 
kilometres), that they could build their economy on the abundant marine resources, and 
that it would “be good to make this small independent state both a demilitarised zone and 
neutral country.”44 
He said the Japanese version of history is “as if anything the Japanese claim is 
just, while Ainu claims are anti-societal.” He called Wajin “cunning Shamo” in their 
pursuit to wipe out Ainu history in relation to the issue while they paid attention to the 
Soviet’s illegal occupation, but not admitting their own. As noted with the example of 
Sato Goji, not all Wajin agreed with the government’s view. In 1980, Kishida Hide at 
Wako University wrote in the Asahi Shinbun that the use of “inherent territory” is 
inappropriate, and if we follow this way of thinking then the Europeans would have to 
head back to Europe, because the Americas belong to the Indians.45 Mention of the 
Northern Territories by Ainu was not limited to Yuki, prominent Ainu cultural leader 
Kayano Shigeru (1926-2006) in the 1970s said “if it comes to the point that the islands 
are returned to the Shamo, it is better the way it is now.”46 In other words, they opposed 
Japanese rule over the disputed islands. Such views on the Northern Territories gained in 
popularity within the Ainu community and to a degree transferred over to Utari 
Association policy. 
The first PR booklet the government published on the Northern Territories, which 
made no mention of the Ainu, encouraged the Utari Association to take up new measures, 
when they decided to articulate Ainu history, including their ancestral rights to the 
Northern Territories. Although this was not a direct response to the Association’s move 
to address the Northern Territories, it conveniently fit into their new framework and goals 
 
42 Takakura’s interpretations would have us believe that “acculturation has helped to solve some of 
their problems as a minority group” (Takakura, “Vanishing Ainu,” 24). 
43 Yuki, Charanke, 64-65, 67. 
44 Yuki, Charanke, 66-68. 
45 Kishida, “Matamo daiteikoku no genso,” Asahi Shinbun, 14 August 1980; quoted in Yuki, 
Charanke, 87, see also pages 85-86. 
46 Quoted in Yuki, Charanke, 89.
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that were in the process of rather drastic changes around the same time as the government 
endorsed the Northern Territories Day in 1981.47 In the early 1980s the return movement 
was limited to direction by the Docho and return movement organisers, the Japanese 
government had yet to play a significant role in the movement. Nomura Giichi questioned 
a Docho representative in 1982 about the movement’s slogan of “inherent territory” and 
since when have the islands been inherent. The reply was that this claim stems from 
Kondo Juzo’s erection of a stake on Etorofu in 1798 that read “Etorofu of Greater Japan.” 
Nomura then asked who was living in Etorofu and the Northern Territories when the 
stake was erected in 1798. “Ainu were living there” was the response. Since the Ainu 
lived there before 1798, why have they not been included in any part of the discussions? 
The representative kept silent. Nomura thought it nonsense that if one plants a stake on 
someone else’s land then they can claim “this is mine.” 48 It should also be noted that at 
the time of Kondo’s trip to Etorofu, the Bakufu had not yet taken direct control over 
eastern Ezochi and Matsumae’s official position was that Ainu should not learn the 
Japanese language or adopt Wajin styles of dress, as a means of authenticating their trade 
monopoly in the area and their own rule over the Other, it was not until 1808 when the 
Bakufu first implemented a short term policy of assimilation (Chapter Three).  
In 1982, the same year the UN established the Working Group on Indigenous 
Populations, the Utari Association, at their annual general assembly, after one year of 
investigation by a Special Committee, formally confirmed former occupants’ rights in 
Sakhalin, the Kurils and Hokkaido for the first time, and adopted a resolution that called 
for the repeal of the Hokkaido Former Aborigines Protection Act. There was a close 
connection between asserting recognition of their history and land claims, and riding 
discriminatory legislation towards the Ainu.49 One year later, the Association published 
and distributed a sixty-five page booklet on the Association’s official position on the 
Northern Territories, Materials concerning the Prior Habitation of the Kuril Islands by 
the Ainu People (Chishima retto no Ainu minzoku senju ni kan suru shiryo).50 Through 
the use of historical documents, they countered the government’s claims to the islands 
including that Wajin peacefully developed the islands with relations to the Ainu based on 
concepts of benevolence.  
47 For the Association’s general movements at the time see Siddle, Race, Resistance, 182. It seems 
that many Ainu paid attention to the fact that the Okinawans fought with the Japanese government to 
“return” Okinawa to Japan because they thought it would be better than being under American 
occupation. But when Okinawa was returned, the Okinawans were not happy with continued US bases 
and a tourist economy that takes the money back to the mainland (like a colony supporting the mother 
land) and leaves only waste and crowded beaches behind. The Ainu have found it better not to work 
alongside the government.  
48 Nomura, Ainu minzoku, 30-31 and Nomura, “Hoppo ryodo,” 150. It is the earlier account which his 
few pages in 1996 appear to be based. 
49 “Hoppo ryodo no senjuken ryuho/Utari kyokai shojiki hyomei/Hogoho haishi mo shoketsugi,” 
Hokkaido Shinbun, 24 May 1982; “Hoppo ryodo Hokkaido ni Ainu senju,” Senkusha no tsudoi 33 (15 
July 1983), 1; and “Zenchishima, Ainu no mono,” Asahi Shinbun, 24 May 1982.  
50 I am grateful to the Utari Association for providing me with a copy of this booklet. 
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The Association adopted the “Law Concerning Ainu People (draft)” in 1984, in 
which one of the objectives was “to recognise the existence of the Ainu people with their 
own distinct culture in the state of Japan.” Included in the reasons for instituting the 
legislation, the draft pointed out that they have a distinct language and culture and 
managed their own common existence in Hokkaido, Sakhalin and the Kurils. It also 
prompted the government to recognise that under the Sakhalin-Kuril Exchange Treaty 
Wajin forced Ainu in Sakhalin and the northern Kurils to give up their traditional 
livelihood and that all Ainu were “bereft of their land, forest, and sea” which worked to 
humiliate “the Ainu’s ethnic pride.”51 Yet importantly, they were not seeking separation, 
but special rights from within the Japanese state of which they were a part. Publications 
by the association after this period focused on historical interpretations to support the 
repeal of the HFAPA and enactment of the Ainu New Law.52 It is a wonder then why 
Ainu movements in regards to the Northern Territories issue often fail to be mentioned 
while authors examine the process of enacting the Ainu New Law.  
 
Another important figure in internationalising Ainu issues was Narita Tokuhei (Akibe 
Tokuhei as of 25 May 1990), an outspoken member of the Utari Association, who was 
born on Uruppu and whose parents lived and worked throughout the Kurils. His parents 
were asked to take part in the Reversion Movement in the mid 1960s but never 
participated. During the 1970s he unsuccessfully proposed for the passive Utari 
Association to take an active stance on the Northern Territories.53 Since the late 1970s he 
has promoted contact between the Ainu and minority peoples outside of Japan.54 In 1984 
he showed the Ainu movement’s previous reliance on the domestic Buraku initiatives 
along with their newer inspiration from international models when he wrote, 
 
Article 27 of Convention B in the International Covenant on Human 
Rights is a very important text for us. Representatives of the Japanese 
government have insisted that there is no such minority as indicated by 
that text. However, the government handles the Hokkaido Utari (or Ainu) 
policies under the Hokkaido Development Agency, dealing with issues 
including discrimination. The Ainu certainly exist for the Agency. 
 Surprisingly, also, the Japanese government leads movements to 
regain the Northern Territories. They say, “In the Northern Islands have 
lived no other race than Japanese. Our ancestors developed those islands, 
therefore they are our territories.” Of course, “our own ancestors” means 
 
51 For a copy of the draft see Appendix 2: New Law Concerning the Ainu People (Draft) Adopted at 
the General Assembly of the Utari Kyokai, 27 May 1984 
52 I am grateful to the Hokkaido Utari Association for kindly presenting me with resources regarding 
the Association’s views on the Northern Territories as well as their written submissions to the UN 
Working Group on Indigenous Populations from 1987 to 2000.  
53 Ogasawara Nobuyuki, Ainu kyoyu zaisan saiban (Tokyo: Rokufu shuppan, 2004), 144-149. 
54 “The Smooth Men and the Hairy,” The Economist, 30 September 1978. 
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the Yamato race. The government tells such a white lie saying no race has 
ever lived there except the Yamato.55 
…
What we, the Ainu, must do first in our situation is to identify 
ourselves correctly, because out identity was twisted by the compulsory 
policies in the Meiji era. We have to advance ways by which we can 
understand what we are. Here is one such manifestation. The general 
assembly of Hokkaido Utari Society this May appealed to the Movement 
to Regain the Northern Territories that they must recognize the fact that 
the Ainu is the historic occupant not only on Chishima but also in 
Hokkaido. 
 Thus the Ainu have made an assertion. Until now all we could do 
was to run away from our identity. 
 We have begun to edit our history as well and we have made a 
decision to work for the abolishment of the Law on the Protection of the 
Old Natives in Hokkaido. 
…
The Ainu are now editing our history, claiming our identity, 
beginning to walk for ourselves.56 
Narita’s article demonstrated connections between domestic and growing international 
influence in their thinking of their place within Japan, renewal of Ainu pride, and desire 
to be relocated within domestic and international historical discourse as a means to 
legitimise their present situation and future endeavours. No longer could Wajin 
exclusively use History to justify state positions and undermine the Ainu without an Ainu 
reaction.  For example, in 1986, Prime Minister Nakasone said that Japan enjoys a higher 
level of education than the United States, because it lacks the many blacks and other non-
white peoples that are a part of their populace, otherwise a result of Japan’s homogeneity, 
a comment that Ainu and international critics reacted to very seriously. 57 
55 Narita Tokuhei, “Discrimination against Ainus and the International Convention on the Elimination 
of all forms of Racial Discrimination,” in United Nations, Japan and Human Rights, ed. Buraku 
Liberation, 136. 
56 Narita, “Discrimination,” 138. 
57 “‘No Minority Races in Japan’ says Nakasone,” Japan Times, 24 October 1986. John Burgess, 
“Nakasone Apologizes to U.S. For Remarks on Minorities Political Fallout Prompts Statement,” 
Washington Post Foreign Service, 27 September 1986 in Nichiro kankei shiryoshu, 1947-1997, in 
Hosoya et al, eds.,  (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1999), 1125.  Hanazaki Kohei, (Mark Hudson 
trans.) “Ainu Moshir and Yaponesia: Ainu and Okinawan Identities in Contemporary Japan,” in 
Multicultural Japan Paleolithic to Post Modern, Donald Denoon et al. eds. (Cambridge University 
Press, 1996), 128. Comments of a homogeneous country have been made by the government in 1973, 
1975, 1986, 1988, 1989 and 1991 (Osanai Takeshi, “Anti-Racism and Education for International 
Understanding in the Japanese Context: Approach, Design, Procedure,” in Indigenous Minorities and 
Education, Noel Loos and Osanai Takeshi, eds. [Tokyo: Sanyusha Publishing], 1993, 387).  Material 
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The Utari Association and the United Nations 
Ainu voices, while taken seriously in the international realm, have been constantly 
reinterpreted and downplayed within Japan. The first time for Ainu representatives to 
participate in any UN function was at the fifth UN Working Group on Indigenous 
Populations in Geneva, where they spoke on their own affairs. Ainu continued to 
participate in these meetings thereafter through continued support by the Shimin Gaiko 
Centre (Citizen’s Diplomatic Centre). Since their initial participation in 1987, the UN has 
recognised the Ainu as being Indigenous.58 In the same year, Japan’s second report to the 
CCPR acknowledged the uniqueness of Ainu religion, language and culture, but said that 
the Ainu are guaranteed equality under the Japanese constitution.59 This standpoint is 
representative of International Law scholar Iwasawa Yuji’s argument that Japan is slow 
and passive in adopting international law standards domestically, as it reinterprets 
international law within the framework of their constitution.60 
After Ainu participation in the UN minority rights group in Geneva in 1989, 
Nomura Giichi expressed his optimism for pursuing support from the international 
community for pressuring the government to officially recognise the Ainu. He said “Our 
demands coincide with world trends towards respect for minority peoples. If the Japanese 
government does nothing, even while saying they are internationalising, we will confront 
them at the UN. Pressure from the outside world has the strongest potential.”61 It is 
interesting that Indigenous peoples, including the Ainu, use concepts of, and the realm of 
International Law to work towards decolonising their lands and life-ways, because 
International Law had been the very discipline used by the Japanese and other colonial 
nations to declare and justify incorporation of Indigenous lands into their own system or 
rule, often calling their lands terra nullius.62 
8, Letter to Center for Human rights submitted by Nomura Giichi, dated 25 November 1986, reprinted 
in AAH, “Statement Submitted to The Fifth Session of The Working Group on Indigenous 
Populations,” in AKS, 1109-1108. 
58 The UN acknowledged Okinawans as being Indigenous since 1996. For details on how Utari 
Association members first went to the WGIP see, Takeuchi, Nomura Giichi, 24-27. 
59 Ainu Association of Hokkaido, “Statement Submitted to the Sixth Session of the Working Group on 
Indigenous Populations,” August 1988 reprinted in AKS, 1072
60 Iwasawa, International Law. 
61 “Hokkaido: Minority People Face Uphill Task to Secure Recognition – Ainu People,” Financial 
Times (London), 23 November 1989. 
62 See, Uemura Hideaki, “Colonial Annexation of Okinawa,” 110-112. Japan also sought to classify 
Formosa as terra nullius when it asserted its claim on the island in the late nineteenth century. In 1988, 
at an International Labour Organization conference in Geneva the international treaty No. 107 
Concerning the Protection and Integration of Indigenous and other Tribal and Semi-Tribal Populations 
in Independent Countries was revised to disavow past encouragement of assimilation. This resulted in 
the creation of No. 169 Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries to 
promote ethnic people’s enjoyment of legitimate rights to their uniqueness and social, economic and 
cultural development. The Utari Association was also an active participating organisation in its 
revision despite the Japanese government’s complete neglect of Ainu positions (AHH, “Statement 
Submitted to The International Labor Conference 75th Session, 1988: Sixth item on the Agenda – 
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The Association continued to stress the importance of the international arena for 
their struggle. In their report to the seventh session of the WGIP, they made a direct 
connection between recognition of their traditionally inhabited lands, their movement for 
a national law guaranteeing Ainu rights, and the international movement for “the rights of 
the world’s indigenous peoples,” so therefore “we would like to secure our self-reliance 
in cooperation with the efforts of the international society.”63 Linked to seeking such 
cooperation, the Association encouraged both governments to re-acknowledge the Ainu’s 
Indigenous status to the area when President Gorbachev visited Japan from 16-19 April 
1991.64 No reply came from either side.65 Shortly afterwards, Chairperson of the UN 
Working Group on Indigenous Populations, Erica Irene Daes went to Japan upon the 
request of the Association to survey discrimination again them and the government’s 
policy toward the Ainu,66 and a symposium was held in Tokyo.  
Their 1991 report to the WGIP informed the international community that 
unauthorised excavations of Ainu remains, for the purpose of “medical research,” took 
place in all of their homelands, where over one-thousand individuals were dug up and 
transported to Hokkaido University’s Medical Department.67 Although the report said 
that the remains were returned and a memorial hall constructed, this is only a partial truth 
as there still remains unresolved issues between Ainu and other peoples, whose bones 
were collected, and this university.68 Of the bones collected fifty-one were from the Kuril 
Islands. These excavations were done mainly by Haruo Yamazaki and Kodama 
Sakuzaemon of Hokkaido University, during excavation trips from 1934 to 1938, then 
again in 1956.69 The stealing of bodies from graves by Hokkaido University professors, 
and having them on display, is an example showing that, although the Ainu are officially 
considered Japanese and equal under the constitution, they are, in the eyes of many Wajin, 
 
Partial Revision of the Indigenous and Tribal Populations Convention, 1957 [No. 107],” AKS, 1028-
978. See also, Swepston, “Indigenous and Tribal Populations,” 447-454). Banner shows how lands in 
Canada and the United States were not seen as terra nullius and how British and American 
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Indian lands when disputes arose (Stuart Banner, How the Indians Lost Their Land [Cambridge, MA: 
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63 AAH, “Statement Submitted to the Seventh Session of the Working Group on Indigenous 
Populations,” in AKS, 972. An international meeting of Indigenous peoples took place in Hokkaido 
from 1-14 August 1989 where people from fourteen countries attended (“Ainu Moshiri [Hokkaido] 
declaration,” AMPO Japan-Asia Quarterly Review 21.2-3 [1990]:53-60.). 
64 Nomura, Ainu minzoku, 32. 
65 “Original Inhabitants Left out of Islands Debate,” The Associated Press 17 April 1991 and 
“Islanders Feel Left Out in the Cold,” Herald Sun, 18 April 1991. 
66 “U.N. Officials Arrive in Japan to Survey Ainu,” Kyodo News, 19 May 1991. She visited Japan 
from 19-25 May 1991. 
67 AAH, “Statement Submitted to the Ninth Session of the Working Group on Indigenous 
Populations,” in AKS, 948. 
68 Pirika Moshiri 
69 AAH, “Statement Submitted to the Ninth Session of the Working Group on Indigenous 
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considered distinct and different (see Figure 6). The same researchers did not dig up and 
steal half decomposed Wajin bodies and put them on display claiming them as their own 
property, neither did Wajin anthropologists go to Wajin cities and villages to take their 
measurements to the extent that was done to the Ainu. This kind of treatment is contrary 
to arguments made by scholars like Okuyama Ryo, who have written that that there was 
no difference in treatment between the Ainu and Japanese as commoners.70 But, this was 
(is) a problem because ignorance of the difference between the Ainu and Wajin led the 
government to treat them the same under law, under the guise of homogeneity, without 
paying attention to local level activity, representing a continuation from differences we 
saw between government and local views of the Ainu, when the Bakufu took direct 
control over Ezochi. Okuyama himself, like the majority of government officials and 
Wajin scholars who claimed that there were no difference of treatment, and therefore no 
issues to be dealt with, concentrated on recordings of law and paper documents. This is 
interesting because Okuyama himself noted the need to be sceptical and critical of his 
resources.71 This issue of Ainu grave theft by Wajin scholars received a lot of attention in 
the WGIP. In a disturbing way, the grave robberies from the 1930s onward helped the 
Ainu gain audiences in the international arena and authenticate their claims.  
In December 1991 Takemura Yasuko submitted four questions to be clarified by 
the government regarding the legal status of the Ainu. The answers given by a Member of 
the House of Councillors illustrates underlying official rhetoric that appears not to 
seriously address the situation at hand. In response to asking when Hokkaido was 
incorporated into Japan and what the legal basis for the incorporation was, the answer 
was that “The island of Hokkaido has been a territory of Japan from the beginning, and it 
is not clear when the land became actual Japanese territory. When Russia and Japan 
settled the border between the two countries at the end of the Edo era and the beginning 
of the Meiji era, the island of Hokkaido was not taken up as a question at all, and it was 
regarded as a natural premise that the land was Japanese territory.” When asked to define 
the procedures taken to assimilate the Ainu at this time he said “The island of Hokkaido 
has been a territory of Japan from the beginning, and the Ainu have been Japanese from 
the beginning.” In response to the last question of what was the position of Hokkaido and 
the Ainu before the incorporation of the island it was recorded that “I have read the 
documents and acquired other information regarding Hokkaido, and I acknowledge that it 
is a common belief that the Ainu have been living on the island of Hokkaido for 
centuries.”72 This type of unclear, unspecific, and non-comprehensive answers are the 
norm that Ainu encounter when questioning the foundation of the return movement. Ten 
days later the Japanese government’s third report to the CCPR recognised the Ainu for 
the first time as an ethnic minority of Article 27, but that they were not denied any of the 
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rights stipulated by the same Article. 73  While this showed a change of government 
position toward the Ainu within Japan, the foundation of their position that there are no 
problems in relation to the Ainu persisted. 
This lack of serious reply is also seen in June of 1992,74 when the Governor of 
Sakhalin invited Ainu to attend a meeting between them and the Hokkaido Government 
regarding the Northern Territories issue in Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk. Akibe Tokuhei, dressed 
in Ainu regalia, showed a map of traditional Ainu lands and said that the Ainu were the 
original inhabitants even before a territorial issue arose, and that both governments 
should remember this when they negotiate. While the Association later wrote that at the 
meeting the “Russian side made it clear that it considered the Ainu people to be the 
indigenous inhabitants of the islands,”75 the press had a different view stating “Some 
Russians laughed nervously while Japanese listeners studied their shoelaces.”76 Once 
again the Ainu were not taken seriously, this time in regional debates. 
At the inauguration of the International Year of the World’s Indigenous People 
in December 1992, which Japan voted in favour of in 1990, Nomura had the rare honour 
of addressing the General Assembly. His speech informed the listeners on the three main 
areas of Ainu life. He talked of how the areas of Hokkaido, the Kurils and southern 
Sakhalin have been the homeland of the distinct Ainu society and culture since “time 
immemorial.” He then described how the Japanese government unilaterally claimed their 
lands and how many of them were relocated in the process as the Japanese and Russians 
negotiated borders in the nineteenth century. The Ainu were the target of government 
assimilation policies that resulted in discrimination and marginalistion within Japanese 
society. Nomura did not dwell on negative aspects of Ainu history and exhibited 
acceptance that Indigenous people throughout the globe have a history of similar colonial 
encounters. He ended his speech by expressing desire for governments around the world 
to begin “a new partnership” and to have the Japanese government open meaningful 
dialogue with the Ainu,77 certainly not a new request.  
 
73 Also see “Ainu minzoku wa shosuminzoku – jinshu hokokusho ni kijutsu: seifu ga hajimete kitei,” 
Hokkaido Shinbun, 16 December 1991. AAH, “Statement Submitted to the Tenth Session of the 
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second point of discussion was that of the Ainu and the northern Territories (AAH, “Statement to the 
Tenth Session,” in AKS, 922). 
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The International Year was a busy year for the Ainu with various events 
throughout Japan. For example, the Utari Association invited Ms. Rigoberta Menchu 
Tum, a Guatemalan Indigenous person, the 1992 Nobel Peace Prize Winner and a UN 
Goodwill Ambassador for the International Year of the World’s Indigenous People, to 
Hokkaido. The Nibutani Forum, a four day event organised by the Association, included 
Indigenous representatives from thirteen countries and had over four-thousand 
participants. 78  The Association said that through these events the people of Japan 
acquired a better understanding of the Ainu. During the same year the UN resolved to 
make the ten years from 10 December 1994 the International Decade of the World’s 
Indigenous Peoples. 79  In their 1993 report to WGIP they briefly mentioned the 
connection between their Indigeneity and the Northern Territories issue. 80  It also 
remarked how “the ‘Collection of Data Concerning the History of Territorial Issues 
between Japan and Russia – Joint Compilation,’ was prepared based on the mutual 
agreement of the two countries in 1992, was produced on the assumption that the Ainu 
people are an indigenous people.” The Ainu Association, echoing the theme of the 
International Year, did not look to blame the government for the past, but demanded a 
“new partnership” and encouraged the Japanese Government to pay closer attention to the 
effect Japanese companies have on Indigenous peoples throughout the globe. They 
understood that the concept of self-determination in the UN draft Declaration is 
troublesome for many governments, but stressed that they only want a “high degree of 
autonomy” and are willing to act in consideration of “the unity of the nations” and 
“preservation of the nation’s territorial integrity.” They are willing to act as part of the 
nation, as full participants, and not outsiders as the government and academics seem to 
fear if they recognise the Ainu as Indigenous.81 They reiterated their traditional lands as 
consisting of Hokkaido, Sakhalin and the Kurils, and that “the Ainu people have never 
given up nor handed over any land, including Hokkaido, on which they have lived. 
Therefore, the land originally belonged to the Ainu people, and they have the rights to the 
land, which no one can infringe.”82 The point here is that the Wajin did infringe and have 
justified it in terms of the nation-state, progress and development, concepts all supported 
by International Law.  
 Nomura, showing how national opinions can differ greatly from local ones, later 
wrote that Russians on Sakhalin were in the opinion that the Northern Territories belong 
neither to Russian or Japanese governments and, if they are returned, they should be 
returned to the Ainu. The Association also inquired, unsuccessfully, to have Ainu 
included in the three groups of “concerned people” (mass communication, return 
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movement members, and returnees [returnee here, does not include the “repatriated” 
Ainu or their descendents]), who became eligible for visa free trips to the Northern 
Territories to pay respects to their ancestors.83 This brings up issues of an internally 
developed communal history of the Ainu despite regional variations in language and 
culture. 
In May 1997, one year after the government ratified CERD , partially in response 
to over ten years of protest by the Ainu, the destruction of Ainu lands by a damming 
project near Nibutani and international pressure, the Japanese government ratified the 
Cultural Promotion Act (CPA),84 based on only one principle presented in the proposed 
Ainu New Law – education and culture. This was often labelled an “Epoch making 
event,” for two main reasons: first it nullified the outdated 1899 HFAPA; second, it 
recognised the Ainu people as having a distinct cultural identity within Japanese national 
borders. The CPA, however, has been a mixed blessing for the Ainu. It recognised a 
separate ethnic group in Japan and supported the promotion of their culture and 
language.85 On the other hand, it completely omitted any mention of: the Ainu being 
Indigenous, Ainu land rights, or other political and economic rights demanded by the 
Hokkaido Utari Association in their 1984 proposed law.86 Nonetheless, many Ainu saw it 
as an improvement compared to comments made by the former Japanese Prime Minister 
Nakasone eleven years prior. 
In the Association’s 1998 report to the WGIP, recognising the shortfall of the 
CPA, they reflected on major decisions regarding the acknowledgement as being 
Indigenous. For example, the March 1997 judgment in the Nibutani Dam Case 
recognised that “the Ainu people are the original inhabitants of Hokkaido and its adjacent 
areas (including the Kuril islands and Sakhalin Island). They constituted a distinct culture 
and identity before Japan extended jurisdiction over their land. Their land was 
incorporated by the Japanese government and they suffered economic and social 
disposition under the governmental policies imposed by the majority Japanese. Even 
under these circumstances the Ainu still maintain their distinct culture and identity as a 
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social group.” 87  While Kayano Shigeru was in political office (1994-1998) it was 
recorded that Prime Ministers and other cabinet members felt that the “indigenousness of 
the Ainu is a historical fact.”88 Repetitious in nature, the report reminded the WGIP that 
since 1982 they have officially asked for reconfirmation of their Indigenous status to the 
entire Kuril chain and want the government to clarify the Ainu’s Indigenous status of 
Hokkaido.89 In Japan’s 1999 CERD report to the UN, they recognised that the Ainu had 
been in Hokkaido before Wajin expansion, but the downfall was that in the same 
sentence they called Hokkaido Japan’s inherent territory, thus undermining the 
Indigenousness of Ainu.90 
Akibe Tokuhei has recently said that he does not “understand why the Japanese 
government claims sovereignty only over the four islands.”91 Implying that since Ainu 
lived throughout all the Kurils, and since Japan claimed Ainu lands as inherently 
Japanese, by extension they should not limit their claim to four islands. While this seems 
like a drastic statement for an Assistant Director of the Utari Association to make, it 
shows independence of thought between the Docho and the Utari Association and 
possible acceptance that their petitioning method has been unsuccessful. Although highly 
unlikely, this may lead to new or more assertive approaches by the Association in the 
future both domestically and internationally. 
The Utari Association has said that they are in a deadlock, because they feel that 
they cannot proceed unless they are recognised as being “Indigenous,” and the only way 
for the government to recognise them as such is to have an international definition 
available.92 This is one reason why they take great interest in the activities at the United 
Nations. Applying thoughts of Iwasawa to this issue, however, even if there were such a 
definition available, courts in Japan would continue to ignore, devalue and move around 
such international human rights issues and focus on their constitutional rights instead, 
therefore, greatly limiting the value of having such an international definition, which, if 
ever created, would greatly limit who could be called “Indigenous.” This is because 
Japanese courts, which are closely linked to the ruling LDP, would rather deal with their 
own familiar ground of the Constitution and that they are “strict in recognizing a certain 
rule to be customary international law, or in regarding it to be directly applicable in 
Japan.”93 
87 See chapter one, note 35. 
88 From August 1993 to January 1996, a coalition of opposition parties, not the LDP, was in power.  
89 AAH, “Statement Submitted to the Fourth Session the Working Group on Right of the Indigenous 
People,” reprinted in KKS, 290-298. 
90 CERD, Japan, CERD/C/350/Add.2, 6. 
91 Hirano Keiji, “Residents Still Dream of Return to Russian-held Isles,” Japan Times, 8 October 2006. 
92 If we put the UDHR up to the criticism of the draft Declaration where there is much insistence to 
have an international definition of “indigenous peoples” then we would also have to define the word 
“peoples” in the UDHR, because it gives a significant amount of rights without ever defining what 
exactly “peoples” is. Under international law “peoples” are groups that are authorized to have self-
determination such as is manifested in a nation or state. 
93 Iwasawa, International Law, 289.
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Domestic Failure to Take the Hokkaido Utari Association Seriously 
Lack of Ainu participation on issues related to them is not limited to the Northern 
Territories. Even in issues directly involving the Ainu, excluding them from being active 
participants in decision making processes is the norm. For example, in a meeting in May 
1992 with the government and the ad hoc Committee for Consideration of the New Ainu 
Law at the Prime Minister’s Office in Kasumigaseki in Tokyo, less than one month after 
Toyooka Masanori, leader of Kurils and Sakhalin Ainu conference, circulated letters of 
Ainu petition to the government and press, Nomura Giichi strongly criticised the 
Committee for asking childish questions even after three years of investigation of Ainu 
matters. The Committee asked: “Now in Hokkaido how many Ainu are there? Is there 
anyone who can speak the Ainu language?” This showed their lack of serious study.94 
Four years later at the “The Conference of the Well-Informed on the Measures for the 
Ainu People,” which formed to discuss the draft Ainu New Law in 1996, was made up of 
seven members, not one was Ainu. The members included four professors (one was an 
ex-judge on the Supreme Court), the president of the National Ethnology Museum, the 
Governor of Hokkaido and a novelist, who past away almost two months before they 
finished their report. The report itself was highly descriptive in nature and lacked any sort 
of in-depth analyses. The group had various meetings over a one year period, with only 
one brief trip to Hokkaido. The report referred to the assimilation policy as the 
“Adjusting policy” in the English translation, and that despite “being treated equally as a 
part of the Japanese nation under the law,”  “many Ainu people suffered from poverty 
and discrimination.” This statement reinforces the idea that the Ainu were incapable of 
succeeding under situations of “equality” due to their inferior nature, justifying the 
HFAPA, and not including Ainu in present discussion since they are descendents of the 
very people that needed “protecting.”  
The Conference members’ opinion on the UN was that its outcomes are 
unpredictable, and that the definition of “Indigenous peoples” is still under heated debate, 
so it would be impossible to yet call the Ainu “Indigenous.” They completely opposed 
any ideas of self-determination, and/or compensation for lost lands into any newly 
implemented measures for the Ainu. To do so would undermine the concept of Japanese 
homogeneity. Outlining only a few of their positions gives a good sense of Committee’s 
underlying position. A supreme court judge, who like most judges in Japan, was likely 
not familiar or entirely comfortable dealing with international law, a museumologist and 
the historical novelist Shiba Ryotaro, who represent putting the Ainu in the past and not 
the present or future, and the Hokkaido Governor, whose position is symbolic of 
manipulating Ainu for the benefit of progress and development of the north.95 Knowing 
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that active Ainu participation in domestic issues directly related to them does not occur 
even in recent times, it is unsurprising that they are not taken as active participants in the 
larger issue of the Northern Territories domestically.96 
International versus domestic/regional treatment of Ainu issues differ greatly, 
while local areas of debate fluctuate between support and ignorance, the UN views the 
Ainu as Indigenous Peoples and supports their claims to traditional lands. Domestically, 
the Japanese government recognises them as an ethnic minority with no problems besides 
those of welfare issues. The United Nations provides a platform and space for including 
Ainu voices, where they can be heard and responded to. The government has difficulty in 
giving clear answers related to Ainu and the Northern Territories. Nonetheless, it expects 
a clear definition by the UN on “Indigenous Peoples” before it is willing to debate this 
issue domestically, yet has shown support for the Draft Declaration on Indigenous 
Peoples. Once again, this shows a difference between domestic circumstances and 
international actions, based on political motives, as we also saw in Chapter Four with the 
1919 racial clause. The Ainu pursuit of rights in the Northern Territories was closely 
associated with their push for the Ainu New Law. One purpose of the New Law, 
according to Nomura, was to avoid the kind of amnesia of Ainu history represented by 
the Northern Territories issue.97 
Other Ainu Organisations and Issues: the Return for the Autonomous 
Ainu Homeland and the Pirika Zenkoku Kai
Many Ainu have found actions of the Hokkaido Utari Association, especially since the 
enactment of the CPA, to be too conservative domestically. These Ainu have, therefore, 
initiated a number of their own organisations to assert their often unheard and seemingly 
powerless voices. One example, is the Ainu Moshiri no Jijiku o Torimodosu Kai or the 
Association to Restore the Autonomous Ainu Homeland.98 The first president was Araya 
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Kokichi, who later died in 1992 at the age of 59,99 followed by Yamamoto Kazuaki. 
Several Ainu created this organisation on 24 October 1991 to seek the return of the four 
islands to the Ainu. The following day many Japanese newspapers printed articles on 
it.100 Their assertion for territorial rights exhibited an Ainu need to further movements 
beyond the Utari Association’s eight year demand for Indigenous rights. 
Simultaneously following arguments and activities presented by this organisation 
with information provided by Brad Williams on the “Sakhalin Factor” proves informative 
for better understanding the development of Ainu arguments and their position on 
currently Russian occupied lands. Reading Ainu arguments alone, without understanding 
the political influence Sakhalin governors, especially Governor Valentin Fedorov (1990-
1993), had on territorial discourse leaves the story incomplete, since this organisation 
formed and matured during this same period. Williams argued that governors had a large 
degree of influence over negotiations with Japan in the early to mid-1990s. As the Soviet 
system broke down, regional leaders gained more power both locally and nationally as 
Moscow relied more on them for cohesion and preservation of their own national 
political power positions.101Amidst such regional influence, the Peace Boat, a Japanese 
NGO, visited Sakhalin and the southern Kurils. Local authorities and peoples in Sakhalin 
and the Kurils told Chikappu Mieko, the only Ainu on board, that if the islands were 
returned to anyone they would be returned to the Ainu and not the Japanese, because the 
lands previously belonged to the Ainu. Such a response is understandable because, at the 
time Fedorov used nationalism and his regional authority to obtain more support from 
Moscow for local development, which gave him an even stronger hold and claim to 
keeping all the Kurils under Sakhalin jurisdiction and as a part of Russia. To support the 
relinquishment of any of the Kurils would have undermined regional development of 
Sakhalin, and his own power. Obtaining Ainu support for his actions further legitimised 
his rule and persuasion to ensure Moscow would make no concessions. The Ainu also 
gained regional Russian support in the early 1990s to have access to Sakhalin and the 
Kurils, which enhanced their own arguments as having historical claim to the region, as 
well as a stronger foundation for asserting their indigeneity.  
After the Japanese government finished a survey of left-behind Wajin in Sakhalin, 
Chikappu demanded the Ministry of Health and Welfare to perform a similar survey of 
Ainu on the island, but the Ministry denied her request. This led her to propose to 
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perform an Ainu-led survey the following month.102 When she went to Sakhalin with five 
other Ainu in 1990, she found out that in the same year the Nivkhi regained a degree of 
autonomy with some lands returned to their control and that the Nivkhi Association 
welcomed the Ainu to join and work together for common goals. In December 1989, the 
Nivkhi of Sakhalin formed the Northern Minority Peoples Association (hoppo 
shosuminzoku kyokai) and called for self-determination rights and started reviving their 
ceremonies, and within the year they secured fishing and hunting rights. Chikappu and 
other Ainu wanted to work with the Sakhalin Indigenous peoples to hold a symposium on 
the Northern Territories there to have both the Soviet Union and Japan think seriously 
about basic Indigenous rights. 103  According to Hokkaido University of Education 
Lecturer Tanaka Ryo, who specialises in Sakhalin Indigenous peoples and Ainu history, 
the Nivkhi signed an agreement with the Sakhalin provincial council on 29 September 
1990 resulting in the return to them an area of about one-hundred and thirty square 
kilometres in northern Sakhalin.104 Ten days before the return, Kaizawa Teruichi sent a 
message to the governor of Sakhalin calling for closer ties between Sakhalin and Ainu.105 
In 1991 five new areas were returned to Indigenous minorities in the island. Tanaka said 
that, even though the system is different in Sakhalin than in Japan, it is worthwhile to 
evaluate the positive way of looking at Indigenous rights on the island.106 These changes 
in Sakhalin likely stimulated the Ainu to take further action and develop ties with 
Sakhalin and its people. Inspired by the Uilta and Nivkhi successes Chikappu called upon 
other Ainu to work hard to have land returned to them.107 
Also around this time an Ainu fishing company, Utari Kyodo, created ties with 
Aniwa, a Japanese-Soviet venture in and around the disputed waters, in order to help 
develop fisheries and contacts with other peoples, and fish. The director of the Foreign 
Ministry, Togo Kazuhiko, expressed concern of this joint venture to Hokkaido Governor 
Yokomichi stating that it could be interpreted as recognising Soviet sovereignty in the 
area.108 Less than two years after the joint venture began, the Ainu company was charged 
with illegal fishing of crab in waters off of Shikotan. The president, Shiiku Tadaichi, 
denied the accusation and justified their actions as being in contract with Aniwa. The 
government said that any fishing in the area, regardless of the company, is a crime 
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without permission of the government.109 Shiiku’s argument failed to please the court and 
in early 1991 the Kushiro district court found him guilty of illegal fishing and sentenced 
him to five months in prison and suspended his fishing for three years. The Sapporo High 
Court upheld the ruling in April 1992.110 Ota Masakuni later wrote that “…the hidden 
meaning behind their actions was that people had the right to communicate and coexist 
with people who lived close to each other. This stands in opposition to the consistent 
course of the modern state, for which borders and territories are the most important 
thing…”111 
The visits to Sakhalin, along with the Utari Association’s lack of success in the 
matter of securing Indigenous rights, led several Ainu to create the Autonomous 
Homeland Association. The president Yamamoto Kazuaki did not see this organisation as 
a sudden formation or activity, but a continuation of work that the Ainu Liberation 
League began under direction of Yuki Shoji. Ideas presented by the Association were not 
new, Ainu and Wajin have made such claims in the past; it is simply that the government 
and many scholars have not noticed. Their mandate included nine articles, which similar 
to the 1983 Utari publication, included their goal to declare to the world their rights in 
their former lands and for the formation of an autonomous Ainu homeland in the disputed 
islands.112 Most of the thoughts presented by this Association directly oppose the return 
of Northern Territories and address Indigenous rights to the same lands. While through 
inference, their claims extend to all of the Kurils, they stress rights on the southern 
portion where the majority of political attention lies. 
 
Chikappu Mieko became the first Ainu since the end of World War II to visit Sakhalin, 
Etorofu, Kunashiri and Shikotan, when she participated in a Peace Boat voyage.113 The 
Peace Boat took its first voyage in 1983 as a Japanese university student-led initiative and 
“creative response to government censorship regarding Japan’s past military aggression 
in the Asia-Pacific…with the aim of learning first-hand about the war from those who 
experienced it and initiating people-to-people exchange.” 114  The eleventh voyage of 
Peace Boat left Niigata with about one-hundred and twenty people on board and visited 
the Northern Territories visa-free and Sakhalin from 17 to 27 September 1991.115 Before 
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departure the Ministry of Foreign Affairs seriously opposed them from going to the 
Kurils. They warned going to the Kurils is for specialists, so the government should be 
responsible for taking amateurs there. The Ministry of Transportation also became 
involved and said that there was the obstacle of getting a license from a travel agency 
before they could go. But those from the Peace Boat persisted and made the trip possible. 
When they arrived in Sakhalin, Governor Fedorov and other government officials 
attended the welcome party, but soon returned to their office. Many locals in the islands 
visited told Chikappu that the Ainu are the rightful owners to the islands and Ainu were 
invited to live there. 116  She was fascinated that in addition to Russians, there were 
Koreans from Sakhalin on the Northern Territories, children in Shikotan were learning 
English and Japanese, and the Russian museum curator on Shikotan had an interest in 
Ainu ruins.117 Her impression of the Indigenous inhabitants of Sakhalin was favourable, 
and she saw the Soviet Union as embracing multiculturalism, a view different than 
official Japanese views as represented by Nakasone’s 1986 remarks and the large body of 
Nihonjinron literature, interpreted as an extension of the Meiji assimilation policy. She 
expressed a need to change the consciousness of each citizen towards the false idea of 
Japan’s homogeneity. 118  She said that Japan was ignoring the Ainu and the current 
inhabitants of the islands, and this was an historical error that is repeating – a criminal 
act.119 She wrote it would be possible to work with local governments to create an 
autonomous region, but in Japan they are not even acknowledged as peoples.  
For this reason their Association was looking into the possibility of creating an 
autonomous region and wanted the Japanese government to give straight answers on why 
they are unable to acknowledge them as an Indigenous people. Yamamoto said they 
formed an Ainu-Soviet Association (AS Association) and the Soviet side recognised the 
Northern Territories as Ainu lands, so they should be free to fish and live with the current 
inhabitants, just like how the Koreans, who the Japanese brought there, live alongside 
Russians.120 He did not mention that such a move, while potentially positive for the Ainu, 
would not work to resolve other issues, nor would it be plausible since the Ainu are 
Japanese citizens, this would create a multitude of new problems. The state would not 
support such an Ainu or Russian initiative. Ainu encouragement of such a move would 
have further supported the Sakhalin Governors’ control over the islands and pressured 
those in Moscow to oppose a return.  
Locals wanted to support the Ainu, because similar to the Ainu, most local 
Russians did not want the islands returned to Japan. Supporting the Ainu also supported 
their cause. Just as it would be impossible to tell the Wajin to get out of Hokkaido, it is 
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similarly impracticable to tell the current residents to leave. The Ainu are insisting upon 
their Indigenous rights and desire the establishment of an autonomous region where they 
can live according to their own ways. While the Utari Association sought to be included 
in “concerned peoples” who could visit the islands visa-free, they would prefer to not to 
be included in the group of “former residents,” because it would imply that Ainu are not 
the original inhabitants. Members argued that they will need to fight to change public 
opinion; however public opinion on historical matters is difficult to change, because it is 
at the mercy of nationalism. They believe that, even if the government does know of the 
Ainu and Ainu rights to lands within the Northern Territories, they purposefully hide this 
with the use of mass communication and media so the public has not learnt the actual 
history of the area.121 Even today most inhabitants of Hokkaido know very little of Wajin 
occupation of Hokkaido and the northern regions.  
This Association also built ties with Okinawans. The twentieth anniversary of the 
return of Okinawa took place in 1992, but numerous locals argued that the return only 
helped them gain economic sufficiency, but they still have no power to choose their own 
path and Japan has destroyed Okinawan nature through the promotion of tourism. From 
their experience numerous Okinawans think Ainu deserve to have a choice in making 
their future based on their own ways.122 Many Okinawans fight for the removal of US 
military bases, but they also oppose the resorts, which destroy the local environment and 
economy. Most of the money from tourism goes back to Honshu with the locals receiving 
little benefit. Okinawan support helps the Ainu to build national contacts and further 
disseminate their claims throughout Japan. 
Like the Utari Association, they also recognised the importance of 
internationalising their cause. Chikappu believed that internationalising the problem 
would help their cause and that is why she took part in the Peace Boat. In 1992, 
Yamamoto handed over a position paper addressed to President Yeltsin and Sakhalin 
Governor Fedorov at the Sapporo Russian Consulate General which stressed the rights of 
Ainu in the Northern Territories.123 And a month later representatives of this organisation 
participated in the Global Forum in Indigenous Peoples in Rio de Janeiro. 124  They 
believed that such international initiatives and movements around the draft Declaration 
on Indigenous peoples give enough power to the Ainu, so they no longer need the 
Japanese government to speak on their behalf. 
Their solution to the Northern Territories issue would not be a “return” to Japan, 
because, if they were, the Wajin would develop them as they did Hokkaido and ruin the 
environment. They would rather leave the islands as they are and continue to work for 
inclusion of the Ainu and other Indigenous peoples in the region and set the area up as a 
place or park, where the Ainu would have access. This would encourage a reduction of 
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concepts of sovereignty and territory and encourage academics and governments to pay 
more attention to the human aspect of the issue and less to the nation. This is one step 
towards breaking the idea of a “sovereign nation” as we begin to think of people above 
that of the state.125 In other words, this organisation called for a softening of concepts of 
sovereignty and territorial national borders. 
Pirika Zenkoku 
Associated with the Autonomous Homeland Association, the Pirika Zenkoku Jikkoiinkai 
(full name is “Hoppo Ryodo no Hi” Hantai! “Ainu Shinpo” Jitsugen! Zenkoku 
Jikkoinkai) has continued to network with empathetic Okinawans and Wajin regarding 
many issues around the Ainu, the Northern Territories being one of them. Tadashi 
Shirakawa, a member of Pirika Zenkoku, made a similar request to the Utari Association 
by insisting both governments recognise Ainu rights in the Kurils, Sakhalin and 
Hokkaido. One of eight articles in the mandate of this organisation, which first took 
shape in 1999, is to oppose the Northern Territories Day and the status quo of Russo-
Japanese negotiations. One of the four themes of the activities of Pirika Moshiri Sha, a
newsletter associated with Pirika Zenkoku, is to fight against the “Northern Territories 
Day.” The newsletter’s second theme is the pursuit of the enactment of a real Ainu Law, 
because the CPA fell short of the draft Ainu Law and fails to recognise the indigeneity of 
the Ainu, or provide political or land rights. Once again the pursuit of a new law and 
opposition to the Northern Territories return movement are intricately connected.126 
Another member of Pirika Moshiri Sha stressed that they are continuing to pursue 
rights to travel to and from the Kurils visa-free and have hunting and fishing privileges, 
which would enable them to live with the current Russian residents. They are not asking 
for a complete unconditional return as the Japanese government is. Members openly 
oppose and wish to stop bilateral Russo-Japanese negotiations that ignore the Ainu and 
try to work towards a realistic and true history that includes the Ainu in the Okhotsk 
region. They also support Ainu and other northern Indigenous peoples’ Indigenous rights 
and movements towards self-determination. 127  Pro nation-centered academics and 
politicians appear uneasy when dealing with the concept of self-determination. Self-
determination, however, is not a black or white concept, but has a large grey area that is 
much more complicated in nature than a binary division. 
While this association is interested in pursuing Ainu rights in the international 
realm, some Ainu think that the United Nations and the draft Declaration for Indigenous 
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Peoples will not help their situation, because Japan will not recognise it since Japan only 
copies the United States’ actions, and they are unlikely to support it. And if Japan does 
adopt it after its acceptance by the General Assembly, then it will argue that they are 
unable to implement it, because there is no international definition of “Indigenous 
peoples.”128 This organisation, therefore, tends to focus on domestic and regional issues. 
Their annual February protest is one such example. On 7 February 2004, Pirika Zenkoku 
organised, mainly through Ainu efforts, the tenth annual demonstration against the 
“Northern Territories Day” in Sapporo. The main objective of this protest was to ensure 
that the Japanese government does not forget about the Ainu and other Indigenous 
peoples, when addressing issues north of Hokkaido.129 In November 2005, Shirakawa 
Tadashi submitted a joint statement to the Japanese Foreign Minister and the Russian 
embassy in Tokyo which stated that neither Japan nor Russia have rights to Northern 
Territories and that both governments need to recognise Ainu human rights as Indigenous 
peoples, including the right to move to and from the islands.130 An official at the Japanese 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs replied that “we will report the request to the foreign minister 
but we cannot accord special treatment only to the Ainu.”131 However, “This will not 
have an effect on the talks because it has never been an issue between the two 
governments.” Likewise, a spokesperson of the Russian embassy said it was “‘not to be 
taken seriously’ and added that it had been a pointless exercise because it had generated 
no reaction in either Japanese or Russian media.”132 State dialogue silences Indigenous 
voices, and media and external pressure in the petition process is important. 
Summary 
The Ainu, who do press the government to get back land and pursue issues of Ainu 
Indigenous rights, are in the minority. This is partially due to most Ainu being satisfied 
with receiving money from the government. “Since we get some money from the 
government it makes it difficult to complain about anything.”133  The “cheque-book” 
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policy, that has become a noted part of many aspects of Japanese policies, is being used 
in a similar manner towards the Ainu. 
Discontented Ainu and empathetic Wajin and Okinawans and other Indigenous 
groups in the region (Nivkhi and Uilta) called for the government to become more 
conscious of human rights, Indigenous rights and hope the government will return land to 
the Ainu, or at minimum allow them access to the islands. While their numbers are small, 
groups outside of the Utari Association have contributed to furthering domestic Wajin 
understanding of Ainu claims through their domestic and regional contacts. They have 
gained little with their struggle so many Ainu and Wajin will continue to fight. 134 
Continual protest through various organisations illuminates Ainu regionalism and lack of 
cohesion of opinion and what they see as appropriate measures to pursue their rights. 
While the Utari Association has stepped forward in the United Nations, their actions 
remain conservative at home. Other Ainu see this conservatism of their domestic 
strategies as harmful and they exhibit a need to openly confront academia and 
government on issues related to Ainu Indigenous rights at home. This variable and 
changing relationship between the Utari Association and other groups shows both a 
healthy and active Ainu community, one that is adaptive and flexible, yet fragmented and 
indecisive. While some critics note the need for Ainu to become more uniform in action 
and opinion, often citing Canadian First Nations examples for direction of cohesion, 
current Ainu regionalism, as Mark Watson recently demonstrated, extends to Ainu 
migration into metropolitan areas in the Kanto region. There is a continuation of the 
realities of territorial regionalism and inter-Ainu politics from the past in the present. 
 
This chapter followed the internationalisation of the Ainu through several Ainu 
organisations. A major obstacle for the Ainu in gaining recognition in this issue is the 
government’s refusal to acknowledgment them as Indigenous peoples. Without 
governmental recognition it is doubtful that the Ainu can break through barriers of 
various forms of discrimination and have the government and academics take them 
seriously in this issue. The government is hesitant to domestically accept the 
“Indigenous” status of the Ainu, because it could encourage other minority peoples to 
further assert themselves and weaken their claims to the disputed Northern Territories, 
and confuse the concept of homogeneity in Japan. These points have yet to be either 
conceded or denied by the government. 135  The relationship between the Japanese 
government and the Ainu is becoming increasingly complex, as their relationship 
breaches domestic boundaries and extends into the international realm. Japan’s policy 
toward the Ainu is reflected in the domestic realm, where the established ideas of 
Nihonjinron or “Japaneseness” are clenching on to the idea of a mono-cultural and mono-
ethnic society, and in the international realm to limit Ainu influence in government 
actions.  
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The failure to recognise the Ainu’s collective ownership of land is not a new 
phenomenon applicable only to the Northern Territories, but it has a long continuation 
since the Kaitakushi, when the Wajin reported the land to be virgin and untouched under 
Meiji’s 1872 Land Ordinance, which declared Hokkaido lands Crown lands. And later 
during Allied occupation land reforms removed a large percentage of lands from Ainu 
ownership. The Ainu pursuit to edit their history originated alongside the decision to 
work towards the abolishment of the HFAPA and establish the Ainu New Law, so it is a 
wonder why the issue of the Northern Territories has been left out or minimalised when 
authors traced the drafting process of the Ainu New Law. The Northern Territories issue 
has encouraged further Ainu movements to reclaim their history and identity by 
relocating them in the past, present and future. 
Ainu arguments and goals on the Northern Territories issue differ greatly from the 
Japanese government and arguments presented by the majority of publications on the 
topic. This issue has traditionally been scrutinised in terms of specific wording in treaties 
between states. From this angle it is easy to disqualify Ainu arguments, because they 
were not signatories of the treaties that recognised their status as separate from either the 
Russians or Japanese, but were unilaterally claimed and absorbed (both people and 
resources) first into the Wajin cultural sphere and later by the Meiji state as “former 
natives.” From this nation-state perspective, the Ainu do not have an important existence. 
In order to include the Ainu there is need to address issues of Indigenous rights, or human 
rights arguments, which themselves only emerged in a coherent context after World War 
II. The Ainu are not arguing for an unconditional return, but for rights as the traditional 
inhabitants of those lands and thus access to live, travel, hunt, fish and gather without a 
visa, together with the current Russian inhabitants, and even past Japanese decedents who 
lived there. This argument indirectly shows that what is, and who is, Indigenous is 
difficult to define.136 
136 Similar to the case of the Inuit in Greenland, the Ainu living in the Kurils may have been the most 
recent in a series of peoples to move into the area. 
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Figure 6: Kodama Sakuzaemon1
1 “Introduction of the Event and Meeting ‘Ainu Special Exhibition Assemble and Think,’” Ainu 




Expanding Frameworks: Solutions that Consider the Ainu 
 
Consistently ignoring Ainu history in relation to the Northern Territories issue erases the 
Ainu from present and future discourses in a government and academic-perceived, top-
down, one-way centrifugal relationship based on conceptions of the nation and progress. 
The government ignored the Ainu when renaming Hokkaido, making treaties with Russia, 
when “opening” Hokkaido, in post-War land reforms, in school texts, during celebration 
of the centennial of Hokkaido history, and in the state’s writings to the UN. Prime 
Ministers, government officials and scholars have ignored the Ainu in claims of national 
homogeneity, and in the Northern Territories dispute, therefore precluding a more 
accurate history of the Okhotsk region. Collectively, Wajin have taken from the Ainu for 
the purpose of land, resources, knowledge of land and navigations in maps, as subjects 
for the creation of institutions and academic disciplines like Anthropology, policy 
relating to other Japanese colonies before World War II, and for museums. Even today 
academics are still clinging onto Ainu bones and taking Ainu blood and urine samples. 
These are not activities limited to Japan alone, as Western academics have also been and 
are involved in degradation of the Ainu that has persisted to this day.1
Since the arrival of both Russians and Wajin into Ainu Moshir, they have worked 
around and above the Ainu when land or power disputes have arisen. Besides the obvious 
loss of Hokkaido, the Ainu have also lost say in events occurring in other parts of their 
homelands, including Sakhalin and the Kurils. This dislocation encompasses disputes in 
land ownership, use of resources, even the rights of Ainu livelihood, cultural and political 
revival and freedom to live or even visit their collective homelands.2 As in the case of 
Hokkaido in 1872, these Northern Territories were declared terra nullius, and discussion 
revolved (and still does) around Wajin and Soviet/Russian representatives and 
governments. Neither party has consulted with, invited, or permitted Ainu people to take 
part in discussion relating to these lands.3
With the end of World War II, the stabilising of the Japanese economy, and the 
international push of human rights, the Ainu proved that they were not the dying race that 
many academics and journalists had labelled them within the bounds of Social Darwinist 
rhetoric, and strove to relocate themselves. Ever increasing contact with international 
Indigenous groups, and the United Nations, led the Ainu to become politically more 
united and organised than in the past. This led to renewed sense of identity (although this 
 
1 Mr. A. et al., personal communication with author, August 2006 (Japan). 
2 In 1998, eligibility for exchange without passports or visas was extended to academic, cultural and 
other field specialists. See, Northern Territories Countermeasures Headquarters Hokkaido 
Government, “Measures for the Reversion of the Northern Territories,” 
<http://www.pref.hokkaido.lg.jp/sm/hrt/hp-en/toriku-en.htm> (1 December 2006).  
3 See, “Getting Back Our Islands,” 7; Nomura, “Hoppo ryodo,” 150. 
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was not and is not for all the Ainu even today) and they are slowly taking back their 
history. 4 
Evaluation of how literature on the Northern Territories and Indigenous peoples 
in East Asia have developed while focusing on Japan brought further depth and 
understanding to the Northern Territories and the Ainu. The predominant scholarship on 
the Northern Territories is state-centered which works to eliminate the Ainu from 
participation in the dialogue. Ainu history was pushed into a local history in Hokkaido 
which, although rich in nature, tends not to move beyond local dialogue, into a national 
or colonial history, a similar situation to Native Studies in general. This issue has 
potential to affect third party initiatives in local, national and international arenas as the 
Smithsonian Institute demonstrated. Historiography of Indigenous peoples in the 
Japanese colonial empire is relevant to the Ainu and the Northern Territories and 
illustrates how approaches in History on the topic have changed, slowly working towards 
ever increasing inclusion of Indigenous peoples. This broadened the framework of the 
Northern Territories by placing it in colonial literature, which has lagged behind in 
addressing subjects of indigeneity especially in the case of Japan. 
A brief history of the Ainu explained their historical connection to the lands in 
question. The Kunashiri-Menashi battle was an important event in the history of the Kuril 
Islands, Hokkaido and for Ainu-Wajin relations in the Okhotsk region and deserves more 
attention in historical analysis of the disputed islands and Indigenous rights. Extending 
examination of the Ainu into historical lessons of the Åland settlement and of 
government and Ainu actions since World War II initiated historical inclusion of the 
Ainu in the Northern Territories issue. The Åland settlement provided opportunity to 
demonstrate that while historical events such as the Åland settlement may provide 
inspiration for resolution of contemporary issues, we need to critically evaluate such 
events to be sure that we do not adopt prior ideas without understanding their historical 
situation. The double standards of international versus domestic issues, as in the example 
of the pursuit of Japanese equality in 1919, are a phenomenon limited to neither history 
nor specifically Japan. Such double standards are a mechanism that the nation-state uses 
to ensure its own survival domestically and recognition as being legitimate and authentic 
internationally. Instead of looking at Åland as a successful solution by the League in 
1921, it is more valuable to look at it in terms of an eighty-five year process that has been 
ever evolving and adapting to new situations based on concepts of flexibility and 
compromise. 
Ainu and Wajin activities in regards to the Northern Territories are relational and 
in constant flux, and the Ainu were and are hardly a static, dead, or obsolete people. 
Globalisation, which some Indigenous peoples have denounced for its harmful effect to 
their people, culture, and way of life (environmental destruction), is now a mechanism 
which they use to preserve and strengthen their own way of life and relocate themselves 
within present and future discourse. According to Beier, the cause of their silence is part 
of a process that is rooted in the very discourse of an advanced form of colonialism, 
 
4 According to one Ainu man only about one percent of the Ainu populace is what may be coined as 
activists (Mr. A. et al., personal communication with Author, 3 January 2004 [Japan]).  
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whose hegemonic voice excludes all others. If we objectify the Ainu or other Indigenous 
groups, we deny their subjectivity in pursuance of academic freedom and objectivity. 
However, on the other hand, if we only recognise their subjective voice it is easy to treat 
them trivially and disqualify their voices. This seems to be an issue when we look at the 
difference in treatment the Ainu receive in international institutions like the UN versus 
how they are treated domestically by the government. It follows that there is need to 
reevaluate the foundation in which dialogue has been occurring between Indigenous 
peoples and states, and Indigenous peoples and academia, and work towards real 
conversation and dialogue. This requires flexibility, compromise and willingness of both 
sides to change. The Ainu have begun to study themselves, as well as those who study 
them, but yet they are not replied to. Mark Mowazer fittingly wrote that “Internationally 
as well as domestically, it seems as though history is more about forgetting the past than 
about learning from it.”5 It is necessary to think that the Ainu and other Indigenous 
peoples’ voices and history have something important to say, for example in the case of 
the Northern Territories, that is worthy of a response. 
Ainu, who are trying to involve themselves in this affair, want it to be clear to 
both Russian and Japanese governments that, no matter whose boundaries the four 
islands are in, three issues must be taken into account. Governments should not allow 
commercial fishing in the Okhotsk Sea, to ensure ocean resources are not depleted. Over 
fishing through commercial fishing, would hurt not only local fishermen in the area but 
also those of Hokkaido. Tourist activities, such as golfing and resort hotels would destroy 
the nature that is still in abundance in many parts of the islands. The islands should be left 
in their natural state. Ainu fishermen must be allowed to fish in the area.6
Tanaka Nobunao was under the impression that the direction in which the 
European Community and the UN have been moving symbolises an era where national 
sovereignty is becoming less important; a promising outlook for Ainu demands. He, 
along with organisations like Pirika Zenkoku, requests a return of even a part of the 
Northern Territories to the Ainu so they can create an Ainu Autonomous homeland.7
Arasaki Moritetsu, a former Chancellor of Ryukyu University, emphasises that 
the dispute must not be resolved in a similar manner as Okinawa after World War II, 
because it left behind an aggravated local population. Important questions he raised are: 
for what purpose is the return sought, and who is the return to benefit? For the case of 
Okinawa, it was a further intertwining of US-Japanese military, rather than sovereignty 
for the Okinawan people. A resolution to this issue must be first for the future 
development of friendship and cooperation between the two nations of Japan and Russia 
contributing to world peace. At the same time, the interests and welfare of both the 
original Ainu inhabitants and the old and new residents must be considered. He also 
warns that if the existence and claims of these people are ignored in the resolution, it will 
be a cause for considerable trouble in the future.8
5 Mowazar, “Minorities and the League of Nations,” 60. 
6 Nomura, “Hoppo ryodo,” 154 and Nomura, Ainu minzoku, 34.
7 AM, Ainu Moshiri, 103
8 Arasaki, Yawarakai shakai, 159-161. 
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Noel Ludwig has proposed ten possible solutions for this dispute, based on 
Russian, Wajin, international, and importantly, Ainu interests in the area.9 He compared 
of the Torres Strait Treaty of Australia and the Kaho’olawe and Moloka’i islands of 
Hawaii to the situation of Japan’s northern claims. Of the scenarios discussed, he 
discarded seven due to “obvious reasons” where interests of Japan, Russian or the Ainu 
are completely omitted.10 The options left include: 
 
(1) The return of all four islands to Japan, with a commitment by Japan to 
either transfer administration or outright ownership to the Ainu once an 
organised governing body is in place. 
(2) The same as (1), but encompassing only Shikotan and Habomai, while 
Etorofu and Kunashiri become UN trust zones or areas for joint 
development. 
(3) The same as (2), but only Etorofu and possibly Kunashir are set aside 
for Ainu ownership and/or administration.11 
Of these, the first would be most idealistic for the Ainu, but either (2) or (3) would be 
plausible, as they would also include the Ainu and other relevant peoples. Ludwig 
concluded by stating that if a solution such as these were agreed upon, it “would not only 
repair historical wrongs at little cost to these governments, but it would also provide a 
lasting legacy for the Japanese, Russian and Ainu leaders who accomplish it.”12 This is 
similar to the argument Wada Haruki made when he suggested turning one of the islands 
in the Habomai group to the Ainu. However, besides providing a “lasting legacy” for 
Russia, there seems to be little benefit for Russia without which no concession would be 
likely, especially since Russia is in a much different position now than in the early to 
mid-1990s due to its growing oil-based economy. 
Arasaki and Ludwig echo calls for flexibility in negotiations that Elisabeth 
Naucler of the Åland government stressed,13 which were also important in other land 
disputes, such as the Torres Strait Treaty and ever changing situations in the Åland 
Islands. In the case of the Torres Strait Treaty, “It was only after the adoption of an 
imaginative, broadly focused approach that a solution acceptable to all the parties 
 
9 Ludwig, “An Ainu Homeland,” 1994. 
10 Ludwig, “An Ainu Homeland,” 17. 
11 Ludwig, “An Ainu Homeland,” 17. These are numbers 7, 9 and 10 in the original. Akibe Tokuhei 
shares the same view as (2), see, “Getting Back Our Islands,” 8-9.
12 Ludwig, “An Ainu Homeland,” 24. 
13 Elisabeth Naucler, “Address on Behalf of the Government of the Åland Islands,” Autonomy – An 
Alternative to Secession? A Seminar on the Åland Islands as an Example for Peaceful Governance,
Seminar held in New York, March 15, 2001 (Helsinki: Publications of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
2001), 31-33;  Harrison, New Initiatives for Solving the “Northern Territories” Issue, 23-25. 
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concerned – not just governments but the people themselves – was achieved.”14 In the 
case of the Ainu and the Northern Territories, however, the issue is more complex, 
because the Ainu have had little scholastic or politically recognised legitimacy or worth 
in the debate. Before seriously considering an “Ainu solution,” it is necessary to begin to 
work the Ainu into the discourse as participants and not merely an area of academic 
inquiry. I agree with Nobuo Arai, at Hokkaido University and Noel Ludwig that neither 
the Japanese nor Russian governments are, at the present moment, ready to take any 
moral action toward the Ainu and the Northern Territories.15 Without political motivation 
concepts of morality are not likely to play any major role in decision making processes, 
nor does morality imply actions would be done for the Ainu with the Ainu, but to the 
Ainu for the nation-state, a continuation of dislocating the Ainu from any meaningful 
discourse. 
Despite both Japanese and Russian governments stating their wish to find a 
mutually acceptable solution, both sides continue to insist that their view on the matter 
will not change: Japan demands full return of the four islands, and Russia insists that 
control of the islands is not up for negotiation. Scholars and governments need to 
seriously analyse, and reconsider, potential solutions provided by Ainu and other 
academics such as Ludwig. Encouraging Ainu input into the matter acts to further bring 
all relevant material regarding the Northern Territories to the discussion table and works 
to enrich history and understanding of the Ainu, concepts of Indigenous peoples and 
Japan. 
Although the return movement and government sponsored state-centered rhetoric 
mainly uses arguments that embrace concepts of continuity and definitions, which work 
to provide stability, or at least a false sense of security, the perspective of focusing on the 
Ainu has brought forth a high degree of instability, conflict, and dislocation. There exists 
wide-ranging contradictions within the recorded history of Northeast Asia, as represented 
by the Northern Territories issue, and rather than dismiss one side of these contradictions 
and conflict to avoid such complexities, this thesis strove to address them. The history of 
Ainu in conflict resolution has been masked as a non-issue, in other words the Ainu do 
not exist, and if they do, certainly not as beneficial to the state, as Indigenous peoples or a 
people with anything meaningful to say or to be responded to. However, embracing the 
conflicts that bringing issues of the Ainu lead to challenges previous ways of thinking of 
disputes between governments and nations, and between peoples themselves. 
The Northern Territories issue is a dispute between two states, but this discourse 
moves beyond the state and state discourse, and nonetheless maintains a focal point in 
discussion either openly or pervades in the background of third party discourse as well. 
The nation-state becomes insecure when dealing with issues of indigeneity. Instead of 
addressing this insecurity, the nation-state and those who advocate it (either consciously 
 
14 Ludwig, “An Ainu Homeland,” 21, original in: H. Burmester, “The Torres Straight Treaty: Ocean 
Boundary Delimitation by Agreement,” American Journal of International Law, 76 (1982): 328. 
15 Nobuo Arai, personal communication with author, 26 December 2004 (Japan). Ludwig thinks that 
Russia is unlikely to make compromises on the Northern Territories, even to the Ainu, because of the 
strength of their oil economy (Noel Ludwig, email with author, 31 May 2006). 
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or unconsciously) such as academics and politicians, move to down play or disqualify the 
Indigenous voice, perspective and experience.16 In order to bring the Ainu into this topic 
we need to expand both time and space/place. Perhaps this is a problem, as it has been a 
trend to narrow both time and space/place by focusing on treaties, especially that of the 
San Francisco Peace Treaty, and even individual articles within the treaty limiting the 
time, and by focusing on one, two, three or four islands instead of viewing the area as a 
whole, we have limited the space. The bilateral nature that this issue developed into limits 
the place, giving it the impression of a localised issue between only Russia and Japan. In 
contracting or limiting these planes where legitimate and valuable discourse is currently 
able to take place, we lose the human component of history to differing degrees in local, 
regional/national and international levels, encouraging a history that reverts to state-
created and centered nationalistic arguments that disqualify non-state actors. There is a 
need to move beyond state-centered diplomatic history and be more inclusive of those 
Indigenous to the lands and current residents. The Northern Territories dispute is one 
example that brings out problems of dealing with identity and conflict resolution. 
Whether it is an issue of border demarcation, or a territorial dispute this issue has 
consequences beyond bilateral political negotiations. 
 
16 In relation to this Ackermann wrote, “Love of one’s nation is meant to be unquestioned so if you 
criticize your nation you have to do it, or at least have others think you do it, to make it stronger and 
improve it” (Robert Ackermann, Heterogeneities: Race, Gender, Class, Nation and State [Amherst: 
University of Massachusetts Press, 1996], 116). 
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Appendix 1: The Hokkaido Former Natives Protection Act 
(Law No. 27, March 1899) 
 
Article 1 
Those Former Natives of Hokkaido who are engaged, or wish to engage, in agriculture 




The land granted under the preceding Article is subject to the following conditions on 
rights of ownership. 
1 It may not be transferred except by inheritance. 
2 No rights of pledge, mortgage, lease or perpetual lease can be established. 
3 No easement (servitude) can be established without the permission of the 
Governor of Hokkaido. 
4 It cannot become the object of a lien or preferential right. The land granted in the 
preceding Article shall not be subject to land tax or local taxes until 30 years from 
the date of grant. Land already owned by Former Natives shall not be transferred 
except by inheritance, nor shall any of the real rights (jus in rem) referred to in 




Any part of the land granted under Article 1 shall be confiscated if it has not been 
cultivated after 15 years from the date of grant. 
 
Article 4 




Hokkaido Former Natives who are injured or ill but cannot afford medical treatment shall 
be provided with medical treatment or expenses of medicine. 
 
Article 6 
Hokkaido Former Natives who are too injured, ill, disabled, senile or young to provide 
for themselves shall be granted welfare under existing legislation and if they should die at 




Children of destitute Hokkaido Former Natives who are attending school will be provided 
withy tuition fees. 
 
Article 8 
Expenses incurred under Article 4 to 7 shall be appropriated from the proceeds of the 




An elementary school will be constructed with funds form the National Treasury in areas 
where there is a Former Native village. 
 
Article 10 
The Governor of Hokkaido will manage the communal funds of the Hokkaido Former 
Natives. 
 The Governor of Hokkaido, subject to the approval of the Home Minister, may 
dispose of the communal funds for the interests of the owners of the communal funds or 
may refuse to expend it if he deems necessary. 
 The communal funds managed by the Governor of Hokkaido shall be designated 
by the Governor of Hokkaido. 
 
Article 11 
The Governor of Hokkaido may issue police orders with regard to the protection of the 
Hokkaido Former Natives and may impose a fine of over 2 yen but no more than 25 yen 





This Act will become effective from 1 April 1899. 
 
Article 13 
Regulations relevant to the implementation of this Act shall be set by the Home Minister. 
 
(Source: Ainu Association of Hokkaido, Statement submitted to the Fifth Session of the 




Note: five revisions of the HFAPA have taken place, deleting Articles 9 and 11 in 
1937 and Articles 4, 5 and 6 in 1946.  
 
Appendix 2: New Law Concerning the Ainu People (Draft) 





The objectives of this legislation are to recognise the existence of the Ainu people with 
their own distinct culture in the state of Japan; for their ethnic pride to be respected under 
the Constitution of Japan; and for their ethnic rights to be guaranteed. 
 
Reasons for this legislation 
The Ainu people are a group with a unique history, possessing a distinct language and 
culture and maintaining a common economic lifestyle in Ainu Moshir (the land where 
Ainu live) – Hokkaido, Karafuto, and the Kurile Islands. The Ainu have held fast to their 
ethnic independence while struggling against the inhumane invasion and oppression of 
the Tokugawa Shogunate and the Matsumae Domain. 
 The Japanese government, having taken its first step to becoming a modern state 
with the Meiji Restoration, unilaterally incorporated Ainu Moshir into state territory as 
ownerless land without any negotiations with the indigenous Ainu. Furthermore, the 
government concluded the Sakhalin - Kurile Exchange Treaty with Imperial Russia and 
forced the Ainu in Karafuto and the Northern Kuriles to leave their homeland where they 
lived in peace. 
 The Ainu were robbed of their land, forests and seas. Taking deer or salmon 
became poaching and collecting firewood was deemed theft. On the other hand, Wajin 
immigrants flooded into the land, destructive developing began, and the very survival of 
the Ainu people was threatened. 
 The dignity of the Ainu people was trampled underfoot by a policy of assimilation 
based on discrimination and prejudice. The Ainu were confined to granted lands, and 
their freedom to move or pursue an occupation other than agriculture was restricted, 
while their distinct language was stolen from them through education. 
 The postwar agrarian reform extended to the so-called Former Native allotments, 
and the trend in agricultural modernisation scattered the poor small-scale Ainu farmers, 
destroying the Kotan [villages] one by one. 
 Several tens of thousand Ainu are now said to live in Hokkaido, with several 
thousand more outside Hokkaido. Most of them are not guaranteed equal opportunities 
for employment due to unfair racial prejudice and discrimination. Excluded from the 
126
modern corporate sector, the Ainu form a group of the disguised unemployed and their 
lifestyle is usually insecure. Discrimination increases poverty, while poverty endangers 
further discrimination. The present sees widening gaps in such areas as living conditions 
and educational advancements for children. 
 The so-called Hokkaido Utari Welfare Countermeasures that are presently being 
implemented are no more than a random collection of legislation and regulations. Not 
only do they lack coordination, but, above all, they obscure the responsibility of the state 
towards the Ainu people. 
 What is demanded here is the establishment of a thorough and comprehensive 
system predicated on the restoration of the ethnic rights of the Ainu, to eliminate racial 
discrimination, promote ethnic education and culture, and provide a policy for economic 
independence. 
 The issue of the Ainu people is a shameful historical legacy that arose during the 
process of establishing Japan as a modern state. It is also an important issue with 
implications for the guarantee of basic human rights under the Constitution. It is the 
responsibility of the government to resolve the situation. Recognising the problem as one 
concerning all citizens of Japan, the government must abolish the humiliating and 
discriminatory Hokkaido Former Natives Protection Act and enact new legislation for the 
Ainu people. This legislation must apply to all Ainu living in Japan. 
 
Section 1: Basic human rights 
The basic human rights of the Ainu have been clearly violated over the years in the 
educational, social and economic spheres by both concrete and intangible racial prejudice. 
 With regard to this, the new legislation for the Ainu people is based on the 
fundamental concept of elimination of discrimination against the Ainu people. 
 
Section 2: The right to political participation 
Since the Meiji Restoration, under the official designations of ‘Native’ or ‘Former 
Native’, the Ainu people have received discriminatory treatment different form that 
accorded to other Japanese. There is no need to discuss the pre-Meiji period here. To 
overcome this humiliating situation and correctly reflect the demands of the Ainu people 
in national and local politics, the government should immediately put in place a policy to 
guarantee seats for Ainu representation in the National Diet and local assemblies. 
 
Section 3: Education and culture 
Institutional discrimination against the Ainu under the Hokkaido Former Natives 
Protection Act not only clearly violates the human rights of the Ainu but also encourages 
discrimination against the Ainu among the public. This has hindered the normal 
development of the Ainu people in education and culture and contributed to their inferior 
situation socially and economically. 
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The government must take the position that breaking through this current situation 
is one of the most important issues in a policy for the Ainu people and implement the 
following policies. 
 
1 The implementation of a general education policy for Ainu children. 
2 The planned introduction of Ainu language lessons for Ainu children. 
3 The implementation of a policy to completely eliminate discrimination against the 
Ainu, both within the school system and in education in society. 
4 The initiation of courses in Ainu language, culture and history in university education. 
Moreover, the employment of Ainu with ability to conduct such courses in various 
fields as professors, associate professors, or lecturers, regardless of existing 
legislation. The establishment of a special admissions system for Ainu children to 
enter university and take such courses. 
5 The establishment of a national research facility specialising in the study and 
maintenance of Ainu language and culture. Ainu should actively participate as 
researchers. Previous research has been fundamentally flawed since it was 
unilaterally conducted without respect to the wishes of the Ainu and turned the Ainu 
into so-called objects of research. This must be corrected. 
6 The reinvestigation of the existence of the problems surrounding the contemporary 
transmission and preservation of Ainu culture, with a view to perfecting methods. 
 
Section 4: Agriculture, fishing, forestry, commercial and manufacturing activity 
The Hokkaido Former Natives Protection Act stipulates a grant of up to 15,000 tsubo 
(about 5 hectares) per household for those engaged in agriculture. However, it must be 
recognised that Ainu difficulties in agriculture clearly result from the presence of 
discriminatory regulations not applied to other Japanese. The Hokkaido Former Natives 
Protection Act must be abolished and a policy appropriate for the modern age established. 
 The present situation with regard to fishing, forestry, commercial and 
manufacturing activity is that because the same lack of understanding of the conditions of 
Ainu life exists, they have been ignored and no appropriate policy implemented. 
 To promote the economic independence of the Ainu, the following necessary 
conditions should therefore be put in place. 
 
Agriculture 
1 The guarantee of and appropriate acreage 
 
Since Hokkaido agriculture can be broadly classified into wet-rice cultivation, arable 
cropping, and dairy farming, a fair and appropriate acreage must be guaranteed 
according to the local agricultural situation. 
 
2 Provisions and modernisation of the productive base 
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Projects to improve the productive base for Ainu-managed agricultural enterprises 





1 The granting of fishing rights 
 
For those managing fishing enterprises or engaged in fishing, such rights should be 
granted to those who fish them regardless of the presence of existing fishing rights. 
 
2 Provision and modernisation of the productive base 
 
Projects to improve the productive base for Ainu-managed fishing enterprises should 





1 The promotion of forestry 
 
Necessary measures should be implemented for the promotion of forestry for those 
who manage or are engaged in forestry enterprises. 
 
Manufacturing and commercial 
1 The promotion of manufacturing and commerce 
 
Necessary measures should be implemented for the promotion of commercial or 
manufacturing enterprises managed by Ainu. 
 
Labour policy 
1 The enlargement of employment opportunities 
Historical circumstances have clearly chronically lowered the economic position of 
the Ainu people. One manifestation of this is the large number of seasonal workers 
who can be regarded as disguised unemployed. The government should actively 
promote a labour policy to widen opportunities for employment for the Ainu people. 
 
Section 5: Fund for Ainu self-reliance 
The so-called Hokkaido Utari Welfare Countermeasures are supported from the budgets 
of the Hokkaido and national governments, but these protective measures should be 
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abolished and a fundamental policy must be implemented to make the Ainu people self-
reliant. The rights to guaranteed political participation, the promotion of education and 
culture, and the improvement in the productive base in agriculture, fishing and other 
enterprises should be considered part of this. Of these policies, some should be 
undertaken on the responsibility of national, prefecture, or municipal authorities, while 
others should be undertaken under the responsibility of the Ainu people. In the later case 
in particular, a fund called the Self Reliance Fund of the Ainu People should be 
established. This fund should be under independent Ainu management.  
 The government should be responsible for providing resources for the Fund.  
 The Fund should be established at the latest by 1987, when the second seven year 
stage of the welfare policy is completed. 
 
Section 6: Consultative bodies 
To justify and continually reflect Ainu policies in national and local politics, the 
following consultative bodies should be established. 
 
1 A Central Consultative Council for Ainu Policy (provisional title) should be 
established, directly attached to the Prime Minister’s Office or associated with it. 
Members should consist of relevant State Ministers, representatives of the Ainu 
people, Diet members representing all parties from both Upper and Lower Houses, 
experienced scholars, business leaders and others. 
2 Along with this consultative body at the national level, a Hokkaido Consultative 
Council for Ainu Policy (provisional title) should be established. Composition 
should follow the same lines as the Central Consultative Council. 
 
(Source: Senkusha no Tsudoi, No. 37 (October 1984), pp. 4-6; Ainu Association of 
Hokkaido, Statement Submitted to the Fifth Session of the United Nations Working 
Group on Indigenous Populations, Geneva, August 1987, Material 10.)  
 
Appendix 3: Law for the Promotion of the Ainu Culture and 
for the Dissemination and Advocacy for the Traditions of the 
Ainu and the Ainu Culture 
 
Law No. 52, May 14, 1997 
Amendment: Law No. 160, Dec. 22, 1999 
 
Article 1 (purpose) 
This law aims to realize the society in which the ethnic pride of the Ainu people is 
respected and to contribute to the development of diverse cultures in our country, 
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by the implementation of the measures for the promotion of Ainu culture 
(hereafter called “Ainu Traditions”), the spread of knowledge related to Ainu 
Traditions, and the education of the nation, referring to the situation of Ainu 
traditions and culture from which the Ainu people find their ethnic pride.  
 
Article 2 (definition) 
“The Ainu Culture” in this law means the Ainu language and cultural properties 
such as music, dance, crafts, and other cultural properties which have been 
inherited by the Ainu people, and other cultural properties developed from these.  
 
Article 3 (duties of the national and local governments) 
The national government should make efforts to promote measures for the nurture 
of those who will inherit Ainu culture, the fruitfulness of educational activities 
concerning Ainu Traditions, the promotion of the monitor and study of the Ainu 
culture, which will contribute to its promotion and other measures to promote 
Ainu culture, as well as providing advice and support to the local governments 
necessary for measures to promote Ainu culture.  
2. The local governments should make an effort to implement measures to 
promote the Ainu culture in accordance with the social situations of their areas.  
Article 4 (respect to be taken into account in the implementation of this law) 
The national and local governments should respect the autonomous spirit and 
ethnic pride of the Ainu people in the implementation of the measures to promote 
Ainu culture.  
 
Article 5 (fundamental policy) 
The Minister of Land, Infrastructure and Transport and the Minister of Education, 
Culture, Sports, Science and Technology are required to establish the fundamental 
policy for the measures to promote Ainu culture (hereafter called “the 
Fundamental Policy”).  
2. The following should be established in the Fundamental Policy.  
(1) The fundamental matters for the promotion of Ainu culture  
(2) Matters related to measures for the promotion of Ainu culture  
(3) Matters related to measures for the spread of knowledge relevant to Ainu 
Traditions, and the education campaign for the nation  
(4) Matters related to the monitor and study of Ainu culture which contribute to 
its promotion  
(5) Important matters related to the respect which should be put into account in 
the implementation of the measures for the promotion of Ainu culture  
3. The Minister of Land, Infrastructure and Transport and the Minister of 
Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology are required to consult with 
the heads of relevant administrative bodies and to listen to the comments of the 
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local administrative bodies concerned provided in the 1st provision of the 
following article.  
4. The Minister of Land, Infrastructure and Transport and the Minister of 
Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology are required to announce the 
Fundamental Policy and/or the amendment with no delay when 
established/amended, as well as dispatch them to the local administrative bodies 
provided in the 1st provision of the following article.  
Article 6 (fundamental program) 
The local administrative bodies, appointed by national government ordinance, are 
recognized as responsible for the comprehensive implementation of measures to 
promote Ainu culture referring to the local social situations in the regions 
(hereafter called “the Prefectures Concerned”) and should establish the 
fundamental program for measures to promote Ainu culture in the Prefectures 
Concerned.  
2. In the fundamental program, the following should be determined:  
(1) Fundamental Policy for the promotion of Ainu culture  
(2) Matters on the content of the measures to promote Ainu culture  
(3) Matters on the content of the measures to spread the knowledge relevant to 
Ainu Tradition to residents  
(4) Significant matters which should be taken into account in the implementation 
of the measures to promote Ainu culture  
3. The Prefectures Concerned are required to publicly announce and submit their 
fundamental program to the Minister of Land, Infrastructure and Transport and 
the Minister of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology immediately 
when established/amended.  
4. The Minister of Land, Infrastructure and Transport and the Minister of 
Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology should make effort to 
provide necessary advice, recommendations, and information to the Prefectures 
Concerned in order to facilitate the establishment of the fundamental programs 
and the smooth implementation of the programs.  
Article 7 (appointment) 
Following the acceptance of applications from corporations which had been 
previously established to promote Ainu culture under the civil law (act #89/1896) 
Article #34, the Minister of Land, Infrastructure and Transport and the Minister of 
Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology will appoint only one 
corporation in the country, and recognize this corporation as proper to carry out 
fairly and surely the duties provided in the following article.  
2. The Minister of Land, Infrastructure and Transport and the Minister of 
Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology are required to announce the 
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name, address of the office of the corporation (hereafter called “Appointed 
Corporation”), after the appointment according to previous provisions.  
3. The Appointed Corporation is required to notify any plan to change its name 
and address to the Minister of Land, Infrastructure and Transport and the Minister 
of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology.  
4. The Minister of Land, Infrastructure and Transport and the Minister of 
Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology are required to announce the 
changed matter provided by the previous provision when they receive notice.  
Article 8 (duties) 
The Appointed Corporation is required to implement the following duties:  
1. Duties for the nurture of those who will inherit Ainu culture and other duties 
relevant to the promotion of Ainu culture  
2. Publishing activities related to Ainu Traditions and other campaigns  
3. Research and monitoring activities which contribute to the promotion of Ainu 
culture  
4. Providing support such as advice, subsidies, and other support to those who 
conduct the promotion of Ainu culture, the campaign activities related to Ainu 
Tradition, and research and monitoring activities.  
5. Other duties which are necessary for the promotion of Ainu Culture not listed 
in the previous provisions.  
Article 9 (implementation plan) 
The Appointed Corporation is required to make an implementation plan and a 
budget, and submit them to the Minister of Land, Infrastructure and Transport and 
the Minister of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology every year, 
according to the statutes of the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport and 
the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology. In case of 
amendments, the same procedure should be taken.  
2. The implementation plan should be made in accordance with the content of the 
Fundamental Policy.  
3. The Appointed Corporation is required to make a report on the measures and a 
settlement of accounts, and submit them to the Minister of Land, Infrastructure 
and Transport and the Minister of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and 
Technology every year, according to the statutes of the Ministry of Land, 
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Infrastructure and Transport and the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, 
Science and Technology.  
Article 10 (the requisition of reports and inspection) 
The Minister of Land, Infrastructure and Transport and the Minister of Education, 
Culture, Sports, Science and Technology may require a report of the duties of the 
Person-in-law Appointed, dispatch their officials to the office of the Person-in-
law Appointed to inspect the conduct of duties under the act, notes of account and 
documents, and question persons concerned, as far as necessary to implement this 
law.  
2. The officials who inspect the office under the previous provision have to carry 
official identification, and show this identification when requested by persons 
concerned.  
3. The implementation of the inspection shall not be interpreted as a criminal 
investigation.  
Article 11 (the order to improve) 
The Minister of Land, Infrastructure and Transport and the Minister of Education, 
Culture, Sports, Science and Technology may order to the Person-in-law 
Appointed to implement measures necessary for improvement, when recognized 
as necessary to improve the conduct of duties provided in Article 8.  
 
Article 12 (dismissal of the appointed body) 
The Minister of Land, Infrastructure and Transport and the Minister of Education, 
Culture, Sports, Science and Technology may dismiss the appointment when the 
Person-in-law Appointed violates the order provided by the previous provisions.  
2. The Minister of Land, Infrastructure and Transport and the Minister of 
Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology are required to publicly 
announce the dismissal of the appointed body.  
Article 13 (the penalty) 
Any person who refuses to make a report or makes a false report as required by 
the first provision of Article 10, or who refuses or interrupts the inspection 
provided by the same provision, or who does not answer or gives false answers to 
questions, may be imposed a penalty of less than 200,000 (two hundred thousand 
yen).  
2. Not only the person who commits a violation under the previous provision, but 
also the same penalty may be imposed upon the Person-in-Law, when its 
representative, deputy, or employee commits a violation under the previous 
provision related to the duties of the Person-in-Law.  
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Supplementary Rules (excerpt) 
Article 1 (date of validity) 
This law will be enforced from a date which shall be provided by government 
ordinance within 3 months from its promulgation.  
 
Article 2 (abolishment of the Hokkaido Ex-Aborigines Protection Act) 
The following acts will be abolished:  
1. The Hokkaido Ex-Aborigines Protection Act (#27/1899)  
2. The Asahikawa Ex-Aborigines Protection Land Disposition Act (#9/1934)  
Article 3 (temporary measures for the abolishment of the Hokkaido Ex-Aborigines 
Protection Act) 
The Governor of Hokkaido should put it under its control the Hokkaido Ex-
Aborigines Common Properties (called “the Common Property” in the next 
provision) which have been controlled under the 1st provision of Article 10 of the 
Hokkaido Ex-Aborigines Protection Act (hereafter called “the Ex-Protection Act”) 
until the return of the properties to the owners as provided by from the following 
to the 4th provision, or the reversion to the Person-in-law Appointed or the 
Government of Hokkaido as provided in the 5th provision.  
2. The Governor of Hokkaido has to publicly announce matters in the official 
gazette provided by the ordinance of the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare 
for each property appointed by the 3rd provision of the Article 10 of the Ex-
Protection Act.  
3. The owners of the common properties may request the return of the properties 
from the Governor of Hokkaido within 1 year from the announcement as provided 
by the ordinance of the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare.  
4. The Governor of Hokkaido may not return the properties to the owners after the 
term, except a case in which all of the owners make a request as required by the 
provision.  
5. In the case that the owners of the common properties do not request the return 
within the term provided in the 3rd provision, the common properties will revert 
to the Person-in-law Appointed (in case that the appointment provided by the 1st 
provision of the Article 7 has not been carried out at the time of passage of the 
term, to Hokkaido).  
6. In the case that the common properties revert to the Person-in-law Appointed, 
the Person-in-Law should apply the properties to expenses related to the duties for 
the promotion of Ainu culture.  
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The supplementary resolution to the legislative bill for the promotion of the Ainu 
Culture and for the dissemination and advocacy for Ainu traditions and culture 
(Cabinet Committee of the House of Councilors and the House of Representatives) 
• Referring to the historical and social circumstance into which the Ainu have been 
put, the Government should take appropriate measures for the following matters, 
in order to find further national understanding regarding the promotion of Ainu 
culture.  
• To make efforts to respect the autonomous spirit and reflect the will of the Ainu 
sufficiently in measures to promote Ainu culture, in order to contribute to the 
realization of a society in which the ethnic pride of the Ainu is well respected  
• To provide further support for the promotion of Ainu culture, for the respect of 
the ethnic pride of the Ainu and for the development of diverse cultures in our 
country  
• To make efforts, regarding advocacy of human rights of the Ainu and awareness 
raising of this people, to take necessary measures by respecting the ratification of 
the “Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination” and 
the spirit of the “U.N. Decade for Human Rights Education” etc.  
• To make efforts to disseminate the knowledge about Ainu traditions, including the 
indigenous nature of the Ainu, which is a historical fact  
• To continue to expand support for the existing Hokkaido Utari Welfare Measures 
(Source:  Foundation for Research and Promotion of Ainu Culture, 
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